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Abstract
I argue that the philosophical discussion over William Rowe‘s evidential
argument from evil needs to take a closer look at the epistemology of religious trust—i.e.,
the rationality of the theist‘s resilient confidence in God‘s goodness in the face of
inscrutable evils. This would constitute a significant change of emphasis in the current
literature away from ―skeptical theism,‖ the in vogue response to Rowe‘s argument
among theistic philosophers today. I argue that the skeptical theist approach is inadequate
for two reasons. First, in trying to defeat even the atheist‘s grounds for accepting Rowe‘s
argument, skeptical theists seem to seriously underestimate the degree of skepticism they
must motivate all reasonable persons to take regarding the human competency to detect
God-justifying reasons for allowing evils. Second, I show that even a successful skeptical
theism would be inadequate to defend the theist‘s actual doxastic stance towards
inscrutable evils—a stance that goes beyond mere skepticism of that human competency.
In place of the skeptical theist approach, I offer theists the ―religious trust‖ approach—a
way of defending theism against Rowe‘s argument that focuses solely on defending the
rationality of the theist‘s committed trust in God. I then explore the nature and
epistemology of committed interpersonal trust more generally before turning my attention
to religious trust in particular. I argue in the end that there is enough promising (from the
theist‘s point of view) underexplored territory in the epistemology of religious trust to
render too hasty the view that the world‘s inscrutable evils make the theist‘s trust in God
unjustifiable. I think my religious trust approach thus affords theists a viable alternative
to skeptical theism in defending the rationality of theism against Rowe‘s evidential
argument. Importantly, it is also an approach that is willing to uphold, in a way skeptical
theists refuse to do, just how powerful a defense of atheism Rowe‘s argument truly is.
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Chapter 1:
The Recent Debate over Inscrutable Evils

1

Chapter Introduction
The year 1979 was marked by a significant resurgence of evil—not in the streets
but in the philosophy of religion. It was the year that William Rowe offered a rejuvenated
version of the argument from evil against the existence of God.1 His argument is still the
most talked about argument from evil among philosophers of religion today. 2 The
primary aim of this dissertation is to argue that to best defend the rationality of theistic
belief against this argument from evil, theistic philosophers would do well to set aside the
current in vogue response to it, namely what has been dubbed the ―skeptical theist‖
approach, in favor of a new and promising response I will call the ―religious trust‖
approach. My goal in this opening chapter is to reconstruct the debate between
proponents of Rowe‘s evidential argument from evil and its skeptical theist critics. In so

1

William Rowe, ―The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism,‖ American Philosophical Quarterly
16 (1979): 335-41.
2
The most prominent alternative version of the argument from evil is Paul Draper‘s ―abductive‖ argument.
See Paul Draper, ―Pain and Pleasure: An Evidential Problem for Theists,‖ Nous 23 (1989): 331-50, and
idem ―More Pain and Pleasure: A Reply to Otte,‖ in Christian Faith and the Problem of Evil, ed. Peter van
Inwagen (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 2004), 41-54. Draper attempts to avoid making Rowe‘s
controversial claim (to be discussed shortly) that there exist evils for which an omnipotent, omnibenevolent
being would not likely be justified in permitting. Draper argues that we should accept atheism simply
because the best explanation of the amount, types, and distribution of evils found in our world is that these
are the workings of natural processes absent any supernatural creator, an explanation he dubs the
―Hypothesis of Indifference‖ (HI).
Michael Bergmann has recently offered a compelling argument for thinking that Draper is, after
all, committed to the claim that there are evils for which an omnipotent, omnibenevolent being would likely
not be justified in permitting. See his ―Skeptical Theism and the Problem of Evil‖ in The Oxford Handbook
of Philosophical Theology, ed. Thomas P. Flint and Michael C. Rea (Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press,
2009), 383-86. The thrust of Bergmann‘s argument is that since Draper wants to argue that the probability
of the world‘s evils (E) is higher on HI than it is on theism, he cannot assign a relatively low probability to
E on theism without claiming that there are evils among E that the theistic God would not likely allow. This
argument is also made independently in a recent essay by Gregory Ganselle and Yena Lee. See their
―Evidential Problems of Evil‖ in God and Evil: The Case for God in a World Filled With Pain, ed. Chad
Meister and James K. Dew Jr. (Downers Grove, IL: Intervarsity Press, 2013), 20-23. The question of
whether Draper‘s argument constitutes a significant alternative to Rowe‘s is beyond the scope of the
dissertation. My focus will remain on Rowe‘s argument.
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doing, I will show that much of the debate has focused on an inadequately formulated
version of the background inference used to support the controversial premise of Rowe‘s
argument and that once this background inference is adequately formulated, it becomes
clear that the skeptical theist‘s strategy for blocking that inference must endorse a rather
extreme skepticism that has not been sufficiently motivated. I will explain how this way
of criticizing the skeptical theist‘s approach constitutes a more direct, frontal assault on
skeptical theism than do the criticisms that feature more heavily in the philosophical
literature. This is not to say, however, that those other criticisms are not very serious
ones. To the contrary, they are quite thorny problems in their own right, which skeptical
theists have proven to have a difficult time resolving. So after rounding out the chapter
with a brief summary of these extant criticisms, I will conclude that the sum of issues
raised in this chapter strongly suggest that theistic philosophers need to explore
alternative approaches to skeptical theism in dealing with Rowe‘s argument from evil.
My hope is that they will want to seriously consider the religious trust approach I begin
constructing in the rest of this dissertation.

Rowe’s Evidential Argument from Evil
Nowadays, arguments from evil are often categorized as being either ―logical‖
arguments from evil or ―evidential‖ arguments from evil, and Rowe‘s argument is
considered the paradigmatic version of the newer ―evidential‖ variety. It is not clear,
however, that arguments from evil can be neatly separated into these two categories,
especially considering there does not seem to be any agreement about what precisely the
3

distinction is between them. Some think of this contrast as being between arguments that
seek to logically prove the non-existence of God based on the existence of evil versus
those that only seek to use the existence of evil to provide strong evidence against his
existence. Others think of it as the contrast between arguments that depend on a priori
premises versus those that depend on a posteriori premises. Still others view it as
between those arguments that are logically deductive versus those that are logically
inductive. But as Daniel Howard-Snyder points out in his recent commentary of this
distinction, there is much that is misleading in categorizing arguments from evil in any of
these ways.

Evidential arguments involve quite a bit of logic, both deductive and
inductive...and every undeniably logical argument is superlative evidence against
theism, if it is a good argument. Moreover, every undeniably logical argument
[from evil] has a premise that can only be known a posteriori, by empirical means,
namely, a premise about evil, e.g., that it exists. And every undeniably evidential
argument has a premise that can only be known a priori, e.g., a premise about
what counts as good evidence or what we rightly expect from God in the way of
preventing evil. And many ―inductive‖ arguments from evil are, on the face of it,
deductively structured.3

I do not think much hangs on this terminological distinction anyway. The more important
3

Daniel Howard-Snyder ―Introduction: The Evidential Argument from Evil‖ in The Evidential Argument
from Evil. ed D. Howard Snyder. (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1996): xii.

4

distinction is, of course, between those arguments from evil we should accept versus
those we should not. And there is good reason to think Rowe‘s argument from evil
compels our acceptance much more strongly than do prior versions of the argument. I
think this major turn of events can be appreciated most easily by considering the way in
which Rowe‘s argument mirrors previous arguments from evil in logical form yet shifts
the focus of the debate from one of its two major premises to the other.
Consider first the paradigmatic member of the so-called logical arguments from
evil famously defended by J.L. Mackie in the middle of the twentieth century.4

Mackie’s Logical Argument from Evil
1) If God exists, evil would not exist.
2) Evil exists.
 3) God does not exist.

Here the first premise is an a priori claim about the logical incompatibility of two
describable states of affairs (i.e., the existence of God and the existence of evil) and the
second premise is an a posteriori existential claim affirming the existence of one of those
states of affairs (i.e., the existence of evil in the actual world). It was, for obvious reasons,
the argument's a priori premise that was always the subject of serious debate. After all,
no reasonable theist wants to deny the existence of evil (where ―evil‖ is just used as a
synonym for ―suffering‖). They do, however, very much want to deny the logical

4

See J. L. Mackie, ―Evil and Omnipotence,‖ Mind 64, no. 254 (April 1955): 200-12.
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incompatibility of evil with the existence of God. Why, they ask, should we think God
could not possibly exist alongside evil? Atheologians proved unable to satisfactorily
answer that question. After all, it certainly seems logically possible that God would have
some justifying reasons for allowing the existence of evil.5 In fact, theists were able to go
beyond merely arguing for this possibility and offered compelling arguments for the
overall value of a world containing evil.6 Seeking to avoid this easy out for the theist,
proponents of the argument from evil sometimes beefed up the a priori premise to
something like

1*) If God exists, vast amounts of evils would not exist.
or,
1**) If God exists, horrendous evils would not exist.

and modified the second premise of the argument accordingly.
These versions of the argument are stronger than Mackie's. Sensible theists do not
want to deny the existence of vast amounts of evils and horrendous evils any more than
they should deny the existence of evil as such, and it is harder to see why a perfect God
would prefer a world containing all those evils as opposed to one with lesser amounts and
less severe types of evil. But again, the bar for responding to the argument from evil was
set too low; theists needed only argue for the logical possibility that God could have
5

This possibility is masterfully argued for in Alvin Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil (Grand Rapids:
William B. Eerdmans, 1978).
6
In addition to free-will theodicies, John Hick‘s ―soul-building‖ theodicy was particularly influential. See
John Hick, Evil and the God of Love (New York: Harper and Row, 1966); reissued 2nd ed with a new
preface by John Hick (New York: Palgrave Mcmillan, 2010).
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justifying reasons for allowing vast amounts of evils and for allowing horrendous evils.
Their efforts were aided again by those who offered more or less plausible arguments for
the overall value of a world containing both vast amounts of evils as well as horrendous
evils. The point I wish to emphasize here is that it was the a priori premise—the premise
about the logical incompatibility of two states of affairs—that was always the subject of
debate prior to Rowe.
The major shift effected by Rowe's version of the argument from evil is not due,
contrary to what one might expect from the common nomenclature, to any change in the
logical structure of his argument relative to the so-called ―logical‖ arguments. He still
argues for the non-existence of God on the basis of an a priori incompatibility premise
according to which the existence of God is incompatible with the existence of some other
state of affairs involving evil and an existential premise to the effect that this describable
state of affairs obtains in the actual world. Here now is Rowe‘s original formulation of his
argument, though I have reversed the order of his two premises so that they parallel those
in the logical argument from evil above.

Rowe's Evidential Argument from Evil
4) An omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence
of any intense suffering it could, unless it could not do so without thereby
losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.
5) There exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient
being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or
7

permitting some evil equally bad or worse.
 6) There does not exist an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being.7

Using the now-accepted term ―gratuitous evil‖ to refer to the sorts of evils described in
(4) and the term 'God' in place of ―an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being‖ the
argument can be streamlined as follows:

7) If God exists, gratuitous evils would not exist. [incompatibility premise]
8) Gratuitous evils exist. [existential premise]
 9) God does not exist.

This streamlined formulation of Rowe‘s argument from evil will be the working
formulation of the evidential argument from evil for the remainder of this dissertation. I
will sometimes simply refer to it as ―the evidential argument.‖ Note that I will also often
refer to a proponent of the evidential argument as ―the atheist‖ for short, but it must be
underlined that one can be an atheist without thinking Rowe‘s argument for atheism is
successful.
Notice the equivalence in structure between Rowe‘s argument and Mackie's
argument. Despite this similarity, however, this evidential argument from evil is a game
changer. It has shifted virtually the entire debate over the argument from evil away from
the a priori incompatibility premise and squarely onto the existential premise. This is

7

Rowe, ―The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism,‖ 336.
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because most all theists are prepared to grant that a perfect God cannot coexist with evils
that he does not need to allow for the attainment of greater goods, which renders the a
priori premise innocuous to most parties to the debate.8 Theists now take aim at the
existential premise in its new, revised form. Why, they ask, should we agree that
gratuitous evils exist?
This time, however, the proponent of the argument from evil has a much better
answer to the theist's question. That answer is, ―Well, it sure looks like gratuitous evils
exist.‖ To support their claim, defenders of the evidential argument point to the numerous
instances of suffering for which there does not appear to be any necessary connection
between the allowance of that instance of suffering and the preservation or obtainment of
some redeeming, outweighing good. In other words, the proponent of the argument from
evil now has at his disposal in defending the controversial premise of his argument the
vast sum of human experiences with evils that appear to be gratuitous. Consider one
famous example of such suffering from Rowe:

8

Peter van Inwagen points out, however, that if God needs to allow evils for greater goods, he will have to
draw an arbitrary line somewhere to demarcate the amount and sorts of evils he will allow. See his The
Problem of Evil (Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press, 2006), 103-6. For example, if we suppose that God
must allow a good deal of suffering of type T for the sake of some greater good, van Inwagen‗s point is that
whatever good is being achieved by his allowances of the number n of T-sufferings he presently allows
would likely be just as well achieved by his allowing n-1 T-sufferings. But due to the inherent vagueness of
‗the amounts and types of evils needed for obtaining these greater goods,‘ the line must, says van Inwagen,
be drawn arbitrarily at some point within a certain appropriate range and thus even a perfect God will have
to admit of some ―gratuitous‖ suffering in this sense. In what follows, I assume the proponent of Rowe‘s
argument can make reasonable accommodations for van Inwagen‘s very interesting point (perhaps simply
by stipulating that by ―gratuitous evils,‖ he means evils that go beyond what could be excused on the basis
of the vagueness of necessity.)
There are other philosophers who take themselves to be disputing the incompatibility premise on
other grounds, but on pp. 17-8, I explain why they are mistaken.

9

Suppose in some distant forest lightning strikes a dead tree, resulting in a forest
fire. In the fire a fawn is trapped, horribly burned, and lies in terrible agony for
several days before death relieves its suffering. So far as we can see, the fawn‘s
intense suffering is pointless. For there does not appear to be any greater good
such that the prevention of the fawn‘s suffering would require either the loss of
that good or the occurrence of an evil equally bad or worse.9

Of course, all the deer to ever burn in forest fires combined are, sad as it is, only a
drop in the bucket of evils that seem to many folks to be unnecessary for greater goods.
The general upshot of Rowe‘s shift to making the incompatibility premise of the
argument from evil the uncontroversial premise and the existential premise the
controversial one is that proponents of the argument from evil are now in position to
provide, as they see it, a fair amount of hands-on evidence for their argument's
controversial premise by pointing to allowances of evils that seem to be without
justification.
Matters are not quite as easy for proponents of this evidential argument, however,
as merely pointing to the existence of terrible sufferings. The question of whether
gratuitous evils exist—i.e., evils that are such that their allowances by an omnipotent,
omniscient being are not necessary for greater goods—is not something that can be
answered completely a posteriori; it requires a thoroughly philosophical judgment as to
whether an omnipotent, omniscient being‘s allowances of certain evils really would be

9

Rowe, ―The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism,‖ 336.
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necessary for greater goods. It is this philosophical judgment that has been the center of
controversy for the last few decades among philosophers discussing the problem of evil.
Rowe‘s assertion that gratuitous evils exist—unlike Mackie‘s assertion that evils as such
exist—goes beyond making an uncontroversial empirical observation and asserts a
philosophical claim that must be evaluated on philosophical terms.

Inscrutable Evils as Evidence of Gratuitous Evils
It is important, then, to clarify the precise nature of the atheist's evidence for the
philosophically-loaded premise that there exist gratuitous evils. In rehearsing an informal
defense of that premise above, I used a common but rather unhelpful way of putting the
point. I spoke, as Rowe and other commentators sometimes do, as if the evidence for
gratuitous evils comes simply from the fact that many evils (e.g., the burned deer) appear
to us be gratuitous. 10 But to suggest that the claim 'Some evils appear to be gratuitous'

10

See, for example, Justin McBrayer‘s formulation of the argument for gratuitous evils in his excellent
recent survey article on skeptical theism: ―At least some of the evils in our world appear gratuitous.
Therefore, at least some of the evils in our world are gratuitous‖ [original emphasis]. See Justin McBrayer,
―Skeptical Theism,‖ Philosophy Compass 5, no 7 (2010): 612. Likewise, Michael Peterson‘s formulation of
the argument for gratuitous evils in his student-friendly work on the problem of evil reads ―It appears that
some evils are connected to no outweighing goods. . . [therefore] . . .It is reasonable to believe that some
evils are not connected to outweighing goods.‖ See Michael L. Peterson, God and Evil: an Introduction to
the Issues (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998), 75.
The ―appearance‖ formulation of the argument is also the focus of a recent exchange between
Trent Dougherty and Jonathan Matheson in Faith and Philosophy that discusses the skeptical theist attack
in light of so-called ―common-sense epistemology.‖ She Dougherty‘s ―Epistemological Considerations
Concerning Skeptical Theism,‖ Faith and Philosophy 25, no. 2 (2008): 172-6; Matheson‘s reply in
―Epistemological Considerations Concerning Skeptical Theism: A Reply to Dougherty.‖ Faith and
Philosophy 28, no. 3 (July 2011): 234-41; and Dougherty‘s rejoinder ―More Epistemological considerations
Concerning Skeptical Theism,‖ Faith and Philosophy 28, no. 3 (July 2011): 560-73. Dougherty argues that
skeptical theism violates common-sense epistemology because, in attempting to block the inference, ―It
appears that gratuitous evils exist; therefore gratuitous evils exist,‖ it fails to afford credulity to those for
whom many evils appear gratuitous. Matheson argues that Dougherty is mistaken since common-sense
epistemology recognizes the defeasibility of beliefs grounded in appearance states, and skeptical theism
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serves as the basic premise of the atheist‘s supporting argument for the existence of
gratuitous evils is rather misleading in that it fails to strictly analyze why many evils
appear to many folks to be gratuitous. The reason a given evil will ―appear‖ to one to be
gratuitous is simply that the evil is one for which, try as one might, one cannot see any
way in which the allowance of that evil by an omnipotent, omniscient being would be
necessary for some greater good. Such evils are now commonly referred to as
―inscrutable evils.‖

inscrutable evil=def., an evil for which we cannot see a way in which the
allowance of that evil by an omnipotent, omniscient being would be necessary for
the attainment of a greater good.

The atheist‘s basic support, then, for his claim that gratuitous evils exist is the fact that
inscrutable evils exist. This is the key inference that stands behind Rowe‘s evidential
argument—a logical leap from the existence of inscrutable evils to the existence of
gratuitous evils. Consequently, the current debate over Rowe‘s argument hinges on
whether the leap is warranted.

argues, says Matheson, that belief in gratuitous evils is defeated by the considerations offered by skeptical
theists (to be discussed later in this chapter) despite the initial justification afforded it by the appearances of
gratuitous evils. This is an interesting exchange, but fails on my view to get to the heart of the debate over
gratuitous evils and skeptical theism for the reason I will cite immediately.
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The Noseeum Inference
Many commentators have helpfully dropped the emphasis on ―appearance‖ claims
in order to focus on this crucial inference from inscrutability to gratuitousness. That
inference is now commonly construed as a ―noseeum‖ inference. A noseeum inference is
simply an inference of the following form.

I cannot see any X.
 There is no X.

Thus, Stephen Wykstra is typical in formulating Rowe‘s crucial noseeum inference as
follows.

10) We see no good for which God would allow evil e
 11) There is no good for which God allows e.11

On my view, however, formulating the atheist‘s background inference in this way,
despite being a step in the right direction, still fails to get us to the heart of the matter. It
belies a much more careful and sophisticated noseeum inference one could make from
the existence of inscrutable evils to the existence of gratuitous evils. This is because it
fails to capture the crucial fact that there is a very large and diverse sample of inscrutable
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Stephen Wykstra, ―Rowe‘s Noseeum Arguments from Evil,‖ in The Evidential Argument from Evil, ed.
D. Howard-Snyder (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996), 127.
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evils (e‘s) in our world. It seems reasonable to expect that this would count in favor of an
inference from inscrutability to gratuitousness.12
I am not suggesting that we simply substitute that entire set of inscrutable evils in
place of ‗e‘ in the formulation above. That would leave us with this inference:

12) We see no goods for which God would allow inscrutable evils E1…En.
 13) There are no goods for which God would allow inscrutable evils E1…En.

Again, this would belie a more careful inference that can be made for the existence of
gratuitous evils. The proponent of Rowe‘s argument is not committed to thinking that all
the world‘s inscrutable evils are gratuitous. Instead, he need only maintain that at least
some of the world‘s inscrutable evils are gratuitous. I think it crucial to recognize this
fact, as I think skeptical theists tend to underappreciate just how initially plausible the
atheist‘s noseeum inference should appear to be.
Below is my attempt to formulate that atheist‘s noseeum inference for the
existence of gratuitous evils as modestly and precisely as I know how. I will refer to this
version of the inference throughout my dissertation simply as the Noseeum Inference.

12

Robert Bass is one philosopher at least who focuses on the quantity of inscrutable evils in formulating an
interesting Bayesian version of the argument for gratuitous evils. See his ―Many Inscrutable Evils,‖ Ars
Disputandi 11 (2011): 118-32.
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The Noseeum Inference
14) There is a large and diverse sample of evils E1…En for which we cannot
identify any way in which their allowances [or the allowances of similar evils
in their place] by an omnipotent, omniscient being would be necessary for [the
attainment or preservation of] greater goods [or the prevention of some equal
or worse evils.]
 15) There are at least some evils among E1…En for which it is true that their
allowances [or the allowances of similar possible evils in their place] by an
omnipotent, omniscient being would not be necessary for [the attainment or
preservation of] greater goods [or the prevention of equal or worse evils.]

Several notes on my formulation of this inference are in order. First, the bracketed
phrases are included for the sake of precision, but I will subsequently leave them out in
my discussion for the sake of brevity. The first bracketed phrase recognizes that an evil
cannot count as gratuitous simply because a similar evil could have been allowed in its
place for the sake of the same greater good. Rather, it must be the case that it would have
been unnecessary for an omnipotent, omniscient being to allow any relevantly similar
evil for any greater good.13 The second bracketed phrase recognizes that there might be a
distinction between allowing an evil in order to attain a greater good and allowing an evil
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As a crude illustration of this point, suppose that an omnipotent, omniscient being needs to allow a good
number of animal burnings in order to attain some greater good. And suppose he therefore allows Bambi to
burn in partial fulfillment of that mission. This would not mean that there is something about Bambi in
particular that made the allowance of his burning necessary for the realization of the greater good at stake.
So those who reject the existence of gratuitous evils are not committed to defending the ―necessity‖ of
allowing particular evils in that sense.
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to preserve a greater good. In particular, I suspect the language of ―attaining‖ is better fit
to refer to an omnipotent, omniscient being‘s generating some sort of grander
consequential outcome by allowing a given evil, whereas the language of ―preserving‖
might be more useful in referring to his securing some sort of deontological value (e.g.,
obeying certain principles of non-interference he is morally obligated to uphold) by
allowing evils. I will dodge these conceptual issues, though, and simply refer to his
allowances of evils as being (or not being) necessary for greater goods while leaving
open whether the goods at stake are consequential or deontological. Finally, the third
bracketed phrase recognizes (as numerous other commentators have) that there might be
a distinction between securing a greater good and preventing a worse evil and that an
omnipotent, omniscient being could be justified in allowing an evil for either purpose.
For my purposes, though, we can treat the prevention of a worse evil as itself being a way
of securing a greater good. In sum, whenever I speak in this dissertation of an
omnipotent, omniscient being‘s needing (or not needing) to allow evils for greater goods,
I mean his needing (or not needing) to allow them—or similar evils in their place—for
the attainment or preservation of greater goods or the prevention of equal or worse evils.
Second, the ―therefore‖ relation between the premise and conclusion in the
Noseeum Inference is to be understood to be broadly inductive; it is not intended to
suggest that its proponent thinks the premise that a large and diverse set of inscrutable
evils exist logically guarantees the conclusion that gratuitous evils exist. Nonetheless, this
is endorsed as an inference, and so, its proponent maintains that the premise ―strongly
supports‖ that conclusion to such a degree that it justifies one‘s acceptance of it. In other
16

words, he claims that belief in the existence of gratuitous evils exist is justified on the
basis of the world‘s many inscrutable evils.
Third, my formulation of the Noseeum Inference emphasizes that what is it issue
is whether an omnipotent, omniscient being‘s allowances of inscrutable evils would be
necessary for greater goods and not whether the evils themselves are necessary for greater
goods. It is possible in a given case of suffering that no redeeming quality ever comes of
it—i.e., there is never a sense in which the world is better off because that suffering
occurred—yet it still be the case that there is a redeeming reason for an omnipotent,
omniscient being‘s allowing that evil. Consider, for example that nothing good ever
results from Rowe‘s deer burning in the woods and that the world would have better off
had it never stumbled into the fire. It is still conceivable that an omnipotent, omniscient
being would have an exonerating reason for allowing it if, say, he were bound to some
moral obligation of non-interference in such cases. I have no idea what that obligation
could be (which is why I agree that Rowe‘s burning deer is an inscrutable evil), but my
point here is just that we can see that there is a difference in saying the evil itself is
necessary for a greater good versus saying an omnipotent, omniscient being‘s allowance
of that evil was necessary for greater good, and it is the latter that is at issue here.
This third point, by the way, is also why I think some theistic philosophers like
William Hasker and Bruce Little confuse matters when they take themselves to be
arguing against the a priori premise of Rowe‘s evidential argument by claiming that a
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perfect God would allow gratuitous moral evils.14 When they think of ―gratuitous‖ moral
evils, they are thinking of ones that God knows would fail to benefit the world in any
consequential way but which he must nonetheless allow if he is to give humans
significant freedom.15 I think these theists would do well to stop calling such evils
gratuitous since they clearly do not think God allows them without good reason.16 On
their view, God allows these evils for the greater good of significant human freedom, and
so, they are not really arguing for the compatibility of God and gratuitous evils in the
relevant sense. A gratuitous evil would be one he allows without good reason.17 Hence, I
will continue to emphasize that it is the allowances of evils by an omnipotent, omniscient
being that it is at issue in the debate over gratuitous evils and not whether the evils
themselves always contribute to better overall outcomes.
Fourth, I will continue to use (at least until the end of Chapter 2) the phrase
―omnipotent, omniscient being‖ rather than the simpler term ―God,‖ because I think it
crucial to keep in mind that the inscrutability of a given evil is a product of our inability
to see how a being with the requisite power and knowledge to prevent it could be morally
justified in allowing it. Since the label ―God‖ tends to connote a being who is by
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William Hasker, ―The Necessity of Gratuitous Evil,‖ Faith and Philosophy 9, no. 1 (1991): 23-44; Bruce
Little, ―God and Gratuitous Evil‖ in God and Evil. ed. Chad Meister and James K. Dew Jr. (Downers
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definition morally perfect, it would muddy the water a bit if our question were
imprecisely understood to be whether certain evils are such that he—i.e., a morally
perfect being—would be morally justified in allowing them. By the end of Chapter 2,
though, I will begin using the term ―God‖ as a proper name for the object of the religious
person‘s devotion—an object that may or may not turn out to have the various omniproperties of the classical theistic conception of God. For now, we can simplify matters
by focusing on evils an omnipotent, omniscient being would be justified in allowing
without giving him a name.
Fifth, my formulation of the Noseeum Inference emphasizes the subjunctive
nature of gratuitous evils. Whether a given evil is gratuitous is a matter of whether an
omnipotent, omniscient being would need to allow that evil for the sake of a greater good
not whether it is being allowed by such a being for those goods. This is noteworthy, as
some commentators seem to think that whether inscrutable evils are gratuitous depends
on whether God actually exists, but I think this is a mistake. While there is certainly a
sense in which much of our suffering must be pointless if there is no perfect God who
ensures that it all fits into a grander plan, this is not what it means for our suffering to be
gratuitous in the relevant sense. Even if naturalism is true, there could still be facts about
how an omnipotent, omniscient being would have needed—i.e., had that being existed—
to allow these evils for certain greater goods. This is especially so considering that if such
a being were to exist, the overall structure of the universe might well be quite different
than it is on a naturalistic worldview. Presumably, for example, if this supernatural
omnipotent, omniscient being actually existed, then our physical universe would be only
19

part of a larger reality that also includes a sizeable supernatural realm. Perhaps, then, such
a being would see ways in which his allowances of our sufferings would be necessary in
the grander scheme of this larger all-inclusive reality. Properly understood, then, an evil
in our world is gratuitous only if such a being would not need to allow that evil for any
greater good even if the actual world contained a sizeable supernatural realm. Since this
is a subjunctive issue, it makes no difference whether the actual world is one of those
supernatural worlds or whether it is actually inhabited by any omnipotent, omniscient,
and/or omnibenevolent being.

The Assumption of Sufficient Competence
With these qualifications about the Nosseum Inference in place, we still need to
make explicit why the proponent of Rowe‘s evidential argument thinks the existence of so
many inscrutable evils justifies his belief in the existence of gratuitous evils. He makes a
crucial assumption that theistic philosophers have since attacked.18 That assumption,
which I will call the ―Assumption of Sufficient Competence,‖ goes as follows.

The Assumption of Sufficient Competence
We humans can justifiably consider ourselves sufficiently competent about the
ways in which an omnipotent, omniscient being‘s allowances of evils would be
needed to contribute to greater goods such that our inability to identify for any
member of a very large and diverse sample of evils E1…En a way in which his
allowing that evil would be necessary for some greater good justifies our believing
18

Strictly speaking, they have attacked less sophisticated versions of the assumption.
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that his allowances of at least some of E1…En would not necessary for greater
goods.

As we will soon see, a wellspring of prominent theistic philosophers have come
forth to argue that ―mere‖ human beings cannot reasonably take themselves to be all that
competent in the domain of God-justifying reasons for allowing suffering. Their position
has thus come to be known as ―skeptical theism‖ since they argue for skepticism of this
competency. A prolific philosophical debate has been ongoing in the philosophy of
religion over this position for the last twenty-five years.
I find that this discussion, though fascinating, is oftentimes sidetracked in an
important respect due to the way in which the skeptical attacks by skeptical theists are
generally aimed at looser and less modest versions of the atheist‘s assumption to
competence than the one I have formulated here. This, again, is due to a lack of attention
from both sides of the debate to the large and diverse sample of inscrutable evils available
to the atheist. Failure to attend to this more modest inference has resulted in a failure to
attend to the more modest assumption of competence that underlies it. Hence much of the
discussion hides, I think, the significant degree of skepticism that the skeptical theist
must motivate us to take towards the relevant competency.
To see this, notice that the Assumption of Sufficient Competence does not at all
require that we be able to justifiably take ourselves to be completely competent in the
relevant domain. Rather, it asserts merely that it is highly unlikely that we would be so
clueless about such matters such that we would fail to see for so many evils how their
21

allowances by an omnipotent, omniscient being would actually be justifiable. We humans
know a good bit about ethics, after all. And it would seem that there is little initial reason
to suppose that a supernatural agent‘s obligations (qua supernatural agent) with respect to
human suffering would differ so drastically from ours in so many cases. Here, a pertinent
quote from Rowe‘s original 1979 article comes to mind:

In the light of our experience and knowledge of the variety and scale of human
and animal suffering in our world, the idea that none of the suffering could have
been prevented by an omnipotent being without thereby losing a greater good or
permitting an evil at least as bad seems an extraordinarily absurd idea, quite
beyond our belief [emphasis mine].19

Skeptical Theism: Some Preliminaries
Because I find it crucial to respect the relatively modest degree of competence
presumed by the Assumption of Sufficient Competence, I will now state the thesis that
skeptical theists need to establish to refute it even if they themselves do not tend to have
this specific thesis in mind when making their arguments. Here, then, is my statement of
the thesis that should define the basic position of skeptical theists.
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The Thesis of Skeptical Theism
We humans cannot justifiably consider ourselves sufficiently competent about the
ways in which an omnipotent, omniscient being‘s allowances of evils would be
needed to contribute to greater goods for it to be the case that our inability to
identify for any member of a large and diverse sample of evils E1…En a way in
which his allowing that evil would be necessary for some greater good could
justify our believing that his allowances of at least some of E1…En would not be
necessary for greater goods.

Or to put it less precisely but more concisely, skeptical theists must argue that it would be
irrational for us to think we understand enough about this kind of stuff to justify thinking
even some of the world‘s many inscrutable evils are gratuitous.
We can note here that the label ―skeptical theism‖ is a bit of a misnomer. Both
atheists and agnostics could assent to the above thesis, so it is somewhat unfortunate to
have a label that, taken literally, would suggest that accepting this thesis makes one a
theist of some sort of skeptical bent. For this reason, others have suggested defining
skeptical theism more exactly as the conjunction of a skeptical thesis like the one I have
formulated above and theism itself.20 While that approach is certainly more true to the
label, it is clear that the sole focus of so-called ―skeptical theistic‖ arguments is the
skeptical thesis—i.e., no skeptical theist takes himself to be arguing for theism when
making his skeptical arguments. This way of responding to the evidential argument
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became known as ―skeptical theism‖ only because the vast majority of philosophers
advancing it were known to be theists intent on defeating Rowe‘s compelling argument
for atheism. I suppose I could provide a new label that would refer solely to the skeptical
thesis at the heart of their ―skeptical theism,‖ but I prefer to just keep with convention
here and refer to the thesis itself as ―skeptical theism.‖ Perhaps it is worth repeating
before I move on from this qualification, though, that one can most certainly be a
―skeptical theist‖ as I am defining it without being any sort of theist in the literal sense.
The skeptical theist movement has been a major fixture among theistic
philosophers for the last few decades. It became prominent in the philosophical literature
with Stephen Wykstra‘s hugely influential 1984 article (published five years after Rowe‘s
evidential argument first appeared in print) in which he argued for skepticism of the
human ability to detect God-justifying reasons for allowing suffering on epistemological
grounds.21 Numerous other theistic philosophers followed suit with their own versions of
skeptical theistic arguments including such notable figures in the philosophy of religion
and epistemology as William Alston, Alvin Plantinga, Peter van Inwagen, and most
recently, Michael Bergmann.22 In what follows, I will briefly sketch the two major
strands of skeptical theistic argumentation that have been developed, each of which
argues that (a) the Assumption of Sufficient Competence is justified for one only if one is

21

Stephen Wykstra, ―The Humean Obstacle to Evidential arguments from Suffering: On Avoiding the
Evils of ‗Appearance.‘‖ International Journal for the Philosophy of Religion 16 (1984): 73-94.
22
William Alston, ―The Inductive Argument from Evil and the Human Cognitive Condition,‖
Philosophical Perspectives 5 (1991): 29-67; Alvin Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2000), 465-67; Peter van Inwagen, ―The Problem of Evil, the Problem of Air, and the
Problem of Silence,‖ Philosophical Perspectives 5 (1991), 135-165; Michael Bergmann, ―Skeptical Theism
and Rowe‘s New Evidential Argument from Evil,‖ Nous 35 (2001): 278-96 and idem ―Skeptical Theism
and the Problem of Evil‖.

24

justified in believing some additional ―enabling premise‖23 about the human cognitive
condition, and (b) that none of us can be justified in believing that requisite enabling
premise. These two strands of skeptical theism differ only by virtue of the precise content
of the enabling premise they require we be justified in accepting before assenting to the
Assumption of Sufficient Competence. As we will see, however, the differences between
these two strands turn out to be insubstantial, as they are really just different ways of
getting at the same point. And both, as we will also see, turn out to share the same major
defect.

Wykstra’s “CORNEA” Skeptical Theism
The first strand of skeptical theistic arguments—of which Wykstra‘s ―CORNEA‖
argument is the paradigm—requires an enabling premise that amounts to a cognitive
sensitivity constraint on justification.24 The core idea of the CORNEA approach is that in
order to be justified in believing the gratuitous evils exist, we must have justification for
thinking our cognitive faculties would be sensitive to the presence or absence of
necessary connections between an omnipotent, omniscient being allowances of E1…En
and greater goods. In other words, the proponent of the Assumption of Sufficient
Competence must have good reason to think that her cognitive situation—i.e., the
necessary connections between an omnipotent, omniscient being‘s allowances of E1…En
23
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and greater goods that appear to her—would be noticeably different in the nearest
possible world in which those connections obtain.25 Wykstra calls his sensitivity
constraint the ―Condition on Reasonable Epistemic Access‖ or CORNEA for short.
The CORNEA principle has taken on a generous amount of varying formulations at
the hands of Wykstra and other commentators, mostly in response to the flurry of
criticisms the principle has faced.26 I will not attempt to survey all of the various
formulations here, choosing instead to focus on Wykstra‘s own formulations of it.27 My
goal in this section is to show that all the handwringing that has gone on in trying to
formulate a workable version of CORNEA is largely a result of a collective failure to
focus more specifically on what exactly Wykstra and his cohorts need the principle to
accomplish. They need it to provide a principled constraint against accepting the
Assumption of Sufficient Competence, thereby blocking the atheist‘s Noseeum Inference
for the existence of gratuitous evils.
All extant formulations of the principle are unnecessarily broad in light of this
focused purpose, and consequently, as I will argue, run into all sorts of unnecessary
trouble. After surveying Wykstra‘s own formulations of CORNEA and showing how they
are subject to counterexample, I will provide my own formulation, which is specifically
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tailored as a principled constraint against the Noseeum Inference. This new CORNEA
principle is, I think, wholly acceptable. Far from validating Wykstra‘s skeptical theistic
conclusion, however, my contribution here serves only to refocus the debate away from
his CORNEA principle and onto the skeptical theist‘s view that proponents of the
argument from evil cannot satisfy the CORNEA constraint. This, on my view, is where
the center of debate over the CORNEA approach to skeptical theism should really be
anyway.
Below are Wykstra‘s first two formulations of CORNEA labeled by their year of
offering.

1984-CORNEA
On the basis of cognized situation s, human H is entitled to claim ―It appears that
p‖ [or simply, ―p‖] only if it is reasonable for H to believe that, given her
cognitive faculties and the use she has made of them, if p were not the case, s
would likely be different than it is in some way discernible to her.28

1996-CORNEA
A situation of seeing no X justifies one‘s claiming ―it appears there is no X‖ [or
simply ―there is no X‖] only if it is reasonable for one to believe that X is
something to which we would likely have epistemic access in the situation.29
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While both of these principles were originally formulated to target ―appearance‖ claims,
such talk is now widely considered to be superfluous for reasons I discussed earlier, and
so, I will treat these principles as instead invoking the bracketed replacements.
The point I want to stress here is that 1984-CORNEA is a much broader epistemic
principle than 1996-CORNEA. Whereas 1996-CORNEA places a constraint only on
making inferences from ―noseeum‖ evidential situations to negative existential
conclusions (i.e., from evidential situations of the form ―I see no X‖ to conclusions of the
form ―there is no X‖), 1984-CORNEA places a constraint on forming any belief on the
basis of any evidential situation whatsoever. 1984-CORNEA is thus a much broader and,
as we will soon see, much more vulnerable principle than the more focused 1996CORNEA.
Interestingly, though, Wykstra seems not to have noticed the potential advantages
of employing a more restricted principle. In his 2007 and 2012 articles, for example,
Wykstra casually takes CORNEA back in an extremely broad direction. In 2007, he
makes the following claim about CORNEA.

On all versions, the key idea behind CORNEA is a proposed test for whether
some alleged evidence E seriously ―supports‖…some hypothesis H…The test is
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this: ask whether, if H were false, E is still pretty much what one should expect. If
the answer is ―yes,‖ then E can‘t seriously support H.30

Here, again, we are talking about evidence and hypotheses in general as opposed to
specifically noseeum evidence and negative existential conclusions.
Wykstra makes clear in both recent articles that the above ―test‖ is to be
understood quite literally as the key idea behind CORNEA and not the CORNEA
principle itself. ―This key idea concerns a constraint on when some datum is levering
evidence—to be distinguished from CORNEAS‘s constraint on when the datum can be
reasonably regarded as levering evidence‖ [original emphasis].31 ―CORNEA itself,‖ he
writes,

…proposes a higher-level test-condition—a requirement on rational (justified,
entitled) claims about the supports relation. The condition is this: for some human
H (Henry, let‘s say) to be entitled to claim that new evidence E seriously supports
H, it must be reasonable for Henry to believe (should he consider the matter) that
the answer to the test question is ―No.‖32

Or, as he (along with Timothy Perrine) puts this in 2012,
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Although CORNEA has morphed through many versions, all versions offer an
acid test for whether one can reasonably regard some piece of evidence E as being
strong evidence for some hypothesis H. The test is this: ask whether, if H were
false, E would likely be different. If the reasonable answer—what one is
warranted in asserting—is “no,” then one isn‘t entitled to regard E as strong
evidence for H.33

Putting all this together, we get something like the following version of CORNEA,

2007-CORNEA
One is entitled to claim that a body of evidence e seriously supports hypothesis h
(and so, can justifiably accept h on the basis of e) only if it is reasonable for one
to expect that e would be noticeably different if h were false.

Despite all the semantical differences between the original 1984-CORNEA and this
2007-CORNEA, I do not think Wykstra intends them to be understood very differently.
In fact, he seems content to use the 1984 formulation interchangeably with 2007CORNEA in his 2012 article. Since my goal in this section is to compare the relative
merits of the broad epistemic principle represented in the 1984- and 2007-CORNEAS
with the more narrowly focused 1996-CORNEA, and since the 1984 formulation remains
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most prominent among commentators, I will simply focus now on comparing 1984CORNEA with 1996-CORNEA..
I will argue for the following three theses: (i) the extremely broad 1984-CORNEA
is much more vulnerable to counterexample than is the more focused 1996-CORNEA,
(ii) 1996-CORNEA is nonetheless itself vulnerable to counterexample, and (iii) an even
more focused formulation of CORNEA is available that seems immune to
counterexample and would still meet Wykstra‘s skeptical theistic purposes in providing a
principled block on the Noseeum Inference

McBrayer’s Attack on CORNEA
To establish theses (i) and (ii), I need only borrow from the excellent recent attack
on CORNEA by Justin McBrayer, which takes aim at the broad epistemic constraint
expressed by 1984-CORNEA.34 McBrayer proposes three counterexamples to CORNEA,
all of which he claims are cases of highly reasonable inductive inferences that
nonetheless fail to meet the (broadly construed) CORNEA constraint.

Case 1
McBrayer believes his lottery ticket will lose on the basis of his knowing that the
odds for a given ticket‘s being the winning ticket are one in a million.
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situation C is evidence for P only if it is reasonable for S to believe that [~P □→ C is discernibly
different].‖ See ibid., 81.
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Case 2
McBrayer is away from home and believes his son is home asleep on the basis of
his knowing that his son is almost always asleep at that time of day.

Case 3
McBrayer believes that all crows are black on the basis of his never having seen
any non-black crows among the many crows he has observed.35

McBrayer argues that in each of these cases, CORNEA‘s requirement for forming
justified beliefs is not met despite its being clear that his beliefs are in fact justified in all
three cases. In Case 1, McBrayer‘s cognitive situation would be no different if he
happens to be holding the winning ticket. In Case 2, his cognitive situation would be no
different if his son happens to be awake due to an unexpected event. And in Case 3, his
cognitive situation would be no different if there happens to be a single non-black crow
flying around somewhere. Yet, McBrayer surmises, his beliefs are justified in all three
cases. Thus, he concludes, ―CORNEA gives us the wrong answer in each case… [So,]
unless we want to be skeptics about inductive justification—we should conclude that
CORNEA is false.‖36
I find that all three of McBrayer‘s cases are successful counterexamples against
the extremely broad 1984-CORNEA once we make a slight change on his behalf to Case
3. McBrayer thinks he can justifiably infer from his never having seen a non-black crow
35
36

McBrayer, ―CORNEA and Inductive Evidence,‖ 83-4.
McBrayer, ―CORNEA and Inductive Evidence,‖ 84.
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that there are, therefore, no non-black crows anywhere. However, due to our background
knowledge on the phenomenon of albinism, it should not seem unlikely that there is a
non-black crow somewhere, and so the inference in Case 3 seems unjustified. We can
easily amend the case to get around the ―albinism loophole‖ by changing McBrayer‘s
inductive inference from his never having seen a red crow to the conclusion ‗there are no
red crows.‘ The fact that McBrayer has never seen a red crow despite having seen a lot of
crows does, I think, give us a counterexample to 1984-CORNEA. McBrayer would be
justified in making this inference even though he could not reasonably expect his
cognitive situation (i.e., his ―noseeum data‖) to be any different if there happened to be a
red crow flying around somewhere. So McBrayer gives us, I think, three successful
counterexamples to the extremely broad 1984-CORNEA.37
Notice, though, that of McBrayer‘s three cases, only Case 3 can stand as a
possible counterexample to the more focused 1996-CORNEA. This is because only Case
3 is a noseeum case—i.e., a case in which McBrayer‘s inductive conclusion is of the form
‗there is no X‘ (e.g., ‗there are no red crows‘) and is such that its evidential support
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There is a caveat here. In their recent 2012 article, Wykstra and Perrine accuse McBrayer of
misconstruing the crucial subjunctive question at the heart of CORNEA of whether the McBrayer‘s
cognized situation would be different in each of these cases if his belief in each case were false as a
question to be evaluated on standard possible-world semantics for subjunctive conditionals. They claim that
the proper way to understand that conditional is as a ―non-counterfacutal subjunctive‖ that is to be
evaluated using the semantics of conditional probabilities. And via an elaborate reshaping of McBrayer‘s
lottery case and a subsequent complicated tour through Bayes‘ Theorem, they try to show how the latter
interpretation of CORNEA makes it immune to this counterexample. See their ―Foundations of Skeptical
Theism,‖ especially pp. 390-9.
As their discussion is dense and was only very recently published, there are no published
responses as of yet. I take no position here on whether the shift they call for is sufficiently motivated, nor
whether it will be of much help to Wykstra‘s cause. In any event, I aim in what follows to offer a much
simpler change to CORNEA that renders it immune to McBrayer‘s counterexamples.
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comes from his not seeing any X‘s (e.g., his never having seen any red crows).38 There is
an important lesson here for proponents of Wykstra‘s skeptical theism: the more focused
you keep your CORNEAs, the less trouble they will lead you into. And since, as
McBrayer‘s Case 3 demonstrates, the more focused 1996-CORNEA gets into enough
trouble of its own, proponents of Wykstra‘s approach would be wise to see if there is an
even more focused version of the principle available that would better serve their
dialectical needs. Let us, therefore, go back to the very beginning and see what sort of
principle Wykstra‘s skeptical theistic argument really needs.

Refocusing CORNEA
Wykstra needs to block the Noseeum Inference for gratuitous evils. Recall that
inference goes as follows:
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Two issues could be raised here. First, one could attempt to translate McBrayer‘s beliefs in Cases 1 and 2
into negative existential claims so that they too violate 1996-CORNEA. Thus we could translate his Case 1
belief ‗my lottery ticket will lose,‖ to ―there is no winning lottery ticket in my hand.‘ And we could
translate his Case 2 belief, ‗my son is at home asleep‘ to ‗there is no awake son of mine at home.‘
However, we still would not have counterexamples to 1996-CORNEA since, in both cases, it would be
wrong to say McBrayer‘s justification for these negative existential beliefs comes from noseeum evidential
states. Think of how bizarre it would be to suggest that these beliefs are justified by his ―not seeing any
winning tickets in his hand‖ and his ―not seeing any awake son of his at home.‖ 1996-CORNEA only
applies to negative existential beliefs that are based on noseeum evidential situations, and hence, only Case
3 is applicable.
Second, a proponent of 1996-CORNEA might attempt to defend the principle against Case 3 by
arguing that McBrayer‘s belief that there are no red crows is justified on the basis of something other than
his noseeum grounds. Perhaps one might argue along these lines that we have independent justification for
thinking that a red crow would be the result of a highly unorthodox genetic mutation, (one that is much less
likely than the already rare sort of mutation known to cause albinism), and that it is this independent
knowledge that does the bulk of the justifying work for McBrayer‘s justified belief in the absence of red
crows. I suspect though that this move would introduce a (pardon the pun) red herring. While it may be true
that our modern acquaintance with genetics happens to ground our beliefs in the absence of creatures with
certain specified bizarre traits (e.g., crows with read feathers), it still seems that folks who know nothing of
genetics but who have seen a lot of crows would be justified in believing ―there are no red crows,‖ purely
on the basis of their not having seen any red ones among a large sample of crows.
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The Noseeum Inference
14) There is a large and diverse sample of evils E1…En for which we cannot
identify any way in which their allowances by an omnipotent, omniscient
being would be necessary for greater goods.
 15) There are at least some evils among E1…En for which it is true that their
allowances by an omnipotent, omniscient being would not be necessary for
greater goods.

To place a principled constraint on this inference, Wykstra needs only to defend
the following focused principle, which I will dub (due to its tighter focus) ―20/20CORNEA.‖

20/20-CORNEA
A situation of seeing no corresponding X‘s for a large and diverse set of Y‘s,
Y1…Yn, justifies one‘s believing there are some Y‘s among Y1…Yn for which
there are no corresponding X‘s only if it reasonable for one to believe one would
likely have epistemic access to at least some of those X‘s if in fact all those Y‘s
had corresponding X‘s.

This is a mouthful, I know, but it actually makes a rather simple claim. The key issue
concerns the degree of observability we could expect certain entities to exhibit given that
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the correspond to other observable entities.39 In the case of the Noseeum Inference, we
already observe numerous inscrutable evils, and the possible entities that might or might
not correspond to them are the necessary connections between an omnipotent, omniscient
being‘s allowances of those evils and greater goods. 20/20-CORNEA requires that we be
able to expect them to be observable in at least some of these cases if we are going to
conclude that they are absent in some of them.
Before testing the strength of this more focused CORNEA, I want to go ahead
now and spell out how it would be used in an argument against accepting the Noseeum
Inference for gratuitous evils.

The 20/20-CORNEA ARGUMENT
16) A situation of seeing no corresponding X‘s for a large and diverse set of Y‘s,
Y1…Yn, renders it likely that ―there are some Y‘s among Y1…Yn for which
there are no corresponding X‘s‖ only if it reasonable for one to expect to have
had epistemic access to at least some of those X‘s if in fact all those Y‘s had
corresponding X‘s. [20/20-CORNEA]
17) It is not reasonable for a human being to believe that he/she would likely have
epistemic access to any of the necessary connections between an omniscient,
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One could just as well think of the corresponding entities mentioned in 20/20-CORNEA as properties
that the observable entities might or might not possess. Under that terminology, 20/20-CORNEA places the
following constraint on when one can justifiably make an inference from there being a large sample of Y‘s
that do not observably possess the relevant X-property to the conclusion that there are at least some Y‘s
that in fact lack that X-property: one must be able to reasonably expect to observe the X-property in at least
some of those Y‘s if all those Y‘s possess it.
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omnipotent being‘s allowances of evils E1….En and the attainment of greater
goods even if, in fact, all those allowances of E1…En had corresponding
necessary connections to greater goods.
 18) One‘s seeing no necessary connections between an omniscient, omnipotent
being‘s allowances of evils E1…En and the attainment of greater goods does
not justify one‘s believing that there are some evils among E1…En for which
there are no necessary connections between an omniscient, omnipotent
being‘s allowance of those evils and the attainment of greater goods.

If sound, this argument not only blocks the Noseeum Inference but also offers an
explanation as to why we should not accept the atheist‘s Assumption of Competence
which underlies it. The reason we cannot reasonably take ourselves to be sufficiently
competent in the relevant domain (i.e., the domain of justifying reasons for an
omnipotent, omniscient being‘s allowances of evils like E1…En) is because we lack the
―reasonably expectable access‖ to facts in that domain that 20/20-CORNEA requires.
I will argue now that the first premise of this argument—my more focused
formulation of the CORNEA principle—seems innocuous and that the second premise is,
on the other hand, highly controversial. Thus I aim to validate my contention that the
wealth of critical attention given to the CORNEA component of Wykstra‘s argument is
ultimately distracting us from the more key issue in his strand of skeptical theism.
To make my case that 20/20-CORNEA is an acceptable epistemic principle, I will
show first that there is nothing in McBrayer‘s attack on the broader (but not completely
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broad) 1984-CORNEA that would constitute a counterexample to it. We can focus again
solely on McBrayer‘s Case 3 since, like 1996-CORNEA, 20/20-CORNEA is only
concerned with beliefs formed via noseeum inferences. But unlike 1996-CORNEA,
20/20-CORNEA applies only to a very particular sort of noseeum inference. Case 3 does
not fit this mold as it stands, so we will need to modify it to make it applicable. To see
why, recall that Case 3 involved an inference from the premise ―I see no red crows‖ to the
conclusion ―No red crows exist.‖ That is the standard variety noseeum inference of the
form ―I see no X‘s; therefore there are no X‘s.‖ As I stressed earlier, though, the Noseeum
Inference for gratuitous evils is a much more careful inference than this standard variety
noseeum inference. Crucially, it does not yield a categorical existential conclusion like
―there are no X‘s.‖ Rather, it yields a much more modest conclusion of the form ―There
are at least some corresponding X‘s missing for at least some of these Y‘s I observe.‖ I
specifically formulated 20/20-CORNEA to target that more careful sort of inference and
thus it places no constraint on the less sophisticated standard variety noseeum inference.
So to see whether Case 3 can give us a counterexample to 20/20-CORNEA, let us
revise the case so that it involves an inference of the sort that 20/20-CORNEA constrains.
Suppose, then, that McBrayer were to make the following inference. .

19) I see no corresponding red-feathered coats for any crows C1...Cn.in my large
and diverse sample of observed crows.
 20 )It is likely that at least some of these crows C1...Cn have no corresponding
red-feathered coats.
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McBrayer is clearly justified in making this inference. For one thing, it is a much more
modest inference than the already justified inference of the original red crow case. There,
we granted that McBrayer was justified in using his noseeum grounds of never having
seen a red crow to infer the bolder categorical claim ―Red crows do not exist,‖ whereas
we are here imagining that he only infers the much more modest claim ―At least some of
the crows I have observed were not in fact red.‖ That is a modest inference indeed.
This time, however, our working CORNEA principle gives us the correct result.
All 20/20-CORNEA requires for McBrayer‘s inference in this case to be justified is that
he have ample justification for expecting that if all the crows he has observed were
actually red, then he would have noticed that for at least some of them. And surely,
McBrayer has justification for that. It seems equally obvious that had McBrayer not had
justification for expecting he would have noticed the redness of at least some of those
crows if in fact they were all red (imagine, for example, that McBrayer knew himself to
be colorblind), then he would not, as 20/20-CORNEA would correctly dictate, have
justification for believing that some of the crows he has observed are not red on the basis
of his not having seen any red crows.40 In other words, McBrayer would have to consider
himself utterly incompetent at detecting the redness of crows if he is to refrain from
taking his failing to see any redness in such a large sample of crows as sufficient
evidence for thinking redness was missing somewhere in that sample. 20/20-CORNEA,
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Notice, 20/20-CORNEA is perfectly consistent with the colorblind McBrayer having some other source
of justification (e.g., testimonial evidence) for believing that (at least some of) the crows he has observed
were not red. 20/20-CORNEA places a constraint only on cases in which one‘s noseeum evidence is the
basis for such a belief.
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at least when applied to this case, looks to be common sense.
The fact that 20/20-CORNEA fares so well in this case, however, does not
completely substantiate my claim that we should view CORNEA as innocuous. The
principle might of course appear less commonsensical in other contexts. There is a
particular sort of case that a couple of commentators on an earlier draft of this chapter
thought might pose a problem for 20/20-CORNEA. Below I will construct a case of that
sort and then show why I do not think it ultimately poses a threat to 20/20-CORNEA.
Imagine that you are watching a play in a large auditorium full of people and, try
as you might, you cannot perceive any way in which any of the audience members are
being causally acted upon by telepathic aliens. Could you then be justified in making the
following inference?

21) I perceive no corresponding alien interferences for persons P1...Pn.in my large
and diverse sample.
 22) It is likely that for at least some of these persons P1...Pn, there are
no corresponding alien interferences.

According to 20/20-CORNEA, you are justified in making this inference only if you
could have reasonably expected to detect alien interference somewhere in that room had
it been the case that every single one of those folks was being interfered with by a
telepathic alien. Arguably, though, this is something you could not have reasonably
expected to detect. There are lots of different ways, after all, that telepathic aliens could
40

interfere with us. Some of these would produce observable behavioral effects (e.g., an
audience member suddenly ripping off his clothes; another going into an exotic trance;
another screaming out ―The mother ship is coming!‖). Other possible forms of
interference, however, would produce no observable effects whatsoever (e.g., inciting an
audience member to have a daydream of puppies; causing another to recall a memory
from her childhood.) So, even if it were the case that everyone‘s mind was being
interfered with, you (arguably) could not have reasonably expected to detect interference
anywhere in that room since it could have all just been the sort of interference that does
not cause observable effects. If so, you cannot meet the condition 20/20-CORNEA
requires of you before making the above inference. But given that you are, as seems
imminently plausible, nonetheless justified in believing that there were at least some
people in that room who were not being controlled by telepathic aliens, it may appear that
20/20-CORNEA has been counterexampled.
There are two problems with this counterexample as it stands. First, in order to
grant that you could not have reasonably expected to detect any effects of audience-wide
alien interferences, we must assume that the likelihood of aliens interfering with
everyone in a large auditorium in solely non-detectable ways is at least as great the
likelihood of aliens interfering with everyone in a large auditorium in at least some
detectable ways. Perhaps I have seen too many science fiction movies, bus this far from
accords with my intuition of how discreet interfering aliens would likely be. But suppose
we grant this assumption anyway. The present version of the case still cannot constitute a
counterexample to 20/20-CORNEA, because 20/20-CORNEA only puts a necessary
41

condition on when noseeum evidence of a certain sort can justify accepting the relevant
sort of conclusion. Following Wykstra, this is to say that the noseeum evidence must
constitute ―levering evidence‖ that would justify you in moving from a state of non-belief
in the conclusion to a state of belief in the conclusion. And while I most certainly want to
agree that you would be justified in accepting the claim that happens to constitute the
conclusion of the above inference, I do not at all think you would be justified in accepting
that claim on the basis of your noseeum evidence.
Think of the matter this way: even if you had your eyes and ears closed during the
whole play, and so, were unable to acquire any legitimate ―noseeum‖ evidence of the
audience members, you would already be justified in thinking it likely that at least some
people in the room are not being interfered with by telepathic aliens. That is just the sort
of thing (given Occam‘s Razor and/or other background beliefs) we have no good reason
to believe in in the first place. So our sense that we are justified in accepting the
conclusion of that inference has nothing to do with the strength of the inference itself.
Hence the present case cannot really count as a counterexample to 20/20-CORNEA,
which restricts itself only to noseeum inferences in which one‘s noseeum evidence is
supposed to be the deciding factor in what one is justified in believing.
Even so, I must admit that this sort of case could theoretically be revised such that
the noseeum evidence does justifiably push one from a state of non-belief in the
hypothesis that at least some audience members are not interfered with to a state of belief
in that hypothesis. This is due to the fact that the noseeum evidence in this case raises the
probability of that hypothesis by some amount, and so, it would seem possible to
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construct the case such that you were already almost justified in accepting it prior to
acquiring the boost from this noseeum evidence to push you into a state of justified
belief. The reason that the noseeum evidence must raise the probability of the hypothesis
to some degree is due to (a) the open possibility (however slight) that the hypothesis is
false prior to acquiring the noseeum evidence—i.e., the open possibility that aliens really
would interfere with everyone in the room, and (b) the component possibility within that
possibility that aliens would interfere with at least some audience members in detectable
ways. Hence it follows that when the noseeum evidence rules out this component
possibility, the overall possibility of the hypothesis being false (of which that component
was a part) is decreased. Given this, there must in theory be some way to revise this case
such that this confirming effect on the original hypothesis is strong enough to get you just
over the hump from a state in which you would not have been justified in accepting the
conclusion before acquiring this evidence and into a state in which you would be justified
in accepting it after acquiring the evidence.
Revising the details of the case to fit this schema would require some significant
imaginative efforts. We would have to somehow imagine that before going to the
auditorium you had a good bit more reason than you do in the actual world to worry that
telepathic aliens would interfere in some way—i.e., whether detectably or undetectably—
with the minds of at least some audience members. Indeed, we would have to imagine the
case such that you had just enough reason to worry about this such that it would just
barely have been unjustifiable for you to squarely accept the belief that no members of
that audience would be interfered with. It is difficult to image exactly how those details
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might go, but really, it does not matter; the generic description above is enough to prove
that a proposed counterexample along these lines is available.
Fortunately for 20/20-CORNEA, avoiding that counterexample would require
only a simple fix. Indeed, I expect the ―fix‖ was already implicit in Wykstra‘s discussion
of CORNEA all along given the context of the overall debate in which he was writing.
All we need is a qualification in 20/20-CORNEA such that it places a constraint on
noseeum inferences (of the relevant sort) only in epistemic situations where the
conclusion of that inference is not already rendered rather likely by some prior body of
evidence. And given the context of the debate within which CORNEA is offered, this
would be far from an ad hoc qualification to get us around the present threat of
counterexample. CORNEA, after all, was intended to stop Rowe‘s evidential argument
from evil, and Rowe‘s argument is that the world‘s many inscrutable evils are sufficient
to be one‘s primary source of evidence for thinking gratuitous evils. Hence it is not
presumed by Rowe‘s argument that we are already almost justified in believing gratuitous
evils exist and just need the evidence of inscrutable evils to get us over the hump. So we
can, in good faith, understand the constraint posed by 20/20-CORNEA to apply only in
similar contexts.
In sum, 20/20-CORNEA places a very modest constraint only on certain noseeum
inferences, which are themselves quite modest relative to standard variety noseeum
inferences. It claims merely that whenever you are in a situation of not observing any X‘s
corresponding to a large set of observed Y‘s, you cannot properly regard that noseeum
data as your primary evidence for believing that some of those Y‘s lack corresponding
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X‘s unless you could have reasonably expected to observe some X‘s corresponding to
Y‘s if all those observable Y‘s have X‘s. 20/20-CORNEA, I conclude, is innocuous. As it
applies it to the Noseeum Inference in particular, it merely dictates that we cannot be
justified in believing that gratuitous evils exist primarily on the basis of our inability to
detect, among our very large and diverse set of inscrutable evils, any non-gratuitous ones
unless we could have reasonably expected to detect at least some non-gratuitous members
among that set had it in fact been composed solely of non-gratuitous members. That is
still a mouthful, but it seems obviously true nonetheless. I submit, then, that we
henceforth regard Wykstra‘s CORNEA principle—when properly focused—as a
harmless, commonsensical epistemic constraint.
I trust my reader will be wondering at this point, though, why we could not have
reasonably expected ourselves capable of detecting any non-gratuitous evils in our set of
inscrutable evils if in fact it had been composed solely of non-gratuitous evils. Why, to
put it another way, should we think it at all likely that there would be so many necessary
connections between an omniscient, omnipotent being‘s allowances of various evils and
the attainments of greater goods that elude our grasp? We are, after all, fairly intelligent
creatures, are we not? How, then, could we fail to see for so many of the world’s various
evils¸ why their allowances by an omniscient, omnipotent being would be necessary for
greater goods?
This, I think, is precisely the issue we should be pressing when evaluating
Wykstra‘s CORNEA-strand of skeptical theism. Claiming that the Noseeum Inference
cannot meet the 20/20-CORNEA constraint seems to commit oneself to a rather severe
45

skepticism of the relevant human competency. And given that extreme skepticisms must
be powerfully motivated (an assumption shared by most analytic philosophers today at
least), there is a major question as to how this skepticism can be sufficiently motivated.

The Challenge of Motivating Wykstra’s Skepticism
The most common way that Wykstra and other skeptical theists attempt to
motivate their skepticism is by drawing an analogy between the omniscient being/human
relationship and some other relationship in which one member is significantly
incompetent relative to the other. Two such analogies have been prevalent in the
literature. The first is the parent/child analogy according to which we should not expect to
be able to understand an omnipotent, omniscient being‘s justifying reasons for allowing
various evils any more than we can expect a child to understand her parents‘ justifying
reasons for allowing some unpleasant experience (i.e., a shot from the doctor). It is often
suggested that the difference in competence between an adult human and an omniscient
being would be at least as great as the difference between the competence of an adult
human and a child. As Wykstra puts it, ―That we should discern most of [an omnipotent,
omniscient being‘s justifying reasons for allowing suffering] seems about as likely as that
a one-month old should discern most of his parents' purposes for those pains they allow
him to suffer—which is to say, it is not likely at all.‖41 The second prevalent analogy, due
to William Alston, is the chess master/chess novice analogy. As Alston puts the point,
―Having only the sketchiest grasp of chess, I fail to see any reason for Karpov [a chess
master] to have made the move he did at a certain point in a game. Does that entitle me to
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conclude that he had no good reason for making that move?‖42 The answer to Alston‘s
question is clearly ‗No,‘ and he claims that the difference in competence between an adult
human and an omniscient being would be at least as great as the difference in competence
between a chess master and a chess novice. Arguably, then, these analogies give us reason
to accept a strong skepticism of our ability to detect necessary connections between an
omnipotent, omniscient being‘s allowances of evils and greater goods due to the sizable
gap between our own minds and an omniscient mind.
These analogies are interesting but, to my mind, seriously incomplete. We can all
grant that there would be a sizable gap between what is grasped by an omniscient being
and what is grasped by even the sharpest human, but the skeptical theist needs to give us
reason to think there is a significant gap between what the omniscient being would grasp
and what the human can grasp in the particular domain at issue, namely the domain of
necessary connections between an omnipotent, omniscient being‘s allowances of evils
and the attainment of greater goods.43 Here is a trivial example to make this point: I
consider myself pretty competent at counting pencils, and I just came up with the
conclusion that there are eight pencils in my desk drawer. I can grant that an omniscient
being would have a much larger grasp of reality than I do, but that gives me no good
reason to think he would have a much greater grasp of the number of pencils in my desk
drawer; we would very likely detect the exact same number of pencils there. Hence the
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William Alston, ―Some (Temporarily) Final Thoughts on Evidential Arguments from Evil,‖ in The
Evidential Argument from Evil. ed. D. Howard-Snyder. (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1996),
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fact that being A is omniscient and being B is far from it does not automatically give
being B reason to be skeptical of his competency in a given domain.
Now, obviously, the domain of facts about which sufferings an omnipotent,
omniscient being would need to allow for greater goods is a much more complex domain
than domain of facts about how many pencils are in a desk. Still, even in many relatively
complex domains, we humans can reasonably take ourselves to have things more or less
―figured out.‖ For example, we nowadays have a very impressive and sophisticated
ability to detect the presence or absence of sufficient levels of many essential nutrients
and minerals in the bloodstream; this competency was not an easy one to attain evidenced
by the fact that a host of generations before us lacked it. Numerous intellectual
achievements in the advancement of medical science and technology afforded this
competence to us. Using a blood test, we can now say with virtual certainty whether, for
example, someone lacks a sufficient level of iron. Our recognition that an omniscient
being would have a grasp of reality that in many ways far outstrips ours gives us no
reason to lose confidence in our competence to make detections of iron-deficiency. Thus
recognizing the general gap between omniscience and human intelligence is not sufficient
to warrant a skepticism of a human competency across a particular domain even if that
domain is rather complex.
Lest one think it might be easy for a skeptical theist to show that the domain of
facts about which sufferings an omnipotent, omniscient being would need to allow for
greater goods is a far more complex domain than medical science, we must remember
that he must also show that there is reason to think we are seriously incompetent in that
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domain. Remember, the carefully formulated Assumption of Sufficient Competence says
only that we can reasonably take ourselves to not be so clueless in that domain such that
we would fail to notice all of the justifying reasons that being would have for allowing
the world‘s inscrutable evils. Given my working assumption in this dissertation that a
great deal of the world‘s suffering is inscrutable, it follows that we need reason from
skeptical theists to think it rather likely that there is a whole lot we do not understand in
this domain. I think that arguing effectively for this would be a tall order since it would
require providing compelling reason to think that all of the connections between an
omnipotent, omniscient being‘s allowances of E1…En and greater goods would be such
that they would elude even the brightest moral thinkers among us in the way that much
about the nature of black holes still eludes the brightest astrophysicists among us today.
Only then would we have reason to see ourselves in this domain as children who cannot
grasp their parents‘ good reasons or as chess novices bewildered at the moves of the chess
master.44
I will have more to say about the difficulty in motivating the skepticism inherent
in skeptical theism, but I wish to turn now to an explication of the other major strand of
skeptical theism that has been developed independently of the CORNEA approach. This
second strand of skeptical theism seeks to place a different epistemic constraint on the
Noseeum Inference for gratuitous evils. I will show, though, that the end result is much
the same: an acceptable epistemic constraint is being offered but without with sufficient
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reason to think the Noseeum Inference fails to meet that constraint.

Bergmann’s “Representative Sample” Skeptical Theism
The second prominent strand of skeptical theism is due to the work of Michael
Bergmann and starts with the observation that noseeum inferences are justified, like all
other inductive generalizations, only in cases where one can be justified in taking one‘s
inductive base to be suitably representative of the larger population to which one is
generalizing. To see just what a reasonable epistemic constraint this is, let us unpack the
notion of ―suitable representation‖ at issue. First, ―representation‖ here stands for a
comparative property between some sample population S and a broader target population
TP. Second, to say that a sample S suitably represents TP is to say that the proportion of
S‘s members that have (or lack) the property in question Q is roughly equivalent to the
proportion of TP‘s members that have (or lack) Q. But just how equivalent these
proportions must be presumed to be will depend on how precise the conclusion of the
inductive inference needs to be in a given case. If one is moving from the premise, for
example, that the percentage of Q‘s in S is 50% to the conclusion that the percentage of
Q‘s in TP is also 50%, then a presumption of ―suitable representation‖ in that case
amounts to the presumption that S is exactly representative of TP. If, however, one is
moving from the premise that the percentage of Q‘s in S is 50% to the conclusion that the
percentage of Q‘s in TP is somewhere between 40% and 60%, a presumption of ―suitable
representation‖ amounts to a much looser presumption of correspondence in that case,
though one would still need reason to think S will be a good bit like TP in the respect of
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Q. None of this is controversial, and hence there is nothing remiss in Bergmann‘s
requiring that the Noseeum Inference of gratuitous evils meet the constraint of a justified
presumption of suitable representation.
Let us now see why Bergmann suspects the Noseeum Inference runs afoul of this
constraint. Bergmann has advanced three key ―skeptical theses‖ he thinks entail that the
proponent of Rowe‘s argument cannot be justified in taking his inductive base to be
suitably representative when moving to the conclusion that gratuitous evils exist. They
are:

(ST1) We have no good reason for thinking that the possible goods we know of
are representative of the possible goods there are.
(ST2) We have no good reason for thinking that the possible evils we know of are
representative of the possible evils there are.
(ST3) We have no good reason for thinking that the entailment relations we know
of between possible goods and the permission of possible evils are
representative of the entailment relations there are between possible goods
and the permission of possible evils.45

A few clarifications on these three claims: The term ―possible good‖ in ST1 and
ST3 was introduced in this context by Rowe to cover not only those goods that theists
and atheists agree obtain in the actual world but also the sorts of goods that might obtain
45
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in a deeply supernatural world such as ―experiencing complete felicity in the everlasting
presence of God.‖46 It is in this sense that, according to ST1, we cannot justifiably
suppose that the possible goods we are aware of are suitably representative of all there
are. The term ―possible evil‖ is introduced in ST2 due to the possibility that an
omnipotent, omniscient being might need to allow a given evil in order to prevent a
worse evil that would have obtained otherwise. In what follows, I will not make much
explicit mention of ST2, since I think it can be understood to be subsumed under ST1 by
thinking of the prevention of one of these evils as a good in itself. ST3 is used to suggest
that the entailment relations known to us between possible goods and the allowances of
certain evils cannot be reasonably presumed to constitute a suitably representative sample
even, I take it, if ST1 were false. That is, I suspect Bergmann takes ST3 to be
overdetermined by ST1 itself and some additional fact about the limitations of our ability
to identify entailment relations. If ST1 is true—i.e., if there are many possible goods we
do not know of—then presumably there would be some entailment relations between
those possible goods and allowing certain evils. But Bergmann also has in mind that there
may be entailment relations beyond our grasp between known possible goods and the
allowances of evils; hence the truth of ST3 does not depend on ST1 even if ST1 might be
sufficient for ST3.47
Let us now take a closer look at the overall logical structure of Bergmann‘s
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argument. Considered at this level, the argument looks to be rather simple.

Bergman’s “Suitable Representation” Argument for Skeptical Theism
23) If (ST1)–(ST3), then we humans lack justification for thinking our sample of
known entailment relations between allowing evils and obtaining greater
goods is suitably representative to justify making the Noseeum Inference.
24) (ST1)–(ST3)
 25) We humans lack justification for thinking our sample of known entailment
relations between allowing evils and obtaining greater goods is suitably
representative to justify making the Noseeum Inference.

However, the argument is actually quite complicated once we specify what ―suitable
representation‖ amounts to in this context. As I explained above, sometimes a
presumption of suitable representation amounts to a very strong presumption of
correspondence between the sample and target population, and other times it can require
a much looser presumption of correspondence. Some work is needed to specify more
exactly what Bergmann is asserting when he says proponents of the Noseeum Inference
lack a suitably representative sample. As I will now show, the Assumption of Sufficient
Competence constitutes a very modest resumption of correspondence, and so,
Bergmann‘s claim that proponents of the Noseeum Inference cannot meet the
representative sample constraint is far from obvious.
Focusing again on the important difference between the standard-variety noseeum
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inference and the sophisticated Noseeum Inference for gratuitous evils, let us compare
the difference between their respective presumptions of suitable representation. In a
standard-variety noseeum inference—i.e., ―I see no X; therefore there are no X‘s, the
proportions of X‘s in the sample population and the target population must be presumed
to be exactly equivalent. This is because an inference of that sort moves from the premise
―There are no Q‘s among S‖ to the conclusion ―There are no Q‘s among TP,‖ where TP is
the at-large population. Thus the proportion of Q‘s among the members of S and the
proportion of Q‘s among the members of TP must be presumed exactly equivalent (i.e.,
exactly 0 / n in both cases).
That is a very strong presumption of correspondence for one to make. One must
have reason to expect that the whole of the target population exactly mirrors the small
slice of that whole one is able to observe for oneself. If such a strong presumption of
correspondence lied behind the atheist‘s noseeum inference for the existence of gratuitous
evils, matters would be easy for Bergmann. After all, it would be wholly unreasonable for
the atheist to think there are no entailment relations between possible goods and evils that
exist outside his own observable ―slice‖ of reality. Unfortunately for Bergmann, though,
the Noseeum Inference for gratuitous evils does not even come close to making such a
strong presumption of correspondence.
To see this, let us clearly lay out the components of the Noseeum Inference‘s
inductive generalization using Bergmann‘s terminology. They are as follows:
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Sample Population
the entailment relations known to humans between an omnipotent being‘s
allowances of evils and greater (possible) goods.

Target Population
the entailment relations there are between an omnipotent, omniscient being‘s
allowances of evils E1…En and greater (possible) goods.

Unobserved Corresponding Entity (or Property) in Sample Population
an entailment relation, for any of an omnipotent, omniscient being‘s allowances of
inscrutable evils E1…En, between his allowance of that evil and a greater
(possible) goods.

Given these components, a presumption of exact correspondence between the sample
population and the target population would yield the following conclusion.

Conclusion Based on Presumption of Exact Correspondence
There are no entailment relations, for any of an omnipotent, omniscient being‘s
allowances of evils E1…En, between his allowances of those evils and greater
(possible) goods.

An inference to this conclusion assumes that the proportion of entailment relations
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between an omnipotent, omniscient being‘s allowances of E1...En and greater goods in
the sample—i.e., 0 / n—is exactly equivalent to the proportion of entailment relations
between an omnipotent, omniscient being‘s allowances of E1...En and greater possible
goods in the at-large target population.
I grant the skeptical theist that this is likely an unwarranted assertion for any
human to make. But the proponent of the existence of gratuitous does not need to make
that assertion. He can instead make a much weaker presumption of correspondence and
draw the following alternative conclusion.

Conclusion Based on Presumption of Modest Correspondence
There are not entailment relations for all of an omnipotent, omniscient being‘s
allowances of evils E1…En between his allowances of those evils and greater
(possible) goods.

No presumption of exact correspondence between sample and target population is needed
to get to this conclusion. In fact, the degree of correspondence can be far less than exact.
Rather than presuming that proportion of entailment relations that exist for E1…En is the
same in the target population as it is in the sample—i.e.,0 / n in both cases —this
inference need only presume that the proportion in the target population is something—
anything—less than n / n. This is because the more careful inference at work here is not
claiming that there are no such entailment relations between E1…En and greater goods—
only that there are at least some evils among E1...En for which such a relation is absent.
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And given that there are a lot of inscrutable evils making up E1…En, it looks to be a
pretty modest assumption to say that the numerator of that fraction will be somewhere
lower than its dominator.
This underscores again why I think the skepticism in skeptical theism is difficult
to motivate. The Assumption of Sufficient Competence requires only that we presume
that our observational data of the entailment relations between allowing E1…En and
greater goods does not completely and utterly misrepresent reality. To argue that this
assumption is unreasonable, then, the skeptical theist must motivate a rather extreme
skepticism.

The Challenge of Motivating Bergmann’s Skepticism
Recognizing that Bergmann‘s ST1-ST3 must be so bold, we can ask how he
intends to motivate our acceptance of these highly skeptical views. For starters, in his
2001 offering of ST1-ST3, Bergmann recites the before-mentioned parent-analogy
argument. I already explained why I find that incomplete to motivate the CORNEA
approach, and the same problem applies here. We need reason to think we are like
significantly incompetent children relative to an omniscient ―parent‖ when it comes to
appreciating the entailment relations between an omnipotent, omniscient being‘s allowing
evils and attaining those goods. We do not bear the same cognitive relation to such a
being in the domain of pencil-counting, for example, as an infant child bears to his
parent. So, the image of the seriously incompetent child does not apply here without a
compelling argument.
Bergmann also suggests in that 2001 article, though, that we should be prepared to
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accept ST1-ST3 based on their intuitive plausibility alone. For example,

The skepticism recommended by ST1 is extremely modest and completely
appropriate even for those who are agnostic about the existence of God. It is just
the honest recognition of the fact that it wouldn’t be the least bit surprising if
reality far outstripped our understanding of it‖48 [emphasis mine].

Bergmann‘s appeal to intuition is far too quick and belies, I think, his failure to
recognize how modest an assumption of competence one can get by with in making the
Noseeum Inference. It is no doubt reasonable to think that reality considered as a whole
would far outstrip our grasp of it, and Bergmann is right to think that no one should be
surprised if that turns out to be the case. But as I pointed out earlier, there are some
domains of knowledge within that larger whole for which it would be very surprising if
reality far outstripped our grasp of it. If, for example, I somehow learned that the number
of pencils in my desk far exceeds the number I counted, that would be very surprising. It
would also be very surprising if medical professionals suddenly came to learn that
numerous anemias were escaping their sophisticated methods of detection. Or consider
the domain of facts about the colors of crows. If a skeptical theist were to remind us that
we are only humans with a grasp of reality that is highly incomplete, I seriously doubt
that should motivate us to think, ―Oh, I suppose it would not be the least bit surprising
then if lots of the crows I have observed were red after all even though I could not tell.‖
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The point here is that Bergmann must give us reason to think that the domain of
connections between an omnipotent, omniscient being‘s allowances of evils and greater
goods is a particular domain for which it would not be surprising if reality far outstrips
our grasp.
Moreover, in light of my argument above concerning the very modest degree of
competence required by proponents of the Noseeum Inference, it becomes clear that
Bergmann seriously underestimates just how surprised many folks would be if it turned
out we were not that competent after all. To stick with the language of ―surprises,‖
Bergmann will have to assert that it should not be ―the least bit surprising‖ if it turned out
that an omnipotent, omniscient being‘s allowances of all of E1…En evils would be
necessary for greater goods in ways we cannot grasp. But I think that should strike us an
incredibly surprising turn of events. ―Really?‖ we might wonder: ―Who could have
guessed we‘d be this incompetent?‖
More recently, Bergmann has defended his skeptical theses by appeal to the
consequential complexity of the ways in which an omnipotent, omniscient being‘s
allowances of various evils could contribute to greater goods. This approach has already
been debated by other commentators, but I will focus here on what Bergmann has to say
about it.49 He claims that his skeptical theses are ―focused on our ability to make
informed judgments about how considerations of consequences would (if God existed)
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factor into God‘s decisions about what is the best thing to do.‖50 While this move seems
to saddle Bergmann with a deeply consequentialist moral theory and all its means/end
baggage, Bergmann attempts to head off this worry by suggesting that his view is
consistent with broadly non-consequentialist ethical theories since ―non-consequentialist
ethical theories have no trouble allowing for considerations of consequences to play a
role in moral decision-making.‖51 In any event, it seems quite dubious to me to speculate
that more than a modest amount of an omnipotent, omniscient being‘s allowances of
E1…En could plausibly be justified by virtue of consequential outcomes. It seems much
more plausible to me to think that if all of an omnipotent, omniscient being‘s allowances
of E1…En were necessary for greater goods, then a good portion of those goods would be
deontological goods such as upholding certain obligations of non-interference (whatever
they might be).
Perhaps Bergmann and other skeptical theists could find a way to mount an
argument for thinking these obligations would be rather likely. Peter van Inwagen has
suggested, for example, that it is likely enough that an omnipotent, omniscient creator
could not (literally) have created a rich natural world without allowing natural evils
comparable to those in our world due to certain causal limitations inherent in logically
possible natural worlds.52 If so, then perhaps such a being could be morally exonerated
for allowing the various evils in our world by virtue of his upholding the value of a
naturally ordered universe. But even if we grant that there is great value in having a
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naturally ordered cosmos, I do not agree that we should think it at all likely that it is
logically necessary that any rich, natural universe an omnipotent being could create
would produce such wide-scale, horrendous suffering as ours does. I doubt there is much
to say by way of arguing for why we should not think this obvious. As Richard Gale
points out, folks like van Inwagen seem to simply have different basic modal intuitions
on such matters than others of us, so there is likely little that can be done to argue for the
superiority of certain intuitions over others. 53 But since it is the burden of the skeptical
theist to argue that atheists are being irrational in accepting the Assumption of Sufficient
Competence, intuitions like van Inwagen‘s will not be very helpful to their cause.
In sum, I think skeptical theists have thus far failed to motivate the significant
degree of skepticism their view must urge us to take toward the relevant human
competency. To put it bluntly, they will need to go well beyond their current arsenal of
loose analogies, misplaced intuitions about the general gap between human and
omniscient minds, and the citing of dubious consequential possibilities to seriously
challenge our degree of confidence in the carefully-qualified and highly plausible
Assumption of Sufficient Competence.

Other Objections to Skeptical Theism
I think my finding in this chapter helps explain why skeptical theism is so
vulnerable to the prominent worry that it entails certain obviously pernicious forms of
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skepticism. Indeed, the most common way to attack the skepticism in skeptical theism in
the literature is via its alleged skeptical implications outside the domain skeptical theists
are directly concerned with. I will briefly survey these attacks below, but I want to note
first that I think my previous discussion provides a more direct explanation for why
skeptical theism seems to have unacceptable skeptical implications; it is because it is a
highly skeptical view of our human competence, and such a highly skeptical view can be
expected to have undesirable skeptical implications. Below, then, are the pernicious
skepticisms that skeptical theism is accused of entailing. I call these ―bleeding
skepticism‖ objections.

Bleeding Skepticism Objections
The most prominent bleeding skepticism objection by far to skeptical theism is
that it is inconsistent with our having justified beliefs about what we ought to do in
response to suffering. The basic idea is simple: if we cannot be justified in thinking that
an omnipotent, omniscient being‘s allowances of various evils are not necessary for the
attainment of greater goods, then we cannot ever be justified in thinking that we ought to
intervene to prevent evils ourselves. Accepting skeptical theism, then, arguably commits
one to a paralyzing moral skepticism.54
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Another bleeding skepticism objection alleges that any theist who accepts
skeptical theism commits himself to a deep theological skepticism about divine
revelation. As Erik Weilenburg cogently argues, the skeptical theist is committed to
maintaining that, for all he knows, there would be a necessary connection between God‘s
deceiving him in any putative revelation of truth and the attainment of some greater
good.55 In that case, a skeptical theist is rationally prevented from believing that what
God says is true.
It has also been argued along these same lines that accepting skeptical theism
commits one to global skepticism since there might, for all we know, be a necessary
connection between God‘s putting us in a globally deceptive skeptical scenario and the
attainment of some greater good.56 Hence a theist in the literal sense (and perhaps an
agnostic as well) would not be able to believe with much confidence that he does not
exist in such a scenario.
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The Unfalsifiability Objection
I want to mention one final objection to skeptical theism of a different sort that
seems to me to be particularly pertinent. It seems to have been overshadowed in the
literature by the bleeding skepticism objections but not as a result of its merits. It
concerns the way in which skeptical theism seems to prevent us from being able to
identify any possible evils that an omnipotent, omniscient being would not be able to
allow. The objection appears very briefly in a published exchange on skeptical theism
between Rowe, Bergmann, and Howard-Snyder. There, Rowe argues as follows:

Since we don‘t know [according to the skeptical theist] that the goods we know of
are representative of the goods there are, we can‘t know that it is likely that there
are no goods that justify God in permitting human and animal life on earth to be
nothing more than a series of agonizing moments from birth to death. But such a
view is unreasonable, if not absurd.57

Derk Pereboom agrees with Rowe, adding, ―[I]f a skeptical theist strategy works equally
well no matter what the degree of evil in a world, one is thereby given reason to doubt its
value.‖58
Ian Wilks has recently picked up on this problem and has developed it into an
extremely cogent attack on skeptical theism. He argues that the real problem here is that
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skeptical theism makes theism empirically unfalsifiable (where unfalsifiable means
―rendered unreasonable to believe‖) since it employs a strategy that, if allowed, would
prevent any empirical state of affairs as counting as evidence against theism. As he puts
it,

Skeptical theism invokes the inscrutability of divine purposes without suggesting
limits on how inscrutable those purposes are, or constraints on how extensively
that consideration is to be employed. That consideration is therefore left free to
operate as a confounding factor against all use of empirical evidence to test claims
about God. Any such evidence against a claim can be undercut by appealing to an
unknown purpose.59

Imagine, for example, that the suffering in the world were 1,000 times more
horrific than it currently is. Even then, Wilks would argue, we would have no empirical
evidence against theism if skeptical theism is correct since there could just as well be
entailment relations beyond our grasp between God‘s allowances of all that suffering and
the attainment of greater goods.
In an unfortunate irony (unfortunate from the perspective of skeptical theists at
least), Wilks cites theistic philosopher Keith Yandell who once provided exactly that sort
of case in an effort to show—in response to objections—that religious theses like ―God
loves us‖ are empirically falsifiable. And as James Sennett notes in commenting on
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Yandell‘s case (presented below), ―[I]t is quite apparent that this scenario would also
count as some evidence, indeed very great evidence, against…the theistic God.‖60
Yandell asks us to imagine a case exhibiting the following features.

(a) Every sentient creature has, for every moment of his existence, been in such
pain that were he to have felt more pain he would have lost consciousness.
(b) This wretched condition is caused by biological features essential to the
species.
(c) Suicide is impossible and so is cessation of procreation, so that future
generations will exist under the same conditions.
(d) Insofar as intellectual life is possible under these circumstances, men rise
above the level of imbecility only to record and roundly curse their plight.
(e) Insofar as moral life is possible under these circumstances each man‘s deepest
wish is to increase the sufferings of every other if this were possible.61

Yandell argues that ―surely if our world were like this (and given that we could raise the
question), we would have good reason to deny that God loves us—as good as we have,
say, that cigarette smoking disposes [one] to lung cancer.‖62 Yandell would also
presumably conclude, as Sennett suspects, that this scenario would give us good reason to
think theism is false.
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Wilks argues, however, that skeptical theists cannot agree with this result. For
skeptical theism, at least in its current formulations, places no constraint on our inability
to detect God-justifying entailment relations. Wilks notes that it is hard to see how
skeptical theists could refine their skeptical arguments such that they clearly distinguish
between conceivable scenarios in which the skeptical theist‘s response is rational and
conceivable scenarios in which it is not. As he puts it,

Arguments for skeptical theism need to license a certain level of discounting [the
relevant human competency], and yet they need to be constrained not to license
too much. But this latter requirement is not addressed in existing formulations of
such arguments. Nor is it obvious that it can be addressed, since it appears to
demand a position that would be impossibly nuanced.63

To sum up, we now see that there are at least three tall obstacles standing in the
way of the success of the skeptical theist approach to responding to Rowe‘s evidential
argument. First, skeptical theists need to better motivate their skepticism of the relevant
human competency—a skepticism that, as I have argued throughout this chapter, will
have to be rather extreme given the relatively modest degree of competence presumed by
the Assumption of Sufficient Competence (the assumption needed to make the Noseeum
Inference for gratuitous evils). Second, skeptical theists need to somehow overcome the
barrage of the bleeding skepticism objections being lodged on them in the literature.
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Third, skeptical theists need to say something more definitive about why it is that the
skeptical theist strategy would be unreasonable in some conceivable scenarios (like
Yandell‘s) but not unreasonable in our actual situation in which we already observe a
great many inscrutable evils. None of this looks to be very easy, and hence there is ample
reason, I think, for theistic philosophers to consider a new strategy if one is available.

Chapter Summary
The recent debate over Rowe‘s evidential argument from evil has focused on the
plausibility of the skeptical theist attack on the atheist‘s insistence that inscrutable evils
justify belief in gratuitous evils. I have tried to show that neither the skeptical theist
attack nor the ensuing debate has been sufficiently focused, however, on the most
plausible formulation of that inference, namely my Noseeum Inference. A more
deliberate focus on the Noseeum Inference reveals that skeptical theists will need to
provide more compelling arguments to motivate our acceptance of their skepticism given
that this inference appears to be an extremely modest one built on the very modest
Assumption of Sufficient Competence. This problem of unmotivated skepticism
combines with the bleeding skepticism objections and the falsifiability worry to
constitute a most steep mountain for skeptical theists to climb. My goal in the rest of this
dissertation is to carve out a new path for theistic philosophers who want an adequate
response to the problem of inscrutable evils.
In Chapter 2, I will have us take a step back to look at the debate between
proponents of Rowe‘s evidential argument and skeptical theists from a meta-dialectical
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perspective. After providing a framework for understanding the existing dialectical goals
of these parties, I will argue that the dialectical goal of skeptical theism is much more
aggressive than it needs to be. Instead of arguing as skeptical theists do that no one has
justification for accepting the Assumption of Sufficient Competence, defenders of the
rationality of theism against Rowe‘s evidential argument need only argue that theists can
have special justifying grounds for rejecting it. This more modest dialectical goal yields
to a much more palatable approach, I think, than skeptical theism. I will also show that an
alternative approach along these lines is needed for independent reasons since skeptical
theism, even if successful, would be inadequate to justify the theist‘s actual stance
towards the relevant human competency—a position that goes beyond ―mere skepticism‖
of it.
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Chapter Introduction
In this chapter I take a broader look at the overall structure of the debate between
proponents of the evidential argument from evil and skeptical theists. I will show that, as
Rowe was himself aware in his original 1979 article, there are two very different
dialectical goals that proponents of the evidential argument from evil can have in mind
when advancing their argument. I will then show that there are two correspondingly
different dialectical goals that theists can have in responding to that argument. I will
argue that in advancing skeptical theism, theistic philosophers have likely chosen the
wrong one. Specifically, I will argue first that the dialectical goal of skeptical theism is
much more aggressive in an important respect than a theistic response to Rowe‘s
argument needs to be. This, I claim, helps explain why skeptical theism runs into the very
serious objections discussed in Chapter 1. Next, I will argue that the dialectical goal of
skeptical theism is another important respect more modest than a satisfactory theistic
response needs to be. Or, as I like to put all this, the dialectical goal of skeptical theism is
too aggressive in its scope and too modest in its depth. I then show how theists would
benefit from choosing the second of the two dialectical goals open to them. In keeping
with that goal, I suggest an alternative approach to responding to Rowe‘s argument based
on the epistemology of religious trust that avoids both defects in the dialectical goal of
skeptical theism.
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Some Varieties of Atheism and Rowe’s Dialectical Goal
Consider again Rowe‘s evidential argument from evil:

1) If God exists, gratuitous evils would not exist.
2) Gratuitous evils exist.
 3) God does not exist.

What are proponents of this argument trying to show? The obvious answer is that
they are trying to convince us all that God does not exist, seeing as how that is the stated
conclusion of their argument. But there is a second, more modest goal some proponents
of the argument might have in mind. Some may be purporting to offer this argument only
as a justification of their own atheism, which is to say they want to show that they (and
like-minded folks) are justified in accepting atheism because they (and like-minded folks)
are justified in accepting the argument‘s premises. Notice that an atheist taking this
approach is free to leave open the question whether some other folks could be justified in
rejecting one of those premises. Indeed, I will now show that Rowe himself made it very
clear in his initial offering of this argument that he does not want to assert that no one is
justified in rejecting his crucial premise that gratuitous evils exist. So, I read Rowe as
aiming to achieve only the weaker of these dialectical goals, namely that of providing a
sufficient justification for his own atheism (and the atheism of other like-minded folks).
It is ironic that this dialectical distinction seems to be largely overlooked in the
debate over Rowe‘s argument given that his original publication of it came with the
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conjunctive title, ―The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism‖ [emphasis
mine]. It is in the ―varieties of atheism‖ bit that Rowe emphasizes his intention to pursue
only the more modest goal outlined above. There, he classifies the possible answers a
proponent of his evidential argument can give to the question of whether some folks
could be justified in believing that God exists in spite of it. As he puts it, the atheist—i.e.,
a proponent of his evidential argument—can give one of three answers to that question,
which he labels ―unfriendly atheism,‖ ―indifferent atheism,‖ and ―friendly atheism.‖ Here
is what each of those three atheists will say on the matter:

The Unfriendly Atheist:
―No one is justified in believing that God exists in the face of Rowe‘s evidential
argument.‖

The Indifferent Atheist:
―I make no claim as to whether any one is justified in believing that God exists in
the face of Rowe‘s evidential argument.‖

The Friendly Atheist:
―Some folks are likely justified in believing that God exists even in the face of
Rowe‘s evidential argument.‖1

11

I have adapted these construals of the varieties of atheism from Rowe‘s own third-person construals. See
his ―The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism,‖ 340.
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As I will be adopting these monikers in what follows, it is important to keep in
mind that they have nothing whatsoever to do with the behavioral dispositions of atheists
towards theists. An ―unfriendly atheist‖ in Rowe‘s stipulative sense can be a perfectly
friendly neighbor to the theist in the usual sense, and a ―friendly atheist‖ in Rowe‘s sense
might be a generally nasty person. The unfriendly atheist should also be distinguished
from the so-called ―new atheist‖ who seeks to actively rid folks of their religious beliefs.
Unfriendly atheism, in this context, is just a philosophical view about the epistemic status
of theism; it is neither a behavior nor an agenda.
Rowe himself espouses friendly atheism in that article, not because he we worries
that his evidential argument from evil is insufficient to justify his atheism but because he
suspects some theists can reasonably take themselves to have an even better case for the
existence of God than they have for the existence of gratuitous evils. The ―reasonably
take themselves‖ qualifier is important here; it is not as if Rowe thinks there actually are
better reasons to believe in God than there are to believe in gratuitous evils. After all, he
is convinced of the existence of gratuitous evils and hence the falsity of theism. As he
puts it, the friendly atheist is only committed to the view that ―the theist has rational
grounds for his belief, a belief the atheist rejects and is convinced he is rationally justified
in rejecting.‖2 Given this, he expects it is within the epistemic rights of some theists to
reject the crucial premise in the evidential argument—i.e., the premise that gratuitous
evils exist—by making a move he calls the ―G.E. Moore Shift‖ (hereafter, the ―Moorean
Shift).

2

Rowe, ―The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism,‖ 340.
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The Moorean Shift
In a famous attempt to defeat arguments for skepticism, G.E. Moore turned the
skeptic‘s argument on its head.3 The general strategy of the skeptic is to argue as follows.

4) If a certain epistemic principle is true (e.g., the principle that knowledge
requires certainty), then we do not have knowledge of the external world.
5) That epistemic principle is true.
 6) We do not have knowledge of the external world.

Moore thought he could reject this argument simply by arguing that the negation of (6) is
more obvious than the truth of (5), and he used the example of a pencil to make his point.
Moore reasoned as follows:

4) If a certain epistemic principle is true (e.g., the principle that knowledge
requires certainty), then we do not have knowledge of the external world.
~6) We do have knowledge of the external world (e.g., We do know this pencil
exists).
 ~5) That epistemic principle is not true.4

3

Gerald Edward Moore, ―Hume‘s Theory Examined,‖ in Some Main Problems of Philosophy (New York:
Humanities Press, 1953): 108-26.
4
Moore, ―Hume‘s Theory Examined,‖ 119-21n
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Thus Moore accepts the conditional premise of the skeptic‘s argument but ―shifts‖ the
ultimate outcome of the argument in his favor by asserting (~6) instead of (5), from
which it follows that (~5)
Moore‘s response skepticism received strongly mixed reactions, particularly since
he was unable to offer much in the way of a supporting argument for the negation of the
skeptic‘s conclusion. Whatever the merits of Moore‘s particular argument, however,
there is nothing inherently wrong with the Moorean Shift strategy in general; it functions
simply by arguing, as is typical in philosophical dialogue, that one proposition is more
plausible than another. When presented with an argument of the form

If p then q.
P.
Therefore, q.

a Moorean Shift responds by accepting the conditional premise and arguing that ~q is
actually more plausible than p from which it follows that ~p. This provides one grounds
against accepting the premise that p in the original argument. Since there is nothing
wrong with arguing that one claim is more plausible than another, there is nothing
inherently wrong with the Moorean Shift strategy. A successful Moorean Shift requires
only that its proponent have a more compelling case for the negation of his opponent‘s
conclusion than his opponent can provide for her crucial premise.
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Rowe suggests that the theist might attempt to apply the Moorean Shift in
defending theism against his evidential argument by reasoning as follows.

7) If God exists, there would be no gratuitous evils.
8) God exists.
 9) There are no gratuitous evils.

As Rowe points out, if the theist can have grounds for God‘s existence that are stronger
than the grounds inscrutable evils give us for the existence of gratuitous evils, then the
theist can be justified in rejecting his evidential argument.
But what grounds could the theist have for being more confident in the existence
of God than they are in the existence of gratuitous evils? Rowe suggests that the theist
could,

[E]ndeavor to justify his belief by appealing to one or more of the traditional
arguments: Ontological, Cosmological, Teleological, Moral, etc. Second, he might
appeal to certain aspects of religious experience, perhaps even his own religious
experience. Third, he might try to justify theism as a plausible theory in terms of
which we can account for a variety of phenomena.5

5

Rowe, ―The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism,‖ 340.
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Rowe obviously does not find any of these grounds for theism—i.e., the grounds afforded
by natural theology, the appeal to religious experience, and the appeal to explanatory
power—compelling enough to justify belief in theism for him. His question, though, is
whether atheists have any reason to think some theists do have such justifying grounds
for their own theism.
It is at this juncture that Rowe explains his reason for preferring friendly atheism
over indifferent atheism and unfriendly atheism.

Although an atheist must hold that the theistic God does not exist, can he not also
believe, and be justified in so believing, that some of these ―justifications of
theism‖ do actually rationally justify some theists in their belief that there exists a
supremely good, omnipotent, omniscient being? It seems to me that he can.‖6

Rowe first points out that it would be absurd to deny that at least someone in the history
of humanity has been in an evidential situation that rendered theism justifiable for her.

If we think of the long history of theistic belief and the special situations in which
people are sometimes placed, it is perhaps as absurd to think that no one was ever
rationally justified in believing that the theistic God exists as it is to think that no

6

Rowe, ―The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism,‖ 340.
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one was ever justified in believing that human beings would never walk on the
moon.7

This is a rather trivial point, though, as Rowe notices. He goes on to make clear
that he does not want to extend his friendly atheism only to cases like these in which
religious believers would be non-culpably ignorant of the various compelling objections
to theism he himself is aware of.

But in suggesting that friendly atheism is preferable to unfriendly atheism, I don‘t
mean to rest the case on what some human beings might reasonably have believed
in the eleventh or thirteenth century. The more interesting question is whether
some people in modern society, people who are aware of the usual grounds for
belief and disbelief and are acquainted to some degree with modern science, are
yet rationally justified in accepting theism. Friendly atheism is a significant
position only if it answers this question in the affirmative.

In what follows, I will refer to the sort of theist Rowe has in mind in that quote as
an ―ably-informed‖ theist. Rowe extends his friendly atheist sensibilities to ablyinformed theists as well, noting that his view is not without an air of paradox. As he puts
it,

7
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It is not difficult for an atheist to be friendly when he has reason to believe that
the theist could not reasonably be expected to be acquainted with the grounds for
disbelief that he (the atheist) possesses…Friendly atheism becomes paradoxical,
however, when the atheist contemplates believing that the theist has all the
grounds for atheism that he, the atheist, has, and yet is rationally justified in
maintaining his theistic belief. But even so excessively friendly a view as this
perhaps can be held by the atheist if he also has some reason to think that the
grounds for theism are not as telling as the theist is justified in taking them to be.8

I gather from this quote that despite self-identifying as a friendly atheist towards
ably-informed theists, Rowe is not prepared to assert this position with much confidence.
Suffice it to say, though, he does seem confident that something between indifferent
atheism and friendly atheism is the appropriate response to take. In other words, he thinks
unfriendly atheism is uncalled for, and that seems to be the more important point in
establishing his overall dialectical goal. Rowe does not wish to pursue the more
aggressive dialectical goal of offering his evidential argument from evil as a decisive case
against the rationality of theism. His is the more modest goal of purporting to show only
how it is that he and other like-minded folks who lack good reason to believe in theism
can be justified in believing that God does not exist on the basis of inscrutable evils.

8

Rowe, ―The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism,‖ 340.
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Some Varieties of Theism and the Skeptical Theist’s Dialectical Goal
Somewhat astonishingly, theists (by and large) chose to respond to Rowe‘s
argument not by attempting to validate his ―friendly‖ suspicion that they can be justified
in rejecting it by way of a Moorean Shift9 but rather by advancing a position that is just as
―unfriendly‖ to atheists as the unfriendly atheism shunned by Rowe is to theists. That
position is the immensely popular skeptical theism discussed in Chapter 1. To see why
skeptical theism is unfriendly to atheists, let us look at three parallel ―varieties of theism‖
that can be drawn to Rowe‘s three varieties of atheism.
Upon being presented with Rowe‘s evidential argument from evil, the theist can
take one of three positions on how successful they think that argument is as a justification
of atheism.

The Unfriendly Theist:
―No one is justified in accepting atheism on the basis of the evidential argument.‖

The Indifferent Theist:
―I make no claim as to whether one can be justified in accepting atheism on the
basis of the evidential argument.‖
9

In fact, I have noticed only a couple of brief mentions of the Moorean Shift in the literature. See Michael
J. Murray and Michael Rea, ―Anti-Theistic Arguments,‖ in An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008): 165-67; McBrayer, ―Skeptical Theism,‖ p. 621, note 5;
and Trent Dougherty, ―Recent Work on the Problem of Evil,‖ Analysis Reviews 71, no. 3 (2011): 565.
Rowe himself expresses surprise at the course the debate over his argument has taken in William Rowe,
―Friendly Atheism, Skeptical Theism, and the Problem of Evil,‖ International Journal for Philosophy of
Religion 59, no. 2 (2006): 80-81.
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The Friendly Theist:
―Some folks are likely justified in accepting atheism on the basis of the evidential
argument.‖

Why the Skeptical Theist’s Dialectical Goal is Too Aggressive in Scope
Notice now the remarkable irony that has transpired in the debate over Rowe‘s
argument. Whereas the originator of the evidential argument himself espoused a friendly
atheism, his argument has been met by an onslaught of unfriendly theistic attacks.
Skeptical theists argue that no one (at least no one who is privy to the skeptical
considerations they offer) is justified in taking inscrutable evils as sufficient evidence for
gratuitous evils. Hence, they argue, no one (again, at least no one who is privy to
skeptical theism) is justified in accepting atheism on the basis of Rowe‘s evidential
argument.
Recall that skeptical theism attempts to undercut the atheist‘s grounds for
believing that gratuitous evils exist by rebutting the atheist‘s crucial assumption, namely
the Assumption of Sufficient Competence.10 Here, again, is that assumption properly
formulated.

10

The distinction between ―undercutting‖ and ―rebutting‖ defeaters I allude to here is now commonplace in
epistemology and was introduced in John Pollock, Contemporary Theories of Knowledge (Totowa, N.J.:
Rowman Littlefield, 1986), 37-39. An undercutting defeater is one that renders a person‘s grounds for a
belief inadequate to justify that belief. A rebutting defeater is one that affords one justification for thinking
the belief is false. For a helpful discussion on the defeasibility of beliefs see Michael Bergmann,
―Defeaters,‖ in Justification Without Awareness: A Defense of Epistemic Externalism (New York: Oxford
University Press, USA, 2006), 153-77.
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The Assumption of Sufficient Competence
We humans can justifiably consider ourselves sufficiently competent about the
ways in which an omnipotent, omniscient being‘s allowances of evils would be
needed to contribute to greater goods such that our inability to identify for any
member of a very large and diverse sample of evils E1…En a way in which his
allowing that evil would be necessary for some greater good justifies our believing
that his allowances of at least some of E1…En would not necessary for greater
goods.

According to the skeptical theist no humans can justifiably consider themselves
sufficiently competent in the sense specified by this assumption. The CORNEA strand of
skeptical theism alleges this is so because purely philosophical reflection shows that we
cannot reasonably expect to have epistemic access to the relevant entailment relations.
The representative-sample strand of skeptical theism alleges it is because purely
philosophical reflection shows that we cannot take ourselves to have a suitably
representative sample of the relevant entailment relations. Since these skeptical
considerations have the same weight for all parties, skeptical theists conclude that no one
is justified in making the Assumption of Sufficient Competence in light of them. Hence
the skeptical theist‘s dialectical goal is very aggressive in scope; it attempts to provide
everyone with a defeater for the Assumption of Sufficient Competence, and so, to
undercut even the atheist‘s justification for the crucial premise that gratuitous evils exist.
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It is worth stressing that, unlike the Moorean Shift strategy Rowe proposes on
behalf of theists, the skeptical theist‘s case for rejecting Rowe‘s argument makes no
appeal whatsoever to the theist‘s positive grounds for accepting theism. According to the
skeptical theist, we should all reject Rowe‘s evidential argument for atheism, not because
any of us have good reason to believe that God actually exists, but because of the
supposedly unreasonable presumption of competence required to accept Rowe‘s crucial
premise that gratuitous evils exist. But if, as I argued in Chapter 1, that presumption of
competence does not seem so unreasonable once it is carefully articulated, skeptical
theism becomes a very hard sell indeed. It should not be surprising, then, that skeptical
theism has run up against the flurry of powerful objections in the philosophical literature
surveyed in Chapter 1. Pursuing such an aggressive dialectical goal is bound to get one
into a good amount of philosophical trouble.

Why the Skeptical Theist’s Dialectical Goal is Too Modest in Depth
I want now to raise a second problem I find with the dialectical goal of the
skeptical theist approach. This problem is independent of the first, so those who do not
share my view that theists should grant the proponent of the evidential argument his
Assumption of Sufficient Competence will still have a reason, on my view, to think that
skeptical theism is an inadequate theistic response to the argument. In advocating for a
skepticism of the human competency to detect any God-justifying reasons for the world‘s
many inscrutable evils, skeptical theists neglect defending the theist‘s actual doxastic
attitude towards that competency. The theist is in no position to take a merely skeptical
view of that human competency—the sort of ―for all we know, we could be that
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incompetent‖ attitude endorsed by the skeptical theist. Rather, her positive commitment
to the existence of God, and consequently, her positive commitment to the non-existence
of gratuitous evils commits her to a positively dismissive view of that competency. That
is, she is required to maintain that given the vast amount of inscrutable evil in our world,
we must really be that incompetent. It is here that the unfriendly atheist can seek to have
the upper hand even if skeptical theists somehow prove able to motivate their skepticism.
For even then, the unfriendly atheist may allege that—skepticisms aside—the theist is
nonetheless unjustified in being so utterly dismissive of the relevant human
competency.11
In other words, the theist then cannot rest satisfied with a response to the
evidential argument from evil that leaves her merely with reason to think that an
omniscient, omnipotent being might well need to allow all the world‘s inscrutable
sufferings for greater goods. Rather, she needs reason to think he really would need to
allow them. The fact that there are so many inscrutable evils thus commits her to thinking
that we truly are seriously incompetent in the relevant domain—not just that we might be.
It is here that I think the theist is in a particularly vulnerable epistemic position.
This is compounded if she grants, as I have argued she should, that the Assumption of
11

Movie buffs will recognize the distinction I am drawing between ―mere skepticism‖ and ―dismissivism‖
from the way in which Neo, the protagonist of the Matrix series, transitions from being merely skeptical of
his competency to form reliably true beliefs about the external world via his senses to being positively
dismissive of that competency. Early in the movie, Neo begins to notice certain oddities in his surroundings
that cause him to suspect that he might well be in some sort of deceptive scenario. At this stage, he is
merely skeptical of that competency. While he certainly has more reason to fear being in a systematically
deceptive scenario than the average person, and so, more reason to suspect his incompetence, he does not at
this point have so much reason that it would justify his being positively dismissive of that competency.
Later, however, the truth of the Matrix world is revealed to Neo, and he consequently has reason to be
positively dismissive about his competency to reliably form true beliefs via sense perception whenever he
is knowingly plugged into the Matrix.
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Sufficient Competence is an otherwise plausible assumption for one to make in the first
place. She might feel (and perhaps ought to feel) the weight of the world‘s many
inscrutable evils eroding her confidence that God is truly trustworthy to prevent
gratuitous evils. She needs reason to go on trusting God in the face of these inscrutable
evils. Even if the skeptical theists can convince her that skepticism of that competency is
appropriate, she will need more. She seeks to maintain her trust in God, but she
recognizes that this commits her to thinking that all the world‘s inscrutable sufferings are
actually non-gratuitous in ways we cannot perceive. Noticing that this commits her to
confessing a significant degree of incompetence that is rather unexpectable, she wonders
if her trust in God is not hopelessly naïve.

A New Dialectical Goal for Theists: The Religious Trust Approach
Thus I submit that if theistic philosophers want to offer her an adequately deep
response to the evidential argument from evil—i.e., if they want to defend the rationality
of the theist‘s outright ―dismissivism‖ of the relevant competency—they will have to
abandon skeptical theism in favor of the Moorean Shift approach. I propose, though, that
they frame the Moorean Shift strategy a bit differently from the schema Rowe proposed
on her behalf. Rowe suggests that the theist start with the truth of theism as her major
premise and consequently deduce the non-existence of gratuitous evils. The sort of
religious believer I have in mind, though, does not so much feel herself assenting to the
proposition that theism is true in the face of inscrutable evils as much as she feels herself
trusting a person. She trusts her ―God,‖ and while this commits her to assenting to
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various propositions—e.g., the proposition 'inscrutable evils are non-gratuitous,‘ and
consequently, the proposition ‗we are seriously incompetent in the relevant domain‘—the
overwhelming phenomenology of her cognitive situation is one of clinging to a person as
a devoted follower rather than clinging to a proposition in the face of counterweighing
evidence. Her Moorean Shift, then, runs roughly as follows.

10) If God is trustworthy to prevent gratuitous evils, then gratuitous evils do not
exist.
11) God is trustworthy to prevent gratuitous evils.
 12) Gratuitous evils do not exist.

My suggestion, then, is that to properly evaluate the rationality of the theist‘s
belief that inscrutable evils are non-gratuitous and her subsequent dismissivism of the
relevant human competency, one must ultimately evaluate the rationality of the trust that
leads her to hold these beliefs. If the rationality of her trust in God can be adequately
defended, unfriendly atheism would be defeated. Let us call the approach to responding
to Rowe‘s evidential argument that focuses on defending the rationality of the theist‘s
trust in God the ―religious trust‖ approach.
In addition to offering the theist a way of defending the rationality of her actual
position on the Assumption of Sufficient Competence in a way that skeptical theism
cannot even purport to do, the religious trust approach would also have the comparative
advantage of resonating much more deeply, I think, with the believer‘s own doxastic
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practices. The typical believer does not look at the vast array of inscrutable evils in the
world and ask the skeptical theist‘s question, ―Does my inability to see how God‘s
allowances of these evils are necessary constitute evidence that they are gratuitous?‖
Rather, she jumps straight to the question, ―Can I—should I—trust my God to have a
good and loving purpose here?‖ If she ends up concluding that those inscrutable evils
must be non-gratuitous in ways she cannot perceive, it will not likely be because she has
reflected on the various skeptical considerations that call her own competence into
question but because she has decided to go on trusting God.
A further and most crucial advantage of the religious trust approach over the
skeptical theist approach is that the religious trust approach need not be at all unfriendly
to atheists. To defend the claim that theists can obtain a defeater for the Assumption of
Sufficient Competence from her grounds for trusting God does not at all entail that the
atheist also has a defeater for that assumption. Hence the religious trust approach would
stand to be a good bit more dialectically palatable to proponents of the evidential
argument from evil.
It is not as if I think defenders of religious trust should make use of the religious
trust approach‘s ability to avoid unfriendly theism solely in the interest of dialectical
prudence; it seems to me that friendly theism is genuinely the most reasonable of all the
varieties of theism to espouse given that (a) the theist cannot reasonably expect her
crucial grounds trusting God to be shared by all non-theists and (b) is prepared to grant,
as I think she should, that the Assumption of Sufficient Competence is a reasonable
assumption for a non-theist to make. I have said enough at this point about why I think
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skeptical theists have not shown it unreasonable for the non-theist to accept the
Assumption of Sufficient Competence. I now want to explain why I think defenders of
religious trust should expect that the religious truster‘s own defeating grounds for that
assumption (assuming for the moment she have such grounds) could not be used in an
argument for thinking non-theists should also give up that assumption.
To provide the non-theist with a defeater for the Assumption of Sufficient
Competence by way of the religious trust approach, the theist would need to make a
compelling case as to why the non-theist should also trust God to prevent gratuitous evils.
This would presumably require advancing the various arguments for theism that make up
the project of natural theology. This is essentially what Richard Swinburne attempts to do
in his The Existence of God.12 Swinburne argues (unlike the skeptical theist) that the
argument from evil does, in itself, count noticeably against the probability of theism but
that the theistic proofs are, when considered as a collective whole, strong enough to
overcome the evidence from evil and render theism overall probable. He calls this his
―cumulative case‖ for theism. While I do not want to suggest that a quick dismissal of
Swinburne‘s dense and important contribution to the philosophy of religion is in order, I
advise against formulating the religious trust approach in these terms for the following
reasons.
First, it is widely recognized that two of the main players in natural theology—
i.e., the cosmological and teleological arguments—can at best establish the existence of a
highly powerful, personal creator and sustainer of the universe but can offer no evidence

12

Richard Swinburne, The Existence of God, 2nd ed. (Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press, 2004).
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for thinking that deity is overall benevolent. Hence those arguments can afford us no
reason for trusting him to prevent gratuitous evils. Indeed, the only arguments from
natural theology I am aware of that can purport to offer evidence of God‘s supreme
trustworthiness are the ontological argument and certain versions of the moral argument.
In short, the cumulative case for a trustworthy God would not be so cumulative after all.13
But even supposing some theists are justified in accepting the natural theologian‘s
arguments that would support the existence of a trustworthy God, it would be
unreasonable, or at the very least highly imprudent, for theistic philosophers to press
these arguments as a defeater for the non-theist‘s Assumption of Sufficient Competence.
After all, arguing that everyone should accept the ontological and/or moral argument for
the existence of God is not much less aggressive than arguing that we should all reject the
Assumption of Sufficient Competence on skeptical grounds. So, this is not at all what I
have in mind in calling for an alternative to skeptical theism.
It is best, I think, for the theist to move away from the unfriendly theist‘s goal
altogether and seek only to defend the rationality of (some of) those who already find
themselves trusting God. And even here, I do not think an appeal to natural theology is in
the theist‘s best interest, as it could stand to achieve little in defending the rationality of
actual religious trustings. It is the rare theist indeed whose trust in God is based on her
appreciation of the ontological argument. As I see it, the goal of the philosopher of
religion who wishes to defend the rationality of religious trust should be to offer an

13

Peter van Inwagen concurs: ―None of the ‗theistic‘ arguments that are currently regarded as at all
promising is, therefore, really an argument for theism.‖ [original emphasis]. From ―The Problem of Evil,
the Problem of Air, and the Problem of Silence,‖ Philosophical Perspectives, 5 (1991): 138.
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account that does not have as its best-case outcome that only a few of the world‘s most
brilliant philosophers (if there are any) who can successfully overcome the dense
objections to natural theology‘s arguments for a perfect deity can be justified in trusting
God.14 This, then, is my final reason for thinking the religious trust approach should not
be subsumed under the project of natural theology: an account of how it is that a believer
can plausibly be justified in trusting God in the face of inscrutable evils should aim to
extend to (at least some) layperson religious trusters as well as professional
philosophers.15
This gives rise to an important question: On what do religious believers tend to
base their trust in God in the face of inscrutable evils? Obviously, this answer will vary
from believer to believer, so I will focus my discussion on the sort of grounds for trust in
God that I am most familiar with from within the Judeo-Christian theistic tradition. A
good number of those believers will make an appeal in one way or another to their own
experience of God as a good and trustworthy being. I will have more to say about this in
Chapter 5, but I note here that I do not think these will be the sorts of grounds they could
plausibly expect to serve as a defeater for the atheist‘s Assumption of Sufficient
Competence. The best they can hope for is that those grounds are strong enough to serve
as a defeater of that assumption for them. And given their recognition of the weight of
inscrutable evils, many of them might well confess that this is far from a guarantee.

14

To be fair, a proponent of the natural theology strategy I am dismissing could argue that the justified trust
possessed by these philosophical experts could extend to other religious believers by way of their ―expert‖
testimony to other religious believers, but this point does not seem much worth pursuing.
15
This is not, of course, to say that we should aim at an account that will show that all believers are justified
in trusting God. Some believers might have good reasons for trusting him, but it is to be expected that many
will have quite paltry reasons.
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Some Preliminaries for the Religious Trust Approach
Thus far I have explained that the religious trust approach will seek to defend the
rationality of the believer‘s trust in God and that it will steer clear of unfriendly theism in
the process. But there is a further question to ask about the intended goal of ―defending‖
the rationality of religious trust. One way to pursue this goal would be to argue that some
religious trusters are indeed justified in trusting God. This, in other words, would be to
argue that Rowe was right to choose friendly atheism over indifferent atheism. A more
modest way to defend the rationality of religious trust would be to argue that it is
plausible enough to think that some (sufficiently informed) religious trusters are justified
in trusting God such that it would be unwarranted for the proponent of the evidential
argument to assume that none of them are. This, in other words, would be to argue that
Rowe is correct in thinking unfriendly atheism is unacceptable. This latter goal is a good
bit more modest than the former. One way to achieve this more modest goal would be to
show that there is some significantly underexplored territory in the epistemology of
religious trust that looks promising enough for the epistemic status of religious trust to
render unfriendly atheism too hasty. Success on that point could at least assure the theist
that there need be nothing demonstrably irrational about her trust in God in the face of
inscrutable evils. No doubt she would prefer to see the stronger defensive goal achieved
as well, but success in achieving this weaker goal would at least be a step in defending
her actual position (i.e., dismissivism of the relevant competency), which is something
skeptical theism cannot do for her.
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I hope my reader will not be too disappointed that I intend to pursue only the
weaker of these two defensive goals in this dissertation. More specifically, I will argue
that there is a good bit of underexplored territory in the epistemology of religious trust
(and the epistemology of trust in general) and that there are a number of points on which
the theist might well be able to develop a claim to justified trust in God. This, I argue,
does seem to make unfriendly atheism too hasty. I will stop well short, though, of
claiming that the epistemic status of religious trusters has been vindicated by my brief
investigation into this underexplored territory. Perhaps, though, my discussion will at
least get the ball rolling for others who might wish to pursue that goal.
Having selected my own dialectical goal as the project of arguing that unfriendly
atheism—in its claim that no one is justified in trusting God to prevent gratuitous evils—
is a bit too hasty, my next order of business is to clarify how I intend to use the concept
―God‖ in the rest of this project. It is typical in the philosophy of religion for ―God‖ to
stand as an honorific title for ―the omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent being of
standard Western monotheisms.‖ I do not, however, wish to use ―God‖ in this way in
what follows. This is because I want to focus on questions about the rationality of trusting
God that do not presuppose from the outset that God is wholly trustworthy.16 I find the
questions I have in mind most pertinent given that most reflective religious believers
would assent to the possibility that the deity they worship may turn out to be less than

16

This is not to say that there are not interesting philosophical questions to ask about trusting a being that
one considers to be wholly trustworthy. For this see Marcel Sarot, ―Why Trusting God Differs from
Trusting Others,‖ Sophia 35, no. 1 (1996): 101-15; Sheela Pawar, Trusting Others, Trusting God: Concepts
of Belief, Faith, and Rationality, (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2009); and most recently Joseph J. Godfrey,
Trust of People, Words, and God: A Route for Philosophy of Religion (Notre Dame: University of Notre
Dame Press, 2012).
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worthy of their devotion after all.17 In other words, the sort of religious believer I have in
mind recognizes that she is taking a significant epistemic risk in trusting God that goes
beyond the possibility that the object of her trust does not exist at all (e.g., as in the
possibility that naturalism is true). She recognizes the further daunting possibility that
though God exists, he is not as trustworthy as she takes him to be. Indeed, many believers
will feel the weight of this second possibility more so than the first when trying to make
sense of their personal religious experiences (which convince them of a loving
supernatural agent) in light of the world‘s vast array of inscrutable evils (which call his
trustworthiness into question). For them, the question of what it would take to be justified
in trusting God is a real and pressing question and one I think philosophers of religion
ought to address. Interestingly, though, the question does not seem to have gotten much
focused treatment among analytic philosophers. This dissertation seeks to begin
remedying that.
To best focus my project on addressing this question, I ask my reader to make a
rather generous assumption for the sake of argument. Let us grant that (some) religious
believers are justified in believing that there is some supernatural being that suitably
serves as the referent of their term ―God.‖ By ―suitably serve‖ I mean that the being
possesses at least some of the distinguishing qualities of the ―God‖ of standard theism—
let us say that, at minimum, he possesses personhood, agency, and tremendous causal
powers over the natural universe. My concept ―God‖ can thus be construed as an

17

A philosophically sophisticated theist might prefer to say that she assents only to the epistemic possibility
that her God might not be perfect so as to avoid making any metaphysical modal claim on the subject.
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honorific title for a being that possesses at least these baseline divine properties,18 and we
will be assuming for the sake of convenience that religious believers can be justified in
believing that there is an actual being that stands as the referent of this concept. Thus
(and more to the point) ―God‖ will also stand as a proper name for the object of their
religious beliefs, and more importantly, the object of their devoted trust.19
I recognize that not everyone will see much reason to think this working
assumption is actually true, but it is important to note that nothing in the evidential
argument from evil rules it out. That argument, after all, is an argument for atheism and
not naturalism. So the unfriendly atheist who wants to argue that theists are not even
justified in believing this much would be going well beyond the bounds of Rowe‘s
argument from evil. For what it is worth, my own view is that there is a respectable
amount of evidence from natural theology (beyond the personal evidence of religious
experience) to support the assumption that God (so defined) exists, but it would be well
beyond the scope of this dissertation to defend the merits of those arguments. Even so, I
think committed naturalists who would resoundingly reject such arguments can
nonetheless take interest in the question of whether—and if so, how—a person who is by
hypothesis justified in believing that such a being exists could also be justified in trusting
this being to such an enormous extent that she can confidently rely on him to ensure that
the world‘s inscrutable evils are non-gratuitous and is thereby willing to consider herself

18

Coincidentally, this is essentially what Graham Oppy recently argues is required in being ―God.‖ See his,
―Gods,‖ in Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion: Volume 2, ed. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2009): 231-50.
19
This, after all, is the name most religious believers use to reference him.
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and all her fellow humans seriously incompetent in the relevant moral domain.20 We are
thus looking here at a very radical trust in God. Is there any reason to think it plausible
that such a radical trust could be justified—i.e., justified in a sense that would enable one
to have an epistemically appropriate belief that no inscrutable evils are gratuitous? That is
our question going forward.

Chapter Summary
I have argued in this chapter that the dialectical goal of skeptical theists is amiss
for two reasons. First, it is much more aggressive in its scope than a theistic response to
Rowe‘s evidential argument needs to be. Skeptical theism attempts to provide all parties
to the debate with a defeater for the Assumption of Sufficient Competence on purely
philosophical, publicly-shareable grounds. But given that it seems reasonable for a person
to think the Assumption of Sufficient Competence is a rather modest assumption of
competency, this makes the skeptical theist‘s task of motivating skepticism of it for
everyone quite ambitious. Instead, theists need only claim that they have a defeater for the
Assumption of Sufficient Competence. I have suggested that they appeal to the grounds
they have for trusting God as a defense of this position—grounds they cannot expect all
parties to the debate to share. Second, the dialectical goal of skeptical theists is too
modest in its depth to defend the rationality of the theist‘s actual stance towards

20

To those who are disposed to think that modern science has in some way rendered belief in a supernatural
creator irrational in the first place, I think my question could still be interesting when posed with an eye to
history. Could folks who existed prior to the major developments in cosmology and biology of the last few
hundred years—say in the larger part of theism‘s existence—have had good reason to trust in God?
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gratuitous evils. Theists are committed to maintaining that we really are significantly
incompetent in the relevant domain; hence the ―mere skepticism‖ advocated by skeptical
theists—even if successfully motivated—could not defend their actual position on the
matter. Here again, I think theists must make an appeal to their grounds for trusting God;
it is their trust in him that, for better or worse, leads them to think we are significantly
incompetent about the reasons an omnipotent, omniscient being would need to allow the
world‘s many inscrutable evils.

A Look Ahead
As I already stated, the question of whether and how a religious believer could be
justified in trusting God to prevent gratuitous evils is not much discussed in the
philosophy of religion. Perhaps one reason for this is that the phenomenon of trust itself
received little attention in the at-large contemporary philosophical literature until rather
recently. It was not until Annette Baier‘s influential article ―Trust and Anti-Trust,‖
published in 1986, that contemporary analytic philosophers began to take a hard look at
trust.21 As Karen Jones, another prominent thinker on the topic of trust, notes,

Where prior to ―Trust and Anti-Trust,‖ there were at most a few scattered remarks
[about trust] to be found in the philosophical literature, nowadays there is a whole
menu of theories for someone interested in philosophical perspectives on trust to

21

Annette Baier, ―Trust and Anti-Trust,‖ Ethics 96, no. 2 (1986): 231-60.
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choose from. All new encyclopedia projects contain entries on trust, as do indexes
in books on political theory, moral philosophy, and epistemology.22

The discussion over trust has continued to pick up steam after Jones penned those words
in 2004. Trust was given an entry in the now widely-used Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy in 2006 and was most recently featured in Oxford‘s popular ―A Very Short
Introduction‖ series with a 2012 installment by Katherine Hawley.23
My research of this budding philosophical discussion has led me to at least one
firm conclusion on the topic of trust: trust is a surprisingly complex phenomenon,
yielding a wide array of conceptual and evaluative puzzles for philosophers to debate.
That said, I hope to show that enough progress has been made on some of these issues to
yield some potentially fruitful contributions to our question about religious trust that
philosophers of religion have yet to explore.24
I will focus my next two chapters on addressing two pressing questions about
trust being discussed in the contemporary philosophical literature. Chapter 3 focuses on
the nature of trust. What distinguishes a state of genuinely trusting a person from various
22

Karen Jones, ―Trust and Terror,‖ in Moral Psychology: Feminist Ethics and Social Theory ed. Peggy
DesAutels and Margaret Urban Walker, (Lanham, MD: Rowan and Littlefield Press, 2004): 3.
23
Carolyn McLeod, "Trust,‖ in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2011 Edition), ed.
Edward N. Zalta. URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/trust/; Katherine Hawley, Trust:
A Very Short Introduction, (Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press, 2012).
24
I am aware of two works that do make explicit applications from the literature on trust I will be
examining to the issue of trusting God. These include the previously cited Sheela Pawar, Trusting Others,
Trusting God; and Joseph J. Godfrey, Trust of People, Words, and God. These projects are quite distinct
from mine, though, in that (i) they examine trust in God within contexts that presuppose that God is by
definition fully trustworthy whereas I do not, and (ii) they are largely unconcerned with evaluating whether
and how a person can be justified in trusting God in the face of inscrutable evils, whereas that is the central
issue of my project. For a case in point, consider that Godfrey‘s 498-page volume—certainly the most
extensive study on trusting God I am aware of—devotes only four pages to a section entitled ―Evil and
Trusting Directed Towards God‖ in which he makes his only explicit comments about the problem of evil.
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states of non-trust? As we will see, philosophers have had quite a difficult time
definitively answering this question. I will survey their attempts to answer this question
before offering an original analysis of trust that I think avoids the problems facing extant
analyses. Chapter 4 then focuses on a particular difficulty in the epistemology of trust
having to do with the way in which we tend to be biased in our doxastic assessments of
the abilities and characters of those we care about, and so, are prone to trust them in ways
that more impartial observers often would not. Of particular interest to me will be the
way that friends and lovers tend to handle counterevidence that threatens to speak against
the trustworthiness of their loved ones. I will argue there that it is at least plausible to
think that handling such counterevidence in a partial way can be epistemically justifiable.
Having explored both the nature of trust as well as the potential epistemic value of these
partial biases, I will be in better position in Chapter 5 to address the epistemology of
religious trust in particular. There I will make my case for thinking it is at least plausible
enough that the religious truster‘s own way of handling the counterevidence of
inscrutable evils—i.e., giving up the Assumption of Sufficient Competence rather than
her trust in God—could be epistemically justifiable so as to render unfriendly atheism too
hasty.
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Chapter 3:
An Analysis of Trust
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Chapter Introduction
In this chapter, I attempt to arrive at an analysis of trust. An initial disclaimer
about this project is in order. There are numerous ways the word ―trust‖ is used in the
English language. We most often use the word ―trust‖ in reference to people but we
sometimes extend it to talk of inanimate objects as in ―I trust my car to get me where I
need to go.‖ In talk of trusting people, we use such various locutions as ―trusting them
with,‖ ―trusting them to,‖ ―trusting them in,‖ and ―trusting in them.‖ We sometimes even
use the word ―trust‖ as more or less a synonym for the word ―presume‖ as in ―I trust that
you slept well.‖ It is thus highly unlikely that our ordinary usages of the word ―trust‖ are
all trying to latch onto the same phenomenon. This means that a philosophically
interesting analysis of trust will really have to be an analysis of something that is not
captured by all these utterances.
This is not all bad, though. Some of our common-language utterances about trust
are probably more loosely connected to ―real trust‖ than others. For example, I agree with
the vast majority of philosophers who have looked at trust that there is a sense in which
our talk of trusting people is a much purer usage of the word than our talk of trusting
inanimate objects. Still, it is likely inevitable that an interesting analysis of trust as such
is going to cut against some usage of the term that seems apt enough to other thinkers to
count as ―pure‖ or genuine. For example, I lean heavily, as we will soon see, towards the
view that a good bit of talk about trusting people to do things would be more precisely
expressed with the language of entrusting them with certain tasks. This is because we
often entrust people with tasks that we—in a very clear sense—do not really trust them to
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complete. Because the latter sense of trust—i.e., its doxastic sense—has been largely
neglected in the philosophical literature and because it (I confess) seems the most
fundamental sense of trust to me (and because it is most relevant to the epistemology of
religious trust), the analysis of ―trust‖ I will offer in the latter stages of this chapter will
focus on it. Even so, I recognize that others will think the phenomenon I prefer to call
―entrusting‖ is just as fundamental a form of trusting (if not more so) than that which I
analyze as ―trusting.‖ That is fine with me so long as in the end, we all at least recognize
the distinction I want to make between those two phenomena.
As another disclaimer, I focus here only on trusting people to do specifiable tasks.
I recognize that there are likely other, more general forms of interpersonal trust in which
we trust folks in ways we cannot exactly specify relative to certain tasks. Even so, the
literature on trust in which I situate my discussion focuses on arriving at an analysis of
trusting a person to do something specifiable. This fits nicely with my overall project
anyway of looking at the theist‘s specifiable trust in God to prevent gratuitous evils. After
surveying this literature on trust, I will subsequently offer an analysis of trusting a person
to do something that sees it as fundamentally a matter of having a particular sort of belief
about that person—or, as I like to put it, having a certain sort of confidence in that person.

The Distinction between Trust and Mere Reliance
A fixture in contemporary philosophical discussions of trust is the view that
trusting someone to do something is distinct from merely relying on them to do it. This

102

was one of the basic insights of Baier‘s initial study of the topic.1 We can rely on
inanimate objects to behave predictably, but it would be misplaced (in a philosophical
analysis at least) to say that we genuinely trust inanimate objects. In a similar way, we
can rely on other persons to behave predictably for us without actually trusting them to
do anything. I will use the term ―mere reliance‖ to refer to cases of relying on someone to
do something in the absence of trust.
Baier‘s central example of mere reliance revolves around the issue of foodtampering in grocery stores (which apparently was a popular American fear at the time of
Baier‘s writing in the late 1980‘s). Baier says we can rely on others to avoid
contaminating our food even when we suspect some of them would like to poison it,
because we know that security measures and the threat of sanctions are in place to
influence those folks to avoid doing what they would otherwise like to do. Since our
reliance on these people to behave in predictable ways is compatible with our staunch
distrust of them with respect to the handling of our food, it seems to follow that reliance
can occur in the absence of trust.2
This case has not been universally considered successful. Richard Holton, for one,
argues that it does not make sense to say we are relying on any actual persons in such a
case. Rather, Holton thinks we are relying only on impersonal states of affairs just as we
are in cases of relying on inanimate objects to behave predictably. To rely on a person,
for Holton, is to rely on her to behave out of a motivation that is ―sufficiently self-

1
2

Baier, ―Trust and Anti-Trust.‖ 234-35.
Baier, ―Trust and Anti-Trust,‖ 234.
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generating.‖3 The would-be poisoners avoid poisoning our food only because of external
pressures that have been placed on them and not, says Holton, out of the right sort of
internal motivations required for reliance on the would-be poisoners themselves. Holton
suggests that to think otherwise would be akin to thinking we rely on prisoners to stay in
prison, which he finds absurd.
I agree with Holton that we do not (at least typically) rely on prisoners to stay in
prison. I also agree that the reason for this is that we rely on factors external to the
prisoners and not on the prisoners themselves. But I think we can grant Holton those
points without joining him in rejecting Baier‘s example of mere reliance. Holton‘s
intuition in that case seems to belie too high a threshold in his conception of ―sufficient‖
self-generation. To see this, consider an ordinary case of reliance on an inanimate
object—i.e., my relying on my car to get me to work. The car‘s movement is determined
by a combination of its internal capacities (i.e., its mechanical components working
together) and the external pressures acting on it (i.e., my foot on the gas), but it does not
seem to matter to my state of ―relying on the car‖ what percentage of the overall causal
process we attribute to the car‘s doings relative to my own doings. There are all sorts of
imaginable vehicles on the ―degree of self-propulsion spectrum‖ from a Flintstone car
that is literally foot-propelled to a futuristic craft that moves via voice command, but no
matter what vehicle on this spectrum we imagine me riding to work in, I think I can be
properly said to be relying on it just so long as I am counting on it to do some of the work
in getting me where I need to go. Thus I submit that to rely on an object is just to count
3

Richard Holton, ―Deciding to Trust, Coming to Believe,‖ Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (1994):
66.
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on it to perform some causal role—however small—in bringing about the desired state of
affairs. By extension, I submit that all that is required for relying on a person is to count
on that person (acting in accordance with her own internal desires) to play some causal
role—however small—in bringing about a desired state of affairs.
To back up a step, I have not said exactly what I mean by relying on or ―counting
on‖ a person to perform her causal role. I am inclined to think that this is a sufficiently
intelligible notion to stand as is, but I recognize that others might like to be more precise.
I am comfortable borrowing a phrase from Holton and thinking of relying on someone to
do something as, more precisely, ―working the supposition that it will happen into one's
plans.‖4 The difference between my analysis of reliance and Holton‘s, then, is just his
added stipulation that the person‘s action be performed in the absence of strong external
pressures. For Holton, I cannot truly work into my plans the supposition that the wouldbe-poisoners will not poison my food; all I can work into my plans is the supposition that
external constraints are in place such that my food will not be poisoned. I find that odd,
and think it makes perfect sense to say I can work into my plans the supposition that they
will not poison my food since I recognize that the external pressures are not sufficient to
guarantee their behavior.

4

Richard Holton, ―Deciding to Trust,‖ 68. I do have one issue with this notion if it has the implication that
Katherine Hawley takes it to have in her Trust, Distrust, and Commitment,‖ Nous (forthcoming). She says
that ―to rely on someone to X is to act on the supposition that she will X: this can fall short of believing that
she will X, though it is incompatible with outright belief that she will not X‖ [emphasis mine.] That
italicized claim seems to be shared by Facundo Alonso in his ―Shared Intention, Reliance, and
Interpersonal Obligations,‖ Ethics 119 (2009): 452-56.
I think it makes perfect sense to say, though, that I can choose (or even be compelled) to rely on a
person or thing even if I believe that person or thing will not come through for me. (Indeed, a case of this
sort will feature prominently in the conclusions I draw in this chapter.) If such a stance is incompatible with
Holton‘s notion of reliance as ―working the supposition into my plans that the person or thing will come
through for me,‖ then I would be eager to look for an alternative analysis of reliance.
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I find my conception of reliance to be much simpler than Holton‘s and more
intuitive. It also paints a sharp—and I think accurate—contrast between Baier‘s case of
the would-be poisoners and Holton‘s case of the prisoners. The would-be-poisoners
clearly have a role to play in bringing it about that my food is not poisoned—i.e., they
have to submit to the external pressures being placed on them. Thus on my analysis of
reliance, Baier and the vast majority of her commentators are right to think I do rely on
would-be poisoners not to poison my food. But when it comes to prisoners remaining in
prison, we do not typically count on them to play any causal role in staying there. It is not
as if we rely on them to submit to the confines of the prison. Instead, we rely solely on
the external constraints in place to keep them there.5 Hence we can share Holton‘s
intuition about the prisoner case without dispensing with Baier‘s classic example of mere
reliance and without accepting his dubious analysis of reliance.
Supposing though that my objection to Holton‘s analysis of reliance is mistaken,
we could still recognize the distinction between trust and mere reliance if we were to
accept his analysis. Indeed, Holton‘s own goal in discussing those examples is not to
deny the distinction Baier draws but to draw it in a different place. Unfortunately,
Holton‘s own favored example of mere reliance is not definitive for independent reasons
I shall discuss later. To better suit my present purposes I will mention a couple of cases
from Kathleen Hawley that I think rather clearly demonstrate that there is such a thing as
merely relying on a person.
5

I say ―typically,‖ because it is possible to imagine a case where I do rely on a prisoner to stay in prison.
That will be a case in which I have reason to believe that the prisoner has, and recognizes that he has, a
genuine possibility of escape but I nonetheless rely on him to choose not make the escape attempt. Such a
case is also consistent with my analysis of reliance since, in that case, I am relying on the prisoner to play
some causal role in his remaining in prison.
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First, Hawley asks you to suppose you know that a street busker tends to perform
at a particular spot in town on a certain weekday and that you decide to work the
supposition that he will perform next week at that place and time into a plan to pull off an
easy pickpocket while the crowd is distracted by his performance. It would seem
extremely odd to say that you trust the busker to perform that day. Hence you seem to be
merely relying on him.6 Second, Hawley asks us to imagine that she prepares several
meals for her and her husband over the course of several days without ever being asked to
do so. While her husband might naturally come to rely on her to have dinner ready on a
given night, it would be misplaced for him to trust her to do so. Indeed, Hawley says she
would be OK with him working the supposition that she will make dinner into his plans
but would positively resent her husband making this a matter of trust.7 I think we can
safely conclude from these two cases that Baier and most all the commentators on trust
who have followed her are correct in thinking there is such a thing as mere reliance.
The really interesting question, then, is not whether there is a distinction between
trusting a person and merely relying on a person but why there is a distinction. I will now
discuss five prominent views of trust that seek to answer this question. I will argue that
none of them are adequate—at least when it comes to capturing a very fundamental and
intuitive notion of trust (and distrust). I will then offer my own analysis of trust in an
effort to fill this gap in the literature.

6
7

Hawley, Trust, 5.
Katherine Hawley, ―Trust, Distrust, and Commitment,‖ Nous (forthcoming).
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Five Views on Trust
The Goodwill View
The goodwill view was introduced by Baier in ―Trust and Anti-Trust.‖ According
to Baier, trusting someone to do something requires ―reliance on their good will toward
one, as distinct from their dependable habits, or only on their dependably exhibited fear,
anger, or other motives compatible with ill will toward one, or on motives not directed on
one at all.‖8 Thus for A to trust B to do X, A must expect B to do X out of goodwill
towards A. This, according to Baier, explains why we feel betrayed when someone does
not act in the way we trusted them to act, whereas we feel merely disappointed when
someone does not act in the way we merely relied on them to act. For example, ―Kant's
neighbors who counted on his regular habits as a clock for their own less automatically
regular ones might be disappointed with him if he slept in one day, but not let down by
him, let alone had their trust betrayed.‖9 When Kant‘s neighbors relied on him to indicate
the time of day, they did not ―trust‖ him to do this, because they were not expecting him
to take their welfare into account in his actions. Hawley forms the same conclusion about
her street busker case: ―You don‘t expect to benefit from the goodwill of the crowd or the
busker, or for them to care about your needs or feelings, you‘re just hoping to benefit
from their presence. And that‘s why this doesn‘t amount to trust.‖10

8

Baier, ―Trust and Anti-Trust,‖ 234.
Baier, ―Trust and Anti-Trust,‖ 235.
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Hawley, Trust, 5.
9
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There are a number of problems with the goodwill view of trust. First, it does not
easily accommodate cases of third-party trusting where the truster relies on the trusted to
take care of a third party‘s good. Such trustings are especially pertinent to my project,
since the religious believer trusts God to ensure not only that her own inscrutable evils
are non-gratuitous but that everyone else‘s are as well. The expectation in such cases that
the trusted will act out of goodwill towards the truster seems unnecessary.11 I would even
add that such an expectation would often belie a moral failing on the part of the truster.
For example, a father who trusts a doctor to provide good care to his child would seem to
be unduly narcissistic if he expects the doctor to be consciously motivated to take care of
the child out of goodwill towards him. But clearly a father can genuinely trust the doctor
to take care of his child without having this narcissistic expectation. Likewise, it would
be misplaced for me to expect God to manage others‘ sufferings properly out of his
concern for me. It would be better in both cases to expect the trusted to be motivated out
of concern for the party whose good is primarily at stake. And such an expectation seems
perfectly compatible with trust.
One might attempt to save the goodwill view from this worry by amending it so
that trusting in such cases requires the expectation that the trusted will be motivated out
of goodwill to at least the third party. But I do not think this will do either, since it seems
possible to imagine a case of trust where the truster does not expect the trusted to act out
of a sense of goodwill toward either the truster or the third party. As an extreme case, I
think I can trust my veterinarian to take good care of my dog even if I know she despises

11

This point is made by Holton in ―Deciding to Trust,‖ 5.

109

both me and my poorly-behaved dog and would rather the two of us live quite unpleasant
lives.12 If I know her to be an excellent vet, I may nonetheless decide to rely on her and
her sense of professionalism to act in spite of her ill will toward us and provide the care
my dog needs, and in so doing, I think I would be trusting her.
This reveals a more fundamental problem with the goodwill account. The
expectation of goodwill does not seem to be necessary for trust even in ordinary twoparty trusting relations. Consider that I can trust my grouchy mechanic to take good care
of my car out of his own sense of professionalism without expecting him to give my wellbeing a second‘s thought. And since my car does not have a ―well-being‖ in the relevant
sense, it seems that an expectation of the trusted 's acting from Baier's goodwill is not
needed in two-party trustings either.
There is also reason to think that reliance plus the expectation of goodwill is not
sufficient for trust. Holton‘s own principle case of mere reliance, which I have hitherto
put off discussing, is meant to demonstrate this. Holton asks us to imagine a ―confidence
trickster‖ who relies on your goodwill towards him in order to con you out of your money.
Holton thinks the confidence trickster cannot be said to truly trust you, and so, Holton
concludes that the goodwill view of trust is mistaken.13 I am skeptical of Holton‘s claim
that genuine trust is absent in this case for reasons I wish to defer to even later on in my
discussion. Even so, I think he is quite right in thinking that reliance plus the expectation
of goodwill can fall short of trust. Consider again Hawley‘s example of her husband
relying on her to make dinner. If we add to the case that Hawley has been preparing all
12
13

Fortunately, in reality my dog is wonderful, and his vet loves him.
Holton, ―Deciding to Trust,‖ 65.
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those meals simply out of the goodwill she has towards her husband (this may well have
been implicit in her original case anyway), then her husband could work into his plans
that Hawley will cook dinner tonight because of her goodwill toward him without, again,
making this a matter of trust.14
We have seen that the expectation of the trusted‘s goodwill is neither necessary
nor, when conjoined with a situation of reliance, sufficient for trust. Thus we would do
well to consider alternatives to the goodwill account.

The Affective View
Karen Jones (at least in her early work on trust) accepts Baier‘s goodwill
component as necessary condition for trust but argues for independent reasons from those
I gave above for thinking that reliance plus the expectation of goodwill is insufficient for
trust.15 She thinks an analysis of trust must also make appeal to its ―affective‖ qualities.
Jones thinks trusting involves having a particular sort of affective state, which she
describes as ―an attitude of optimism about [the trusted‘s] goodwill.‖16 She views this
state of optimism as functioning like an emotion. She notes that emotions are ―partly
constituted by patterns of salience and tendencies of interpretation‖17 and thinks of trust
in the same way. So beyond the mere doxastic expectation of the truster‘s goodwill, there
is, for Jones, also an evidence-filtering optimism involved in trusting.
14

Both Hawley and I agree that what is missing in this case is the belief that Hawley has a commitment to
cook him dinner. I will have more to say on this theme later in the chapter.
15
She renounces the requirement that an expectation of goodwill is necessary for trust in Jones, ―Trust and
Terror.‖
16
Karen Jones, ―Trust as an Affective Attitude,‖ Ethics 107, no. 1 (1996): 5.
17
Jones, ―Trust as an Affective Attitude,‖ 11.

111

An emotion suggests a particular line of inquiry and makes some beliefs seem
compelling and others not, on account of the way emotion gets us to focus on a
partial filed of evidence. Emotions are thus not primarily beliefs, although they do
tend to give rise to beliefs; instead they are distinctive ways of seeing a
situation…the claim being advanced here is that the attitude of optimism
constitutive of trust is a distinctive way of seeing another. This way of seeing the
other is constituted by a distinctive trusting cognitive set, which makes one‘s
willingness to rely on the other seem reasonable.18

I think Jones is onto something important here. As we will see in Chapter 4, there
is a great deal of anecdotal evidence to suggest that people often look less objectively at
the behavior and motivations of people they trust. I think Jones is mistaken, though, to
view this affective state as a component of trust itself. As I have already shown, it seems
easy enough to imagine a case where I trust someone without expecting them to act out of
goodwill towards me. In such a case it follows a fortiori that I am being less than
optimistic about the prospect of their acting out of goodwill toward me.
Suppose, though, that we loosen Jones‘ requirement so that there does not need to
be an affective optimism about the trusted‘s goodwill in particular, but only an affective
optimism that he will do the action we are relying on him to do. I do not think we should
accept such a view either. It seems to me that trust can occur in the absence of affective

18

Jones, ―Trust as an Affective Attitude,‖ 11.
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optimism altogether. For example, I can trust my mechanic in the case above without
having any sort of evidence-filtering optimism about what he is going to do. Instead, my
trust can be based on a purely rational assessment of his track record in the profession. If
I have good evidence for thinking he takes his job seriously, then I can trust him. There
does not need to be anything markedly emotional or biased in my assessment of his likely
behavior or motivations.
I wish to emphasize again that there is much left to discuss about the way in
which our affections are often involved in our trustings. Indeed, I think a consideration of
the role of affect in trust will prove particularly pertinent to a discussion of religious trust,
since believers often feel compelled by their affections toward God in maintaining their
trust in him. I will wait until Chapters 4 and 5 to discuss this issue. For now, it is enough
to say that I view the affective phenomenon Jones describes as a frequent accompaniment
of trust rather than as an essential component of it.

The Participant-Stance View
The participant-stance view originated with Holton and has come to be perhaps
the most popular view in the literature. On this view, trusting a person is a matter of
relying on her while taking the participant stance towards her a la Strawson‘s ―participant
reactive attitudes.‖19 To take the participant stance towards another is basically to be
vulnerable to incurring the attitudes of betrayment or gratitude in response to their
behavior. Numerous commentators have agreed with Holton that taking the participant

19

P. F. Strawson, Freedom and Resentment (London: Methuen, 1974), 1-25 cited in Holton, ―Deciding to
Trust,‖ 66.
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stance is at least a necessary condition for trust,20 but it is Holton‘s own view that trusting
just is relying from the participant stance—i.e., it is necessary and sufficient for trust. As
he puts it, ―When you trust someone to do something, you rely on them to do it, and you
regard that reliance in a certain way: you have a readiness to feel betrayal should it be
disappointed, and gratitude should it be upheld.‖21 This, for Holton, is why the
confidence trickster does not truly trust you despite the fact that he relies on you and your
goodwill: he does not take the participant stance towards you. Rather, he treats you
merely as a tool in the same way he would treat a relied upon inanimate object. As such,
you stand to be the source of his pleasure or disappointment but not a catalyst of his
gratitude or betrayment.22
I do not think we should accept this view of trust either. First, this account also
seems, like the goodwill view, to be rather unaccommodating of cases of third-party trust.
It seems I can genuinely trust a person to take care of a third party without being prepared
to feel that the trusted has betrayed me.23 If it turns out, for example, that God has

20

See Bernard Lahno, ―On the Emotional Character of Trust,‖ Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 4
(2001): 181; Paul Faulkner, ―A Genealogy of Trust,‖ Episteme 4, no. 3 (2007), 317; Pamela Hieronymi,
―The Reasons of Trust,‖ Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 no. 2 (2008), 216; Stephen Wright, ―Trust
and Trustworthiness,‖ Philosophia 38 (2010), 616-18; Hawley, ―Trust, Distrust, and Commitment,‖
(forthcoming).
21
Holton, ―Deciding to Trust,‖ 67.
22
Or as Stephen Wright puts it, ―This added disappointment or gratification is what raises the stakes in
cases of trust…these raised stakes give trust the separate status of being something more than reliance.‖
Wright, ―Trust and Trustworthiness,‖ 617.
23
Hawley is also aware of this problem for the participant-stance view. See her ―Trust, Distrust, and
Commitment,‖ (forthcoming). There, she describes a case where you rely on your daughter‘s friend to give
your daughter a ride. ―On the one hand, it is natural to think of your attitude towards your daughter‘s friend
as trust: you are disposed to hold many of the trust-related reactive attitudes towards your daughter‘s
friend…On the other hand, it is natural to think it is only your daughter who is betrayed if her friend breaks
her promise to her.‖ Hawley appears to give her all-things-considered conclusion on this case when she
says, ―It seems more plausible to say that the only person betrayed is the person to whom the commitment
is made.‖
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allowed millions of children to starve to death without a justifying reason, God has not
thereby betrayed me even though I have trusted him to have his reasons for allowing all
that suffering.24 Similarly, I think it makes sense to say that I trust my friend to be faithful
to his wife even though I would not consider an act of marital unfaithfulness on his part
to be a betrayal against me. Thus I conclude that taking the participant stance is not
necessary for all trustings.
Nor do I agree that relying on another while taking the participant stance towards
her is sufficient for trust as such. Hawley has recently provided the grounds for what I
think can amount to a decisive case for this point. (Ironically, the objection I am about to
build from Hawley‘s work also seems to challenge her own preferred view of trust as we
will see in the next section.) Hawley points out that taking the participant stance towards
another is compatible with distrusting him. She writes, ―[W]here we distrust, rather than
trust, someone in a particular respect, this marks no diminution in our tendency to hold
reactive attitudes towards that person. Indeed, attitudes such as resentment are to the fore

One would expect, then, that Hawley does not think the participant stance is necessary for trust,
but then she continues to endorse the necessity of the participant stance throughout her work on trust. I am
not sure what to make of this. She says that the case at hand ―weakens, though does not break, the
connection between trust and betrayal.‖ But as I see it, either the participant stance—understood as
preparedness to feel betrayal or gratitude—is necessary for trust or it is not. And if Hawley has given us a
case in which trust need not involve taking the participant stance, then the participant stance is not
necessary for trust. If I had to guess, though, I suspect Hawley really wants to propose a revision to our
understanding of what is required in taking the participant stance. Since she says, ―you are disposed to hold
many of the trust-related reactive attitudes towards your daughter‘s friend‖—presumably attitudes like
sadness, moral outrage, and/or pangs of empathy towards your daughter—despite your recognition that
your daughter‘s friend cannot betray you. So, I suspect Hawley is thinking that a preparedness to feel
betrayal is not part and parcel of taking the participant stance.
24
The word ―thereby‖ is crucial here. I would certainly feel betrayed by God if it turns out that he lets
millions of children suffer without an exonerating reason, but that is not simply because he let them suffer
(which, in itself, is only an offense to them and not to me). Rather I would feel betrayed because I feel God
has additionally actively elicited my trust in him. And if God has actively elicited my trust in him and then
does not come through on that trust, that makes his mismanagement of others' sufferings a betrayal to me as
well.
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in situations of distrust.25 In other words, Hawley thinks it obvious that we can find
ourselves open to experiencing betrayal and gratitude in cases of distrust just as in cases
of trust. After all, she notes, ―Jesus knew that Judas would betray him. Yet trust is
impossible in such a situation so betrayal does not require trust.‖ [emphasis mine]26
It is worth noting that not everyone would agree with Hawley on this point.
Compare what Carolyn McLeod has to say about a case involving female employees
working under a sexist boss. ―The female employees might know that their perverse
employer treats them well only because he fears social sanctioning. In that case, he could
not betray them, although he could disappoint them‖27 [emphasis mine]. McLeod thus
views distrust as incompatible with taking the participant stance, and so, would think it
impossible for Jesus to truly feel betrayed by Judas. We seem to have here a case of
diverging basic intuitions between Hawley and McLeod. I do not know of any other way
to resolve this conflict except to say that I find McLeod‘s intuition bizarre, and so, side
with Hawley.28 It seems quite natural to me that a woman would feel betrayed by an
employer who takes advantage of his position of power over her to treat her in a sexist
fashion even if (like Jesus) she saw it coming.
25

Hawley, ―Trust, Distrust, and Commitment,‖ (forthcoming).
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McLeod, ―Trust.‖ This case is originally due to Nancy Potter; see her How Can I be Trusted? A Virtue
Theory of Trustworthiness, (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002), 5.
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believe that she likely endorses it. Here is the relevant quote in context from McLeod, ―Trust‖:
Many would argue that while this person's behavior is predictable or reliable, it is not trustworthy
in any genuine sense. These theorists might distinguish mere reliability from trustworthiness on
the grounds that people known or considered to be trustworthy have the power to betray us,
whereas people known or considered to be merely reliable can only disappoint us. The female
employees might know that their employer treats them well only because he fears social
sanctioning. In that case, he could not betray them, although he could disappoint them. And if that
were true, he would not be trustworthy for them.
26
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Assuming Hawley is correct in thinking that taking the participant stance is
compatible with distrust, all we need to see that Holton‘s participant-stance view of trust
is mistaken is to notice that people can also rely on those they do not trust while taking
the participant stance towards them. The case of the female employees may already give
us such a case, since it seems plausible to imagine they were relying on their boss to treat
them properly in some meaningful sense (and maybe the same could be said of Jesus too),
but I think I can make my point more definitively with the following simple case of
distrust in which the aspect of reliance is quite clear.
Suppose Jones is a young lawyer seeking to be a partner at his firm. A named
partner recently informed Jones that the firm is seeking to add one new partner and that if
Jones can win the case he is currently working on, the firm will vote to make him a
partner. The only problem is that Jones knows he cannot win this particular case without
finding someone to help him sift through a large body of tax codes, as he lacks both the
time and the specific expertise in that area to win the case. As it turns out, his colleague
Smith is the only available person with the necessary competence. Smith knows of
Jones‘s predicament and helpfully offers to take care of the tax code portion of the case.
Jones is wary to accept Smith's help, however, since he and Smith have never been close,
and Jones knows that Smith is also seeking partnership at the firm and would
consequently have incentive to make Jones look bad. These considerations lead Jones to
take a stance of marked distrust toward Smith in this matter. Nonetheless, Jones sees this
as his best opportunity to make partner and, knowing Smith is his only hope to win the
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case, he determines that his best possible move is to rely on Smith for the success of his
case despite his staunch distrust of him.
Some may want to resist my characterization of this case and will want to say
instead that Jones is begrudgingly ―deciding to trust‖ Smith after all for lack of a better
option, meaning this is not actually a case of distrust. I grant that we often talk of trusting
in this way, a way that essentially reduces Jones‘ ―trusting‖ Smith to his willingly taking
on a position of reliance on Smith. That is fine as far as it goes, but I do not think it
removes the very clear sense in which Jones so obviously continues to distrust Smith in
this case.
I think this suggests that there really are two fundamentally different things that
go by the name of interpersonal ―trust.‖ There is a doxastic state of having a certain sort
of confidence in a person that he or she will actually come through for one. That is the
sense in which Jones so clearly distrusts Smith. Then there is a sort of ―acceptedvulnerability‖ sense of trusting in which Jones can be said to be (begrudgingly) ―trusting‖
Smith. As I foreshadowed at the beginning of this chapter, it is perhaps not worth
haggling over which of these senses of ―trust‖ is more deserving of the term. But many
commentators on trust seem to think the accepted-vulnerability sense of trust is the
fundamental sense of trust, and I think this is wrong. I will have more to say about this
distinction later in the chapter and will offer at least some reason for thinking doxastic
trust must be every bit as deserving of the name ―trust‖ (if not more so) than acceptedvulnerability trust.
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For now, we can note that the Jones-Smith case shows at least a clear sense in
which Holton‘s participant-stance view does not capture the meaning of trust. Insofar as
distrustful reliance from the participant stance is possible, relying from the participant
stance is not sufficient for trust in a very basic sense. And in Jones‘ case, I think it makes
perfect sense that he can rely on Smith from the participant stance whilst distrusting him
in a very basic way. Suppose, for example, it turns out that Smith does not come through
for Jones. Even though this is the result Jones (in distrusting Smith) predicted all along, it
would surely still make sense for Jones to feel betrayed by Smith. And supposing instead
that Smith does come through for Jones, it would make perfect sense for Jones to feel
grateful towards Smith—perhaps even especially so given the incentive Smith had to
betray him. This shows that a person can simultaneously (a) rely on another to do X, (b)
take the participant stance towards the other with respect to doing X, and (c) nonetheless
fail to trust (in a very basic sense) the other to do X. Hence, relying on someone from the
participant stance is not what distinguishes all genuine trusting relations from situations
of mere reliance.

The Obligation View
Phillip Nickel offers an alternative view of trust according to which trusting
someone to do X is a matter of relying on her to do something you think her morally
obligated to do.29 A major objection to Nickel‘s view is that it seems possible to trust
someone to do something you think him obligated not to do. For example, it seems I can
29

See Phillip J. Nickel, ―Trust, Staking, and Expectation,‖ Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior 39,
no. 3 (2009): 345-62; and op cit ―Trust and Obligation-Ascription,‖ Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10,
no. 3 (007):309-19.
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genuinely trust a friend to help me cover up an act of infidelity even if I recognize that he
really ought not do that. If he agrees to help me, then it can be perfectly coherent, I think,
to say that I can trust him to help me cover up my indiscretion.30
But I think an even more decisive objection against Nickel‘s view comes from the
phenomenon of distrustful reliance as exhibited in the Jones and Smith case above.
Clearly, it makes sense for Jones to think Smith is morally obligated to do a good job of
assisting him on the case especially since Smith willingly offered to do the work. But
Jones‘ decision to rely on Smith to meet that obligation (which, again, is just a result of
his lack of a better option) is nonetheless compatible with Jones‘s staunch distrust of
Smith in a very clear sense.

The Commitment View
The newest view of trust on the scene is Hawley‘s own proposal, which differs
only slightly from Nickel‘s. According to Hawley, ―To trust someone to do something is
to believe that she has a commitment to doing it, and to rely upon her to meet that
commitment.‖31 Hawley does not offer an analysis of commitment itself, but she does
make clear that she considers it in a rather broad sense that will not reduce to just cases of

30

Amy Mullin offers an interesting case that could serve as a second counterexample. ―[I]f we were thieves
in crime making common cause, we might trust our confederates even if we and they share the belief that
thievery is morally wrong…‖ This case appears in Amy Mullin, ―Trust, Social Norms, and Motherhood,‖
Journal of Social Philosophy 36 no. 3 (2005), 320.
My own intuitions about this case are not so clear. I am inclined to think we need to know more
about the motives the thieves are expected to act from. If they can be relied on to do their part only because
you know they want the loot, then I am inclined to classify this as a case of mere reliance. If, however, they
can be relied upon to do their part because of their sense of loyalty to the group, then I am more inclined to
classify this as a case of trust. I will discuss the importance of anticipating motives in trusting later in this
chapter.
31
Hawley, ―Trust, Distrust, and Commitment,‖ (forthcoming).
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explicit promising.32 My own view is that it makes sense to think of ―commitments‖ here
in the broadest sense possible as encompassing the commitments of both one‘s explicit
promises and all of one‘s overall moral obligations. An advantage of such a view is that it
would accommodate cases like my infidelity case above. If my friend explicitly commits
to helping me cover up the infidelity, that does seem to help make sense of my trusting
him to do so. If one worries that this leads to a paradox in that I must therefore think my
friend simultaneously has a commitment to help and a commitment not to help me, I
reply that this is no paradox. I do think he has a commitment (of some form or other) to
do each of those things, but I only expect him to meet one of those commitments—
namely help me cover up my indiscretion. That is the thing I trust him to do. A paradox
would occur only if I somehow expected him to fulfill both of these commitments, which,
of course, is not what I would be doing in such a case.
One possible objection to the commitment view, which Hawley addresses, could
be based on Holton‘s confidence trickster case. Suppose you gave an explicit promise to
the trickster to hand over your money. If Holton is right that the confidence trickster does
not truly trust you in such a case, then Hawley‘s view is in trouble. Hawley‘s reply to this
case is to argue that ―Although you don‘t realize it you do not have a genuine
commitment, the trickster recognizes this, and this is why he does not trust you. You have
issued a ‗promise‘ under a misapprehension, indeed to the very person who has deceived
you about your situation, and such ‗promises‘ do not bind.‖33 In other words, the trickster
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does not truly take you to have a commitment in either the broad sense or the narrow
sense.
But no matter whether Hawley‘s reply to the confidence trickster case is adequate
and no matter how we parse her notion of commitment, her view (understood as an
analysis of trust as such) nonetheless falls victim to cases of distrustful reliance just as
the participant-stance and obligation views did. After all, Smith has a commitment to
help Jones in both the broad sense—i.e., he is morally obligated to help Jones—and in the
narrow sense—he told Jones he would help. But the fact that Jones chooses to rely on
Smith to meet that commitment does not, as we have seen, entail that Jones trusts Smith
to meet that commitment (in a very clear sense). Hence the phenomenon of distrustful
reliance once again proves crucial to understanding the nature of trust as such.

Distrustful Reliance and “Deciding to Trust”
I want to turn now to explaining why it is that many commentators have left out
the doxastic sense of trust in their analyses. Many seem to treat the accepted-vulnerability
sense of trust as the fundamental sense. This leads them in turn to explicitly deny that
trust (presumably, real trust) requires having any doxastic expectation of compliance on
the part of the trusted. The basic argument for their position goes as follows: we
sometimes decide to trust via a direct act of the will, whereas we cannot decide what to
believe via a similar act of the will; hence trusting cannot be a matter of holding a belief
that a person will act in a certain way.
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Holton focuses much of his paper on trust making this argument. He describes a
well-known team-building exercise in which participants are asked to allow themselves
to fall from a dangerous height whilst relying on other participants to catch them.

If you are like me,‖ Holton observes, ―there is a moment at which you weigh up
whether or not to let yourself fall. How does it feel at that moment? It feels as
though you are deciding whether or not to trust. I think we should take this feeling
at face value: there are circumstances in which we can decide to trust.‖34

But Holton does not think you could ever actually choose to believe that the other
participants are going to catch you. Notice how he keeps belief out of the decision to trust.

Does my decision to trust the others entail that I believe that they will catch me? If
it does, does this in turn mean that when I decide to trust them, I also decide to
believe that they will catch me? I think not. In order to trust I do not need to
believe. Certainly my trust involves a certain state of mind; but it does not seem to
me that it always involves a belief. Mightn't I be most uncertain that I will be
caught, but decide to trust anyway? Mightn't I decide to trust thinking it as likely
as not that you will let me fall?35
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Those who agree with Holton that trust is possible in the absence of a doxastic
expectation often also cite the phenomenon of ―therapeutic trust‖ as further evidence of
their view.36 We trust someone therapeutically when we do not yet think them likely to
come through for us, but we want to give them opportunities to do so in order that they
might have opportunities to develop trustworthiness. Parents often engage in this sort of
practice. A mother might ―decide to trust‖ a teenage daughter to bring the car home on
time even before the daughter has proven that she is likely to comply as a way to take a
shot at fostering more trust in their relationship.
Again, I grant that this is all a very natural way of talking about trust. There are at
least a few problems, though, with thinking it captures the fundamental notion of trust.
The first of these is that, building on what I said earlier, it does not accord well with our
ordinary notion of distrust. If ―deciding to trust‖ someone to do something essentially
involves deciding to allow oneself to be vulnerable to her behavior, then what becomes of
distrust? Would we say that you also ―decide to distrust‖ someone to do something when
you choose not to make yourself vulnerable to their behavior? That seems to me to be a
mistake. I might choose not to rely on my wife to proofread my work, for example,
without its being true that I distrust her to do a good job; maybe I just want to spare her
the boredom. To distrust her with respect to proofreading my work, in the most obvious
sense, I would have to expect either that she would fail to proofread it or that she would
do a shoddy job. So distrust, in its most obvious sense, is a doxastic state—a lack of
confidence in the one distrusted. In Jones‘ case, he does expect Smith to do a shoddy job
36
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for him even though he decides to rely on him for lack of better options. I think it is very
natural, then, to say he relies on Smith even though he positively distrusts him. We can
say something similar about Holton‘s case; he decides to rely on the people below him to
catch him even though he lacks confidence that they will. The only difference is that his
confidence in the people below him does not seem to be as severely lacking as was Jones‘
confidence in Smith; hence I think we should say Holton is not in a square state of
distrust, but his confidence is low enough such that he does at least fail to be in a state of
square trust in that very same sense. While we can still call Holton‘s and Jones‘
willingness to rely on others in these cases a form of ―trusting,‖ that does not change the
fact that there another very intuitive sense in which trust is noticeably absent in these
cases.

Hieronymi on Trusting Versus Entrusting
I have at least one ally on this point in Pamela Hieronymi who has written an
excellent recent paper on this distinction. I can do no better than to quote her at length:

Suppose that, in the morning, you and I agree to meet for dinner at a certain time
at a certain restaurant to plan an upcoming event. Later in the day you learn that
all my friends have decided to go to my favorite restaurant to celebrate a surprise
promotion bestowed on one of them. You now doubt whether I will keep my
engagement with you. You are not certain I will not, but then you are not certain I
will, either. You are in a state of doubt. In the face of your doubt, you decide to go
to the restaurant and wait for me. When I show up, you tell me of your anxiety
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and your subsequent decision to come to the restaurant, even in the face of your
doubts. Upon hearing your story, I am less impressed with your overcoming your
doubt by your decision to ‗trust‘ me and more concerned with the lack of trust
expressed in the doubt itself. Certainly your actions are somehow more trusting
than those of someone who, in the face of such doubt, did not come to the
restaurant at all. Nevertheless, I could rightly complain that your lack of
confidence betrays a lack of trust. In this case, Holton‘s analysis of trust, as a
decision to rely from a participant stance that does not entail a belief, picks out
something considerably less than what we want to call trust.37

I find Hieronymi‘s point highly intuitive. If you do not actually believe I will be
where I tell you I will be, then you do not really trust me (in a very intuitive sense) to be
there even if you are nonetheless willing to show up and give me an opportunity to prove
myself. But what of the sense in which Hieronymi grants that your actions are ―somehow
more trusting‖ than someone who would not even bother to go to the restaurant in similar
epistemic circumstances? For Hieronymi, this can be captured well with the language of
―entrusting‖ instead of ―trusting.‖ That is, you can choose to entrust your time and energy
to me in such a case without actually trusting me to be at the restaurant. Hieronymi
describes the decision to let yourself fall in Holton‘s case in the same way.
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As you hesitate and weigh up, you may find that you are uncertain whether or not
they will catch you. You have no definite beliefs on this point, and, what is more,
you cannot come to any. You are in a state of doubt. From this state of doubt, you
must now decide whether to fall. You may then decide to entrust yourself to them,
and let yourself fall.38 [emphasis mine]

Hieronymi‘s reading of Holton‘s case seems right to me. And I would say the same about
the cases of so-called therapeutic ―trust;‖ a mother can choose to entrust to her daughter
the opportunity to prove herself responsible by coming home on time without actually
trusting her daughter to do so.
Hieronymi‘s discussion provides at least one way to suggest that the doxastic
sense of trust is actually more fundamental—a more genuine type of trust—than the
accepted-vulnerability sense, given that we could just as easily describe the latter in the
language of ―entrusting‖ rather than ―trusting.‖ Even so, I do not want to insist that
entrusting without doxastic trust should not count as ―genuine trust.‖ The important point,
here, is just that there are two distinct phenomena going by the name of ―trust‖ that must
be acknowledged. Insofar as extant analyses of trust leave out the doxastic sense, they fail
as analyses of trust as such. Since the doxastic sense has been largely neglected in the
literature, I want to focus in the rest of this chapter on developing an analysis of trust in
that sense.
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To keep the two senses of trust distinct in what follows, I will simply employ
Hieronymi‘s terminology and use the word ―trust‖ to refer to the doxastic phenomenon
(i.e., that which is acutely missing in cases of distrust) and the word ―entrust‖ to refer to
the act of putting yourself (or something you value) under the causal control of another. It
is not crucial to appreciating this distinction that my notion of doxastic trust be accepted
in any way as the notion of trust even though I do happen to think it plausible that it is
more fundamental than that which Hieronymi captures with the language of entrusting.
With this in place, some further terminological distinctions will be helpful here.
Sometimes we entrust things to people we trust—i.e., sometimes we trustingly entrust.
To trustingly entrust someone to do something is just to (a) place something under their
causal control and (b) have an expectation that the other will manage it properly. Other
times, we agnostically entrust—i.e., we entrust something to the other despite being
unable to form an expectation either way whether the other will come through for us. Still
other times we distrustingly entrust—i.e., we entrust something to the other despite
having an expectation that other will not come through for us. This is what Jones chose to
do in handling his high-stakes law case; he entrusted a crucial portion of the case to
Smith while nonetheless distrusting Smith to handle it properly. This was Jones‘ one shot
at making partner, and he was going to have to rely on Smith—i.e., entrust that case to
Smith—come what may.
Not only is it possible to distrustingly entrust, it is sometimes perfectly reasonable
to do so. Both pragmatic reasons (as in Jones‘ case) and moral reasons can properly
compel us to entrust something to those we distrust. The mother who recognizes that she
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ought to afford her coming-of-age daughter more responsibility need not be acting
unreasonably in any sense—including flouting any epistemic duties—if she decides to
entrust her daughter with a task that she predicts her daughter will not perform. This
makes an important point, as it means that the justifying conditions for trustings are quite
distinct from the justifying conditions for entrustings. Trusting, as I am now thinking of it,
is a doxastic state; thus it is properly subject to epistemological evaluations. Entrusting
(understood as taking on a position of reliance or vulnerability with respect to something
one values), on the other hand, is taking on a sort of submissive social state, and so, is
more properly subject to pragmatic and moral evaluations. In all cases, the act of
entrusting—of so to speak ―letting go‖ so that the other can have control—is distinct
from the doxastic trusting that may or not may not exist in each of those cases.
Reliance in the face of distrust is perhaps atypical of interpersonal reliance, but I
do not think it especially rare. Our strong desire for realizing some state of affairs can
easily enough make us willing to rely on those we distrust. Indeed, it is not hard to
imagine cases where people have no choice but to rely on those they distrust for meeting
even their most basic needs (e.g., impoverished citizens relying on corrupt governments
for sustenance.)

Trust without Reliance
Cases of distrusting reliance reveal only one way in which doxastic trust and
reliance can come apart. I will now show that just as there can be reliance without trust,
there can be cases of trust without reliance. This means that the five views of trust
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above—insofar as they were being offered as analyses of genuine trust—were built on
the false pretense that trust is by its very nature a ―reliance-plus‖ state.
Recall that the five views of trust we examined were all formulated with an eye
towards explaining why relying on a person does not always amount to trusting that
person. Each view thus offers a ―reliance-plus‖ account of trust to make sense of this—
e.g., trust is reliance plus expectation of goodwill; reliance plus taking the participant
stance; reliance plus thinking the other has a commitment; etc. While I certainly agree
with their observation that reliance does not always amount to a situation of genuine trust,
these commentators tacitly leap to a conclusion I find unwarranted, namely that reliance
is therefore only partially constitutive of real trust. There is another available explanation
for why reliance does not always amount to trust. That is to simply say that reliance is
consistent with—but not constitutive of—trust.
Consider the following simple case. I want a neighbor to collect my mail for me
while I am away on vacation. As I have neighbors living on either side of me, I have to
choose which neighbor I will rely on to collect it. I view Bob, who lives to my left, and
Jim, who lives to my right, both to be honest men who seem perfectly capable of carrying
out the task. I decide to rely on Bob instead of Jim, because I remember doing the same
favor for Bob last month, and it seems natural to call on him to return the favor. Suppose
Jim notices my departure and wonders why I did not ask him to collect my mail. He
approaches me upon my return and asks whether I made any arrangements for my mail. I
inform him that I indeed made arrangements with Bob. Suppose Jim responds to this
news by asking, ―Why, John? Didn‘t you trust me to do it?‖ I would be taken aback by
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the egregious fallacy implicit in his question. ―Poor Jim,‖ I might respond. ―The fact that
I chose not to rely on you in no way suggests that I did not trust you to take care of my
mail. I did trust you, and still do. But I also trust Bob, and I chose to rely on him instead
of you for reasons that had nothing to do with trust.‖
I think this case makes clear that reliance is not constitutive of trusting (in all
fundamental senses of ―trusting‖) in the way the five views above suggest. Others might
disagree; they might claim that in not relying on Jim I did not really trust him to take care
of my mail; instead, I simply believed he was trustworthy with respect to taking care of
my mail. In response, I want to claim that these locutions are more or less equivalent
once we come to appreciate the doxastic sense of trust.39 If we draw a sharp distinction
between trusting a person and believing the person is trustworthy, we create the
undesirable result of making trust (and distrust) causally inept in our decisions about who
to rely on. I think it both natural and analytically precise to say that we often choose to
rely on people because we trust them and that we often choose not to rely on people
because we distrust them. As such, any analysis of trust that wants to allow for trust‘s and
distrust‘s obvious motivational-causal link in our decisions about whether to make
ourselves vulnerable to others will have to leave reliance out its analysis.
For a case in point, look at how causally inept trust and distrust become on
Hawley‘s reliance-plus account.

39

I say ―more or less‖ equivalent, because I see room for a sort of case in which one recognizes that one
has sufficient evidence for being confident in another person but cannot, for whatever reason, actually bring
oneself to beconfident in that person. In such a case, I would say one recognizes that the person is
trustworthy without its being the case that one trusts the person.
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To trust someone to do something is to believe that she has a commitment to
doing it, and to rely upon her to meet that commitment. To distrust someone to do
something is to believe that she has a commitment to doing it, and yet not rely
upon her to meet that commitment.40

Because Hawley makes actual reliance on someone to meet a commitment a required
component of trust, the existence of the commitment itself becomes a prerequisite for
trust or distrust.41 But I think it evident that our trust and distrust in others plays a causal
role in which commitments we ask others to take on. If I distrust my neighbor with
respect to taking care of my mail, I will not ask him to take care of it (assuming I have a
better option), and hence, he will incur no commitment to take care of it. On Hawley‘s
analysis, though, I could not even be said to distrust him to take care of my mail since he
does not have a commitment to take care of it. That seems very odd to me.
Again, I am still happy to grant that there is the other sense of ―trust‖ in which
choosing to make oneself vulnerable to another is itself an instance of ―trusting.‖ But
since that sense of ―trusting‖—which I prefer to call ―entrusting‖—is not compatible with
distrusting in its most intuitive sense—i.e., the doxastic sense—I am led to analyze trust
in doxastic terms as well. And as we have just seen, thinking of trust in doxastic terms
accords nicely with the obvious sense in which trust often motivates our decisions to rely
on others. In the case of my neighbors, I trusted both men perfectly well to take care of
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Hawley, ―Trust, Distrust, and Commitment,‖ (forthcoming).
This last point is deducible from the above quote, but it is also explicitly stated elsewhere in Hawley‘s
paper. ―I propose that it is appropriate to trust or distrust someone to do something only if that person has
an explicit or implicit commitment to doing it.‖
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my mail and hence—i.e., because of my trust in them—would have been pleased to rely
on either of them to perform the task.
Notice next that because there can be trust without reliance, there can also be trust
(in the doxastic sense) without any of the ―reliance-plus‖ ingredients proposed by the
philosophers above. I trusted Jim to take care of my mail but chose not to rely on him to
do so. It follows that I did not literally expect him to be motivated to take care of my mail
out of goodwill towards me since, after all, I did not expect him to take care of my mail at
all. Likewise, I did not take the participant stance towards Jim with respect to his taking
care of my mail, as I made myself vulnerable to Bob‘s betrayal rather than his. Nor did I
think Jim obligated to take care of my mail; after all, I never even asked him to do so. I
did not think Jim had a commitment to take care of my mail for the same reason. Thus
none of these reliance-plus ingredients are in the end necessary for genuine trusting (once
we recognize the two types of ―genuine‖ trusting) for reasons independent of any
arguments I made against each of them earlier.
The need to accommodate cases of trust in the absence of reliance in our
understanding of trust cannot be easily overstated, for such cases are extremely familiar.
We choose not to rely on people to do things we nonetheless trust them to do for all sorts
of reasons. Sometimes, as in the case of me and Jim above, it is because there are other
third parties whom we think specially obligated to help us instead. Other times, it is
simply more convenient to rely on someone else. For example, suppose I chose to rely on
Bob instead of Jim only because I already had Bob's phone number programmed in my
phone, and so, could get in touch with him quicker. Sometimes it is because we prefer to
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do things ourselves. Still other times, we choose not to rely on those we trust for moral
reasons. While I might trust two friends equally well to take care of my dog for the
weekend, I might choose to rely on one over the other because I know the latter is
stressed from work and would benefit from a more relaxing weekend. None of these
decisions to refrain from relying on others belie an absence of trust (in the very intuitive
doxastic sense) between us.

The Confidence View
I will now diverge from the extant reliance-plus views of trust to focus on
analyzing trust in its basic doxastic sense. On my view, to trust is to have a certain sort of
confidence in the trusted. I will thus call my view the ―confidence view‖ of trust. I will
need to make some important refinements to the confidence view, as not just any form of
confidence in another should count as trust, but I will first restate it here in analytical—
though unrefined—form.

The Confidence View (unrefined version)
A trusts B to do X = def. A has confidence that B will (or would if called upon)
do X.

While my confidence view is a significant divergence from the standard approach
among philosophers who work on the topic of trust, it is very close in an important
respect to the way in which prominent social scientists have conceived of trust. Diego
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Gambetta, for example, summarizes (and endorses) the consensus view of trust among
contributers to his edited volume on trust as follows:

Trust (or, symmetrically, distrust) is a particular level of the subjective probability
with which an agent assesses that another agent or group of agents will perform a
particular action, both before he can monitor such action (or independently of his
capacity ever to be able to monitor it) and in a context in which it affects his own
action.42

Similarly Russell Hardin, who is perhaps the most prolific scholar on trust in the social
sciences, puts it simply: ―To say that I trust you in some context is just to say that I find
you trustworthy in that context.‖43 Gambetta and Hardin thus view trust as a purely
doxastic confidence that the trusted will act in a certain way.44
But the view I want to propose diverges sharply from Gambetta‘s in that I do not
wish to recognize just any state of confidence that another will behave in a way that will
affect me as a case of trust. We have already seen numerous cases of mere reliance—i.e.,
42

Diego Gambetta, ―Can We Trust Trust?‖ in Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations, ed.
Diego Gambetta (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988): 217.
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Russell Hardin, Trust (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006), 1. Hardin also begins in his edited volume on
distrust by saying,
Most of the contributions to this book assume, either explicitly or implicitly, that trust is cognitive,
that it is a de facto an assessment of the trustworthiness of the potentially trusted person or group
or institution. If on your own knowledge, I seem to be trustworthy to some degree with respect to
some matter, then you trust me [to some degree] with respect to that matter.
See op cit, ―Distrust: Manifestations and Management,‖ in Distrust, ed. Russell Hardin (New York: Russell
Sage Foundation, 2004): 3.
44
I notice, though, that Hardin qualifies his view in the opening line of an earlier publication saying,
―Usually, to say that I trust you in some context simply means that I think you will be trustworthy toward
me in that context‖ [emphasis mine]. See Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, (New York: Russell
Sage Foundation, 2002). Perhaps that qualification was meant to recognize the way in which we can trust in
the accepted-vulnerability sense without trusting in the doxastic sense.
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reliance in the absence of trust—that can easily meet Diego‘s conditions without
deserving to be called cases of trust in either of the two fundamental senses. For example,
I can be confident that Baier‘s would-be-food-poisoners will not poison my food without
its being true that I trust them not to poison my food. Hawley‘s husband can likewise be
confident that Hawley will have a meal ready for him, and that confidence certainly
affects his own actions without trusting her to do so.
And while my view of trust as confidence more or less accepts Hardin‘s equation
of trusting a person with believing him to be trustworthy, he and I have quite different
views of what it means to be trustworthy. Hardin explicitly endorses an ―encapsulated
interest‖ view of trustworthiness according to which ―A is worthy of B‘s trusting A to do
x if and only if it is reasonable for B to think A has an interest in continuing his
relationship with B in such a way that would require A to encapsulate B‘s interests for
doing X into his own interests.‖ But I have insisted throughout this chapter that room
must be made in an analysis of trust for third-party trust. Hence I reject Hardin‘s
requirement that it is necessary that the truster believe the trusted is interested in
continuing a relationship with him—i.e., the truster.
Furthermore, there is reason to think Hardin‘s encapsulated interest condition is
not sufficient for trustworthiness either. McLeod offers a compelling variation of the
sexist employer case to show this. She asks us to imagine that the sexist employer enjoys
seeing and then fantasizing about his female employees so much that he is willing to
encapsulate enough of their interests into his own in order to keep their working
relationship intact. An employee who knows this about him could be quite confident that
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he will not make demeaning sexist comments towards her but without, it seems, trusting
him to so refrain.45 I agree and want to respect such boundaries in preserving the notion
of trust, and so, will seek to have a refined confidence view that requires more than
simply being confident that the trusted wants to do what he has to do to keep the truster
around.
My first step, then, is to refine the view in such a way that, unlike Gambetta‘s, it
captures the distinction between genuine doxastic trust and the sort of confidence we
have in cases where we ―merely rely‖ on people to behave in ways we are confident they
will behave. My inclination here is to find a way to assimilate the best of the existing
theories on the difference between the accepted-vulnerability sense of trust and mere
reliance into my confidence view. Two such approaches seem very plausible to me. One
approach is to assimilate Nickel‘s obligation view such that to trust a person to do X (in
the doxastic sense) is, roughly, to be confident that she will do X, where X is an action
the truster takes the trusted to be obligated to perform. I say ―roughly‖ here since the
view would need to be further refined to accommodate cases in which the truster need not
actually believe that the trusted is obligated to do the action—just that he would do it if
obligated. The second approach assimilates Hawley‘s commitment view into my
confidence view such that to trust a person to do X is, roughly (see previous), to be
confident that she will do X, where X is an action the truster takes the trusted to have a
commitment to do. I am most attracted to Hawley's commitment view due to its ability to
easily accommodate cases in which a person can trust someone to do something he thinks
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that person is morally obligated not to do, and so, will employ a version of the second of
these accounts in what follows. It is worth stressing though, that we can agree that there
is a distinction between genuine trusting confidence and non-trusting forms of confidence
while disagreeing on what sort of thing exactly (e.g., obligations, commitments, etc.) it is
that trusters are confident the people they trust will (or would) do.
With this in mind, here is an updated look at my analysis of trust with the present
refinement in place.

The Confidence View (somewhat more refined version)
A trusts B to do X = def. A has confidence that B would do X if B had a
commitment to do X.

Before I make the further refinement needed to more clearly distinguish my view from
Hardin‘s, I want to explain why I formulated it here in the subjunctive tense. This is the
best way I know of to clearly accommodate cases of trust in the absence of reliance,
which I argued is a requirement of an acceptable analysis of trust. My subjunctive
analysis makes sense of the fact that I can genuinely trust Jim to take care of my mail
without thinking he actually has a commitment to take care of it. When I trust him, I am
confident that he would do it if he had a commitment to do it. My analysis should not be
read, however, as making trust a necessarily ―counterfactual‖ matter in the literal sense.
In cases where the truster takes the trusted to already have a commitment to do the act in
question, then the truster's trust will, of course, amount to the confidence that the trusted
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will perform the action. Even so, I take it that the philosopher who wants a unified
analysis of trust is free to describe that confidence in subjunctive tense so long as it is
understood that such a description need not be truly counterfactual.46
Next, I want to refine my confidence view so that it is clearly distinguished from
Hardin‘s view. I do not want to say that A trusts B to meet his commitment to do X if and
only if A thinks B has an interest in doing X in order to maintain a relationship with A.
Not only does this rule out third-party trust, but McLeod‘s fantasizing employer case can
be used to show that you can expect someone to have an interest in doing what he has a
commitment to do without really trusting him to do it. It is easy to imagine that the
employer has a commitment both in the broad and narrow sense to refrain from making
degrading sexist comments to his employees. He clearly has a moral obligation not to
make such comments, and so, has a commitment to refrain from making them in the
broad sense. And we can also easily imagine that he signed a company-wide code of
ethics that prohibits sexist comments, and so, has a commitment in the narrow sense as
well. But if the only reason an employee has for being confident that he will meet this
commitment is that he does not want his employees to get upset and leave lest he be
unable to peer at them, then I do not think she truly trusts him to meet his commitment.
46

There are further interesting question to raise about the extent to which trust can be a counterfactual
matter. Do we want to say, for example, that A trusts B to do X even in cases where A has not even
considered whether B would likely do X (if B obtained a commitment to doing X) so long as it is
counterfactually true that A would be confident that B would do X if the question were raised in A‘s mind?
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of counterfactual, dispositional state such that A can ―have confidence‖ that B would do X so long as A
would be disposed to expecting that B would do X if the question were raised in A‘s mind. For example,
was I confident yesterday that my wife would keep a secret of mine from her best friend even though it
never even occurred to me to share the secret with my wife in the first place? And did I trust her to keep
that secret? I am inclined to say it makes sense to speak of confidence and trust in this way, but I do not
wish to broach such issues here, and so, will focus on the less controversial occurrent—i.e., consciously
opaque—cases of trust.
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The issue, as I see it, is that trusting involves expecting people to act from a
higher motive. Consider again Baier's example of the would-be poisoners. This is another
case in which we can expect people to do something they have a commitment to do
without truly trusting them to do it. If we want to employ the narrow conception of
commitment, though, we need to amend the case to see this. So suppose a few would-be
poisoners are brought in by the police for questioning after being suspected of plotting a
poisoning attack and that these would-be poisoners are subsequently released on the basis
of insufficient evidence. On their way out, however, they feel compelled to make an
explicit (and apparently sincere) promise not to poison anyone‘s food. Thus the wouldbe-poisoners now have a commitment even in the very narrow sense to refrain from
poisoning food. But it is clearly possible for anyone who is privy to this explicit
commitment to maintain their staunch distrust of these weirdoes while nonetheless
having a confident expectation that they will avoid poisoning food simply out of their
fear of sanctions. If I am right, then distrust here amounts to the belief that the would-be
poisoners will not do what they have a commitment to do out of the right sort of motive.
Interestingly, Hawley—the originator of the commitment view that I have
assimilated into my own analysis—seems to outright deny that anticipating motives plays
a role in trusting. ―To be trustworthy in some specific respect, it is enough to behave in
accordance with one‘s commitment, regardless of motive.‖47 But Hawley‘s view is highly
problematic as the cases at hand demonstrate. Furthermore, Hawley‘s argument for
adopting this position is clearly flawed. Working in the context of her commitment view

47

Hawley, ―Trust, Distrust, and Commitment,‖ (forthcoming).

140

she says, ―You may trust me to do something because you believe both that I have a
commitment to do it, and that I will do it, without believing that I will do it because of
my commitment. Maybe I am motivated by pure enthusiasm.‖ She concludes from the
premise that since there is a motive besides the desire to meet one‘s commitment (i.e.,
enthusiasm) that can suffice for trustworthiness that therefore, ―to be trustworthy in some
specific respect, it is enough to behave in accordance with one‘s commitment, regardless
of motive.‖48 I agree with her premise but think the fallacy in moving from that premise
to her conclusion is evident.
First, let me say why I agree with Hawley‘s premise. After showing that the
fantasizing employer and the would-be poisoners can be relied upon to do certain actions
they have commitments to do in the absence of trust, I could have advanced the following
version of my confidence view to explain this.

The Confidence View (the “motivated by commitment” version)
A trusts B to do X only when (i) A is confident that B would fulfill his
commitment to do X if B had a commitment to do X and (ii) A is confident B
would be motivated by the fact that he has a commitment to do X.

But while such a view may help make some sense of why the fantasizing employer and
would-be poisoners are not to be trusted (since they do not seem to care much that they
made commitments), I do not think this will do as a general requirement on trust. The
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problem here is strongly akin to a familiar problem facing Kantian ethics. Just as most
philosophers think it a mistake for Kant to make acting out of a sense of duty a necessary
condition for moral behavior, it seems a mistake to make expecting someone to act out of
a sense of commitment-meeting a necessary condition for trusting. Sometimes, for
example, I trust my wife to keep her commitments to me without expecting the weight of
her commitments to play a motivational role in her actions. I often simply expect her
loving affections for me to suffice.
Indeed, trust seems consistent with a broad range of anticipated motives—e.g.,
acting from love, goodwill, a sense of duty or professionalism, wanting to be a person of
integrity, etc.—but it would be fallacious to conclude along with Hawley that anticipating
motives is therefore completely irrelevant to trusting. We should be led instead to the
conclusion that while many anticipated motives are sufficient for trusting, not just any
motive will do.
So which anticipated motives are compatible with trusting and which ones are not?
This is a difficult question, and I purport to only make one suggestion that I think points
the way forward. I suspect the key to understanding the difference between trusting a
person to meet his commitment and merely expecting him to meet his commitment in a
non-trusting way (because of incompatible motivation) lies in the way in which we often
speak of trust and confidence as having trust and confidence in others. That is, there
seems to me to be an important difference we are able to capture by saying of a person
that we have confidence in her that she will do what she has a commitment to do versus
being able to say only that we have confidence that she will do it.
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So what are we getting at when we talk about being confident in persons? Since
persons are often distinguished from non-persons by their capacities for moral agency, I
think it makes sense to conceive of this as our having a certain expectation of their moral
characters. Thus I think that to be confident in a person that she will meet her
commitment is to have an expectation that she will be motivated to meet her commitment
out of one of her positive moral character traits as opposed to just her fears, lusts,
obsessions, and the like.49 Trusting a spouse to be faithful because you know she loves
you; trusting a mechanic to provide good service because you know him to be a serious
professional; trusting a stranger to provide honest directions because you have strong
inductive evidence of the general goodwill of strangers in such circumstances—all of
these trustings involve an expectation that the trusted will act out of various positive
character traits. I suspect this is why it makes sense to say that you are trusting in them.
I think we can say even in the case where I trust my friend to cover up my
infidelity that I would be expecting him to do so out of his concern for me and/or out of
concern to keep his promises. And since I take it that the disposition to be concerned for a
friend and the disposition to keep one‘s promises are in themselves positive character
traits, I think it makes sense to say I trust in him to help me if those are the sorts of
attributes I anticipate he will act out of. But in the cases of the fantasizing employer and
the would-be poisoners, we can be confident they will do the actions they have
commitments to do only because of dispositions like lust or fear and hence not out of any
markedly positive moral attributes. So, I think it would not make sense to say we are
49
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confident in such persons to meet those commitments. We are confident that they will do
certain actions they have commitments to do, but we are not in any way confident in
them as moral agents; hence, we do not truly trust them to meet those commitments.
I recognize that this proposal for addressing the anticipated motive issue is rather
fuzzy. For one thing, I have not said what exactly can and cannot count as a ―positive
moral attribute.‖ But since I think it clear that anticipated motive plays an important role
in distinguishing trust because this suggestion seems to me to be on the right track, I will
include it my ―official‖ analysis of trust in this project. Here is that analysis:

The Confidence View (official version)
A trusts B to do X = def. A has confidence that B would do X out of a positive
moral attribute if B had a commitment to do X.

A Counterexample to the Confidence View?
I can think of at least one type of case that arguably will not fit into this analysis. I am
thinking of certain possible situations similar to Holton‘s confidence trickster case except
they involve relying on others to keep commitments towards third-parties. Recall that
Hawley‘s response to Holton‘s original case was to say that the confidence trickster
cannot truly perceive you to have a commitment to handing him your money because
your decision to hand it over was based on a deception that he himself is aware of. Since
the view of trust I have endorsed assimilates Hawley‘s commitment component, I could
respond to Holton‘s case in the same way. I could assert that because the confidence
trickster does not take you to truly have a commitment to hand over your money, he is a
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fortiori not confident you will meet a commitment to do so, and so, does not truly trust
you.
But even if Hawley‘s move works in the confidence trickster case, there is a thirdparty variant of that sort of case for which it certainly will not work. Suppose that you
and I are coworkers and that I am desperate to get some cash before I leave the office so
that I can stop on the way home to purchase drugs to feed my addiction. I know you carry
cash, and I want it badly. But knowing I am not clever enough to obtain it by any
confidence trick, I decide to try to steal it from you. Unfortunately, I notice that you are
especially vigilant when it comes to protecting your cash. But while lurking behind your
cubicle, I am lucky to overhear a conversation between you and a third coworker named
Sally. ―I have the fifty bucks I owe you, Sally,‖ you say. To which she replies, ―Thanks,
but I have no pockets, and I‘m in a rush for a meeting. Please just put it in my top desk
drawer, and I‘ll get it before I leave.‖ ―Sure thing,‖ you tell her. Ah hah! Now I know
how to get around your vigilance over your money; because I know you to be a person of
high integrity, I can just wait for you to fulfill your promise to Sally and then snatch the
money from her drawer.
I expect many readers would want to say that my relying on you to put the money
in Sally‘s drawer is not really a matter of trust. I suspect this intuition stems from the
same worry that Holton has in his confidence trickster case. There is just something offputting about saying such evil-doers are genuinely trusting their unwitting participants.
Notice, though, that Hawley‘s way of explaining away Holton‘s confidence-trickster case
will not work in my office thief case. We cannot say that trust is absent here because I do
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not take you to have an actual commitment to put the money in Sally‘s drawer. You do
have a genuine commitment, and I know you do. After all, I heard you promise Sally to
put it there, and I have every reason to believe this was a genuine promise not made
under any confidence-trickster-style pretenses of Sally‘s conniving. Thus if I do not truly
trust you in such a case, it seems both my and Hawley‘s views of trust are mistaken.
Before I propose a way around this difficulty, I think we should note that the
problem likely generalizes to any case that meets the following two conditions:

Condition #1:
Person A is confident Person B will fulfill a commitment to a third party Person C
out of a positive moral attribute.

Condition #2:
Person A relies on Person B to fulfill this commitment to Person C in order that
he (Person A) can achieve some terrible end.

On my analysis of trust, any case that meets Condition 1 is a case of trust by definition.
Thus my analysis is in deep trouble if a case that meets Condition 1 and Condition 2
somehow fails to be a situation of trust.
It would be no use for me to try to argue that cases meeting Conditions 1 and 2
are impossible, as the office thief case is a perfectly coherent—and even not very
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farfetched—case.50 There thus seem to be only two options open to me. One is to add the
stipulation to my analysis that a case cannot count as a case of third-party trust if
Condition 2 is met. In other words, trust would be defined as the state of affairs
consisting in meeting Condition 1 and not meeting Condition 2. The other is a much
simpler (and likely less ad hoc) solution, and I propose we take it. I say we simply
maintain that there is genuine trust in any case that meets both conditions. That is, I think
it makes sense in the end to say I truly trusted you to put your money in Sally‘s drawer
even though I grant there is something initially off-putting about the idea.
I am inclined to think our aversion here can be explained away as a result of our
tendency to fixate on more typical cases of trusting reliance where features that tend to
accompany trust are present. Typically, for example, when I trust someone to do
something that I am relying on him to do, I will quite naturally take the participant stance
towards him even though it is not necessary for trusting reliance that I do so. Clearly,
though, it would be utter nonsense for me to feel betrayed by you if you end up not
putting the money in Sally‘s drawer as promised. But as I have already shown, taking the
participant stance is not always necessary for trust. Recall that it makes good sense to say,
for example, that I trust my friend to be faithful to his wife even though I would not
ordinarily think an act of marital unfaithfulness on his part to be a betrayal against me.
We should say the same thing, I think, about cases that meet Conditions 1 and 2.
The only difference in such cases is the way in which the trust is used by the truster in the
formation of his overall plans. When I trust my friend to be faithful to his wife, I do not
50

I do not mean to suggest, of course, that it is not far-fetched to think I in particular would steal a
coworker‘s money for drugs. I might do it for Skittles, though.
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typically set out to use that confidence to achieve anything of particular benefit for
myself,51 but I am using my confidence in you to keep your promise to Sally in the
formation of my plan to do a very bad thing. So there is an understandable hesitation in
calling this ―trust.‖ But upon reflection, I think it makes perfect sense to say trust is
present in this case. Indeed, I think it makes sense to say that it is precisely because I
trust you that I have decided to wait for the opportune moment when the money will be
unguarded in Sally‘s drawer rather than trying to pickpocket you beforehand. I grant that
it is a shame that an otherwise healthy trust in others can undergird a willingness to rely
on them to unwittingly assist us in achieving our immoral ends, but I think it too real a
shame to be defined out of existence by an analysis of trust. For this reason, I also think
Hawley‘s attempt to explain away Holton‘s confidence trickster case is misguided. I
think we should say, contra Holton, that the confidence trickster does trust you to keep
your commitment to him so long as he has the sort of confidence in you that my analysis
requires. If he uses that trust to take advantage of you, that is a shame, but it is still trust.

Is the Confidence View at Odds with my Overall Project?
I ended Chapter 2 by saying we should not evaluate the theist‘s belief that
gratuitous evils do not exist and her belief that the Assumption of Sufficient Competence
is false as ordinary cases of propositional assent. This, I said, is because the theist takes
herself to be trusting a person and not merely holding beliefs. I have since offered an

51

This is not to say that I cannot use this trust to my advantage. Suppose for example, I am deciding
whether to ask him to give an attractive and ill-behaved friend of mine a ride back to her hotel to save me
the trip. There it would be a very good thing if my attempt at obtaining a pragmatic good for myself was
based in large part on my trust in my friend‘s faithfulness to his wife—as his wife would certainly attest.
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analysis of trusting persons according to which trusting a person just is a matter of
holding a belief—i.e., believing that a person will do what he has a commitment to do out
of some positive moral attribute. I thus may seem to have reasoned my way to the
conclusion that theist‘s phenomenological experience misleads her about her own
doxastic state. I submit, though, that we can better account for why the theist does not
feel like her trust amounts to merely holding a belief about God when we examine the
role played by the various affective states that often accompany trusting beliefs. I think
there is often something phenomenologically distinct about trusting a person and holding
more ordinary beliefs because of the way in which our affections are often tied up in our
trusting beliefs. A failure to trust one‘s loved one, for example, can feel like a failure to
love. In Chapter 4, I will examine some interesting questions about the epistemic status of
allowing our affections to undergird our trusts in this way. I will argue that it is at least
plausible to think that it is sometimes justifiable to allow one‘s trusting beliefs to be
―skewed‖ by one‘s affections.

Chapter Summary
I have argued in this chapter that, in a very basic sense, to trust another person to
do something is just to have confidence in that person that he would do the act in
question out of a positive moral attribute if he had a commitment to do it. While I did not
offer an analysis of ―positive moral attribute,‖ nor an exhaustive list of positive moral
attributes, I did argue that it is not necessary that the truster expect the trusted to act out
of a feeling of goodwill in particular or out of an explicit concern for meeting her
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commitments. I also argued in opposition to most contemporary thinkers on trust that
genuine trusting (in either of the two core senses) does not require taking the participant
stance towards the trusted. And perhaps most notable, I argued in opposition to all the
prominent philosophical views of trust that it is not even partially constitutive of all
genuine trustings that the truster rely on the trusted to do the action in question. Instead, I
pointed out that doxastic trust—a most genuine form of trust— is often formed before we
choose to position ourselves in situations of reliance on others. I also stressed the
importance of recognizing that we can choose to rely on others even when do not trust
them in the doxastic sense—and even when we positively distrust them. These choices
will sometimes be due to our desperation for realizing some state of affairs and our lack
of better options. Other times, we will have moral reasons to entrust things we value to
those we distrust as in cases of therapeutic trust. I think an appreciation of these various
phenomena is crucial in getting clear on how to evaluate the rationality of various trusting
and distrusting stances on the one hand and various situations of reliance (e.g.,
entrustings) and non-reliance on the other. It should be informative, then, to our
evaluations of the rationality of the various sorts of trustings and entrustings common in
religious life in particular.
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Chapter 4:
Being Epistemically Partial in Trusting Those We Love
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Chapter Introduction
I argued in Chapter 3 that to trust another to do something is, in one primary
sense, to have a certain type of belief. More specifically, it is to have a predictive
expectation or ―confidence‖ that the other will (or would) fulfill a commitment out of
some positive moral attribute. We saw that trust in this sense is not required for deciding
to entrust things to others nor for choosing to rely on them to perform certain actions, as
we will sometimes have pragmatic and/or moral reasons for making ourselves and/or
goods we possess vulnerable to those we do not have confidence in.
This is instructive for critics of religious followers; it is one thing to argue that it
is irrational for religious folks to trust God in various ways and quite another thing to
argue that it is irrational for them to rely on him to do certain things or to entrust certain
goods into his care. I expect some critics of religious believers have overlooked this
point. That is, I expect some have in mind that religious believers are being highly
irrational in being willing to entrust various goods—e.g., their time, energy, life goals,
etc.—to their ―God‖ and to rely on Him to meet certain needs in light of the evidence
from inscrutable evils against this ―God‘s‖ trustworthiness.1 But even on the assumption
that inscrutable evils really do render it epistemically unjustifiable to trust God, it does
not follow that entrusting one‘s time and energy to him, for example, is irrational. Recall
that the rationality of entrusting a valued good is often determined by pragmatic and/or
moral considerations. So for it to be established that all religious entrustings are irrational

1

I ask my reader to remember our working assumption that these folks can at least be justified in believing
that God (as defined in the minimal sense of Chapter 3) exists.
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(as opposed to religious doxastic trustings), it would need to be clear that all religious
believers are always either forsaking some important pragmatic advantages or flouting
important moral duties when they entrust something valuable to God. But it is certainly is
not obvious that this is the case. If anything, many of their religious entrustings seem to
provide them pragmatic benefits (e.g., piece of mind) and many seem morally admirable
(e.g., spending time in petitionary prayer for the needs of others). Thus the unfriendly
atheist does well to keep his critical sights set on doxastic religious trustings—the state of
believing God will come through for one in various ways—when making his case for
their being irrational.
So the really interesting question is about the epistemology of religious (doxastic)
trust. To rely on God to take care of us when there seems to one to be no other hope is
one thing, but to actually believe that he takes adequate care of us is quite another.
Surely, one might think, religious believers do not have sufficient reason to trust God to
manage the world‘s sufferings properly given that the world contains so much inscrutable
suffering.
In order to evaluate whether this position is correct, it would help to articulate an
account of the justification conditions for trust more generally. But given that to trust (in
the relevant sense) is just to hold a certain type of belief, a full-blown account of its
justification conditions would likely require a theory of epistemically justified belief as
such. And it is certainly beyond the scope of this dissertation to solve that age-old
problem. I think my time can be better spent, then, by focusing in this chapter on one
particular difficulty that the epistemology of trusting beliefs faces that the epistemology
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of many other beliefs does not. That difficulty can be expressed as follows: people tend to
disproportionally trust those whom they have certain affections for. That is, the more you
like a person, or the more you love a person, or the more devoted you are to her, the more
your beliefs about her abilities and character seem to be skewed in her favor.
The doxastic practice of forming beliefs that favor those you deeply care about
has recently been dubbed by one philosopher as the practice of ―epistemic partiality,‖2
and a budding conversation is emerging in the philosophical literature about whether the
practice can be epistemically justifiable. I will survey that discussion here with the intent
of advancing a modest thesis. I aim only to show that is at least plausible to think that
epistemic partiality can be epistemically justifiable even when such partiality results in
beliefs that are not proportioned strictly to the evidence. In advancing this thesis, I will
make use of some arguments that my reader may well find less analytically rigorous than
the arguments in my previous chapters. I ―trust‖ that my reader will afford me some
leniency in that respect since the thesis I wish to substantiate here is modest and the
territory I am treading has not yet been thoroughly explored. After arguing that it is at
least plausible that these practices can be epistemically justifiable, I will be in position in
my final chapter to argue that though this thesis is modest in its own right, its acceptance
opens up a new and promising avenue for philosophers of religion who wish to debate
whether religious believers can be justified in trusting God to prevent gratuitous evils.

2

This term comes from Sarah Stroud, ―Epistemic Partiality in Friendship,‖ Ethics 116, no. 3 (2006): 498524.
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Epistemic Partiality: Some Preliminaries
When is trusting epistemically justified? One may expect that the answer to this
question is no more challenging than the question of when any other sort of belief is
justified. After all, to be justified in trusting a person on my analysis of trust would just
mean that one is justified in holding certain beliefs about that person‘s commitments,
abilities, and character traits, and such beliefs might seem to be rather ordinary sorts of
beliefs to hold. Thus it might be natural to suspect that the justification for one‘s trusting
beliefs would be obtained in the very same way that justification for other rather ordinary
beliefs are obtained (however exactly that works) and would likewise be defeated by
counterevidence in the very same way that other ordinary beliefs can be defeated by
counterevidence. But there is a significant reason to think that trusting beliefs pose a very
special problem for epistemologists. Trusting beliefs often occur within the confines of
close personal relationships, and some philosophers have claimed that members of such
relationships ought to be very careful about how evidence-centrically they approach the
formation and sustaining of certain beliefs about their loved ones‘ abilities and
characters. These philosophers argue that being a good partner in such a relationship
often demands a form of epistemic partiality—i.e., a biasing of one's doxastic faculties in
the partner's favor when it comes to forming and/or sustaining such beliefs. I will turn to
a critical examination of reasons that have been offered for and against this thesis.
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Trust and Affections in Intimate Relationships
People in intimate relationships have strong affections for each other. These
include affections like love (insofar as love is an affection), a passionate concern for the
other‘s good, empathy, and an acute sense of loyalty and/or devotion. It should not be
news to anyone that our affections often affect our judgments about people. When we
really care about people (or even when we just like them), we tend to interpret data
concerning them in their favor, and when we dislike someone, we may well interpret data
in ways that are unfavorable to them. A typical college professor knows full well, for
example, how difficult it can be to evaluate coursework ―objectively‖ when she simply
likes some of her students more than others. It is rather easy for her to search for and
―find‖ a favorable interpretation of a student‘s work when that student is very likeable.
She looks at that unclear essay the young man has written and begins searching for the
―elusive insight‖ he must have been trying to grapple with. That approach is much more
difficult for her to take, though, when the unclear essay is written by a very annoying
student. It is much easier in that case for her to catch herself thinking simply, ―This kid
cannot write worth a damn!‖ and then cut the evaluation off there. This goes to show that
both positive affections like affinity, love, admiration, and devotion and more ―negative‖
affections like hate, disgust, and annoyance all sway our cognitive faculties in various
directions. It takes effort not to be biased by our affections. This, I take it, is a rather
obvious point about human psychology.
It is time to return, then, to the connection Karen Jones made between trust and
the affections. Though I argued that Jones was mistaken in viewing affect as a necessary
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condition for trust, I think she was quite right to emphasize the prominent role it plays in
trusting relationships given the present observation that many trusting relationships are
intimate relationships where affections have powerful sway. Indeed, I suspect many of
our actual human trustings (but certainly not all of them) are undergirded by strong
affections we feel towards those we trust. Thus I think the question Jones raises about the
rationality of sustaining our confidence in others while under the sway of powerful
affective biases towards them is crucial to arriving at an applicable epistemology of
everyday trustings. A number of recent philosophers have tried to argue for the
justifiability of this sort of doxastic biasing in close relationships. And though the recent
philosophical discussion on the topic does not often talk explicitly about affections, I
think we will do well to keep in mind that our affections are often the driving forces
behind these biases. That way, we can easily connect questions about the rationality of
biases in trusting back to the more general question about the rationality of arriving at
any judgment under the influence of affection (not that I will be doing that here in this
project).

Baker on the Rationality of Trust in Friendship
Backing up a step, Jones was not the first recent philosopher to notice the way in
which our beliefs are often skewed in favor of those we care about. This phenomenon
was the focus of Judith Baker‘s 1987 article, ―Trust and Rationality,‖ one of the first
publications on trust in the philosophical literature after Baier‘s influential 1986 paper.3
For whatever reason, Baker‘s paper seems to have been largely overlooked in the ensuing
3

Judith Baker, ―Trust and Rationality,‖ Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 68 (1987): 1-13.
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scholarly conversation, but it shares much in common with the more recent work on
epistemic partiality I will soon evaluate. Baker focuses her paper on the sort of trust that
typically exists between close friends and inquires about the rationality of what seems to
be a prevalent feature of trust in friendship: People often trust their friends in a way that
is especially resistant to counterevidence about their friends‘ characters. Baker describes
a hypothetical case to highlight this phenomenon—a case that, although perhaps more
extravagant than need be for making her point, seems especially pertinent to the sort of
connection I want eventually to draw to the religious believer‘s persistent trust in God in
the face of inscrutable evils. Baker writes,

Suppose I trust a friend who has been accused of wrongdoing, with an impressive
amount of evidence brought against her…Suppose she is accused of selling
secrets to a foreign government…If I trust her in such a situation, I do not merely
stand by her, acting in ways that support her, either materially or emotionally. I
believe she is innocent. I do not, however, come to believe she is innocent, despite
the evidence…[W]hat others regard as evidence against her isn‘t considered by
me as evidence at all. It is not that I close my ears to what people say, or refuse to
look at, or repress, the facts. I believe that there is an explanation for the alleged
evidence, for the accusation, which will clear it all up. In advance of hearing the
case, I am prepared to believe that there is such an explanation. I am biased in
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favor of my friend, in favor of her innocence. To put it another way, I am
committed to her being innocent.4

It is conceivable that Baker raises the stakes unnecessarily by constructing a case
involving the daunting threat of being intimated with a person involved with government
espionage, but we will soon see that more realistic cases are not hard to imagine that
seem to corroborate Baker‘s claim that doxastic biasing of the sort she describes here is
rather common in friendship. For now, I only want to note two things. First, it is clear
that Baker is describing something very close to Jones‘s notion of ―affective optimism‖
discussed in Chapter 3. Baker is pre-committed to her friend‘s innocence in a way that
prevents her from being swayed by what would otherwise be considered a substantial
amount of counterevidence against her friend‘s trustworthiness. She is committed, as
Jones would put it, to a ―distinctive way of seeing‖ her friend.5 Second, I think it is
crucial to take seriously that Baker is talking about a genuine belief state here. That is,
she is not just pretextually acting as if her friend is innocent; rather she believes her
friend is innocent, and she believes it in a particularly resistant—one might even say
―stubborn‖—way.
This, of course, raises the question of whether such doxastic biasing is justifiable.
Baker at least thinks it a good thing that she biases her beliefs in her friend‘s favor, and
so, that it is at the very least morally justifiable. She points out that although this practice
―runs counter to our general picture of what it is to be rational,‖ we nonetheless ―demand
4
5

Baker, ―Trust and Rationality,‖ 3.
Jones, ―Trust as an Affective Attitude,‖ 11.
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it of our friends, and we think well of people in general who manifest such trust.‖6 And
while Baker admits that there are limits to how much evidence against our friends we
should be willing to push to the side or explain away, she makes clear her view that it is
characteristic of good friends that their confidence in their friends should not be
determined solely by their evidence.
This last point foreshadows a crucial debate in the more recent philosophical
discussion of epistemic partiality: When asking whether these biases are epistemically
justifiable, we might try to validate them by virtue of the evidence we have acquired of
our friends‘ abilities and characters—evidence we do not possess for our non-friends.
Baker, however, thinks our evidence is insufficient to justify our partialism. As she puts it,
―Confidence in a friend may well grow as a result of experience, with the growth of the
friendship itself. But at each stage of a friendship the confidence one has in one‘s friend
leaps ahead of what we can think of as the evidence supporting it.‖7
Thus Baker views this ―supra-evidential‖ bias towards her friend as part and
parcel of engaging in genuinely close friendships. But the question remains: Does this
mean she thinks that friends are morally obligated to form epistemically unjustified
beliefs in such cases? While this might be a natural conclusion to draw from her view—
and indeed we will soon see that one recent philosopher draws this conclusion from the
very same starting premise—Baker herself is averse to the idea that a plausible theory of
―rationality,‖ by which I assume she means ―epistemic rationality,‖ would deem the
practice necessarily irrational. This leads her to formulate a very unorthodox theory of
6
7

Baker, ―Trust and Rationality,‖ 6.
Baker, ―Trust and Rationality,‖ 5.
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rationality that I will discuss later on in this chapter. As we will see, other commentators
also feel the need to expand our ordinary notions of epistemic norms in unconventional
ways in order to accommodate at least some of the non-evidence-based epistemic
partiality we have towards our loved ones. I myself will suggest an original approach
along these lines at the end of the chapter. My contention at the end of the chapter is that
these proposals show that it is at least plausible to think that epistemic partiality is
epistemically justifiable.

Stroud and Keller on Epistemic Partiality
The more recent discussion on epistemic partiality began with two independently
published papers in 2003 and 2004 by Sarah Stroud and Simon Keller respectively. They
(like Baker) argue that friendship demands doxastic biasing in ways that are at odds with
traditionally recognized epistemic demands. As Stroud puts it, ―[T]hese differential
doxastic practices really do constitute partiality or bias and contravene the epistemic
standards held up by mainstream epistemological theories.‖8 Likewise, for Keller,
―[E]pistemic norms sometimes conflict with the requirements of a good friendship.‖9
Their arguments for this view, while quite similar to Baker‘s, have for whatever reason
caught much more attention from critics. After providing a brief synopsis of Stroud‘s and
Keller‘s discussions, I will focus on some very recent critiques of their work by
Katherine Hawley, Troy Jollimore, and Curtis Brown.

8
9

Stroud, ―Epistemic Partiality in Friendship, 499.
Simon Keller, ―Friendship and Belief,‖ Philosophical Papers 33, no 3 (2004): 329
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Stroud and Keller, like Baker before them, each rest their case on thought
experiments in which the doxastic demands of a friend in a given situation are to be
compared with the demands of non-friends. Stroud‘s and Keller‘s cases do have the
advantage of being a good bit more ordinary than Baker‘s fanciful case. Stroud‘s primary
case asks you to imagine you are told that your close friend Sam ―recently slept with
someone and then cruelly never returned any of that person‘s calls, knowingly breaking
that person‘s heart.‖10 Stroud then compares how an unbiased observer would approach
that evidence against Sam with how you, as Sam‘s friend, would likely approach it.

Others who hear that story might conclude [about Sam‘s behavior], ―that certainly
was insensitive‖ or ―what an inconsiderate jerk‖…As a good friend, however,
your conclusions will likely differ. As a good friend, you will tend to file this
incident—and Sam‘s behavior generally—under other labels. Your reaction to
this story might be, for instance, ―There‘s never any artifice with Sam. You know
where you stand with him: if he doesn‘t want to see you, he makes that
clear.‖…In a similar vein, what other people might classify as compulsive
womanizing on Sam‘s part, you might see as irrepressible but fickle enthusiasm
and appetite for female charm in all its many varieties.11

Stroud, just like Baker, finds this sort of response to counterevidence to be
characteristic of a good friend. She is quick to note that these responses do not amount to
10
11

Stroud, ―Epistemic Partiality in Friendship,‖ 504.
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total ―blindness‖ toward the new data; rather, she thinks the good friend ―sees the data,
all right; she just puts a different cast on them…[T]he bias of a good friend will normally
take the form of casting what she sees or hears in a different light, shading it differently,
placing it in a different optic, embedding it in a different overall portrait of her friend.‖12
So a good friend will allow her affections towards her friend to bias her assessment of
this threatening counterevidence in a way that an unbiased observer would not. That is
epistemic partialism at its essence.
Keller‘s primary case involves a young man named Eric whose good friend,
Rachel, has asked him to attend her poetry reading at a local café. Eric was previously
unaware that Rachel had any interest in poetry and has himself attended enough amateur
readings at that particular café to know that the chances of hearing good poetry on a
given night are quite low. But Keller thinks that Eric should not base his expectation of
the quality of Rachel‘s work on this inductive evidence. He writes,

If some stranger were about to give the reading, then Eric would believe that the
poetry he is about to hear will probably be pretty awful…Seeing as he is
Rebecca‘s good friend, though, and seeing as he is there to offer her support, he
ought not, before she takes the stage, have those beliefs about her. He ought not
be expecting that the poetry about to come out of Rebecca‘s mouth will be
awful.13

12
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Keller, ―Friendship and Belief,‖ 533.
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But not only does Keller think Eric should refrain from expecting Rebecca‘s
poetry to be in keeping with the statistical norm of his inductive evidence base, Keller
thinks Eric‘s loyalty to Rebecca ought to shape his assessment of the quality of her poetry
once Rebecca begins to read it.

If it were a stranger giving the reading, and if Eric were setting out to make an
accurate judgment about the poetry‘s quality…then he would listen attentively
and with an open mind, and then form critical and dispassionate
judgments…Rebecca, however, is a friend, and that seems to be a reason for Eric
to listen with a more sympathetic ear. In listening as a friend, he will allow the
poetry to strike him in the best possible light; he‘ll actively seek out its strengths,
and play down its weaknesses; he‘ll be disposed to interpret it in ways that make
it look like a stronger piece of work…He should put himself into a situation under
which it‘s more likely that he‘ll form certain beliefs, but his reason for putting
himself into that situation is not one that bears upon the likelihood that those
beliefs are true [emphasis mine].14

Thus Stroud and Keller both agree with Baker that friendship requires that we allow
factors other than evidential considerations to affect our beliefs about our friends. Notice
that although Stroud and Keller do not explicitly mention trust, they have collectively
argued that beliefs about our friends‘ characters and beliefs about our friends‘ abilities

14
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ought often be biased in our friends‘ favors. And since I have argued that trusting another
is (in the relevant sense) a matter of holding a belief about her ability and character, their
arguments will apply quite straightforwardly to concerns about the rationality of trust.
In what follows, I will call any belief forming practice that aims at forming beliefs
not solely on evidential grounds a supra-evidential belief-forming practice. Stroud, Keller,
and Baker collectively claim there are at least three supra-evidential belief forming
practices that friends ought to engage in. I think it will help to clearly list them:



Friend-1 ought to refrain from forming unfavorable beliefs about Friend-2‘s
abilities until the evidence against Friend-2‘s abilities becomes overwhelming.



Friend-1 ought to actively seek favorable interpretations of Friend-2‘s behaviors
as Friend-1 observes those behaviors.



Friend-1 ought to assume that a threatening body of counterevidence against
Friend-2‘s character is defeated by some exonerating explanation even before
Friend-1 discovers such an explanation (at least when that counterevidence is not
overwhelming).

It is important to keep in mind claim that the claim that a friend ought to engage in
these practices does not in any way suggest that most of us will have to work very hard at
being good friends in this respect. Rather, we often simply ―find ourselves‖ as it were
with biased beliefs towards those we love. It is the sort of doxastic practice we would
have to actively try to rid ourselves of if we deemed it undesirable. As John Heil notes,
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―One simply does not draw certain conclusions about one‘s friends or loved ones in the
way one draws conclusions about others. This need not be a matter of effort or deliberate
calculation. Rather, it is, typically at any rate, perfectly natural and unselfconscious.‖15
So to claim that these are practices we often ought to engage in is just to claim that our
doxastic faculties are often working just as they should when we are being epistemically
partial.
With this in mind, I will now offer a succinct summary of the argument that Baker,
Stroud, and Keller make about these norms up until the point that they diverge into their
own disagreements about where to go next. Since the critics of this argument we will
soon meet all focus on Stroud‘s and Keller‘s presentations of the argument, I will simply
label it the ―Stroud-Keller Argument‖ in hopes that I have already done my part in
stressing that Baker‘s presentation of the argument was just as noteworthy.

The Stroud-Keller Argument
1) Friends ought to engage in supra-evidential partial belief forming practices
when arriving at or sustaining beliefs about their friends‘ abilities and/or
characters.
2) Mainstream epistemological theories do not allow for supra-evidential beliefforming practices.
 3) Mainstream epistemic theories do not allow for cases in which a friend

15

John Heil, ―Believing What One Ought,‖ Journal of Philosophy 80, no. 11 (1983): 762.
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epistemically ought to engage in supra-evidential partial belief forming
practices when arriving at or sustaining beliefs about their friends‘ abilities
and/or characters.
 4) Either (a) the sense in which friends ―ought‖ to engage in supra-evidential
partial belief forming practices on behalf of their friends is not an epistemic
one, or (b) mainstream epistemological theories are mistaken in not allowing
for supra-evidential belief forming practices such as those demanded by
friendship.

Baker, Keller, and Stroud all endorse this argument. They only differ on which
horn of the dilemma expressed in (4) we should accept next. Keller accepts the bleaker
horn (a) and concludes that we should simply sometimes be ―epistemically irrational‖ for
our friends, whereas Stroud and Baker opt for horn (b) and look for alternative
conceptions to the ―mainstream‖ epistemological theories that can accommodate the
partial doxastic demands of friendship. But let us see first whether we need to make such
a choice.

Hawley’s Critique
Katherine Hawley has very recently taken issue with both premises (1) and (2) of
the Stroud-Keller argument.16 In her case against premise (1), Hawley makes clear that
she does not want to deny that there are cases in which we ought to think more highly of
our friends than we would of our non-friends, nor does she want to deny that there are
16

Katherine Hawley, ―Partiality and Prejudice in Trusting,‖ Synthese (forthcoming).
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cases in which we ought to handle counterevidence regarding friends and non-friends
differently. She suggests, though, that these differences in our obligations are due merely
to the additional evidence we would have in such cases regarding our friends‘ abilities
and good natures relative to the evidence we would have regarding our non-friends. ―Put
simply,‖ Hawley asserts, ―we already know a lot about our friends, and this can give us
good epistemic reason for treating new information about our friends differently from
new information about our non-friends.‖17
Stroud, however, anticipated this objection. She grants that ―an appeal to
differential information can certainly do some work in explaining and vindicating
differences in the conclusions we draw about our friends. But I am very doubtful that it
can do all the work required under the strategy we are now considering.‖18 Stroud offers
two considerations to support this response. First, she suggests that the objection simply
fails to appreciate the way in which the demands of friendship call on us to handle
evidence differently than impartial observers. An impartial observer, she suggests, could
by hypothesis also have strong inductive evidence of your friend‘s good character but not
feel the same obligation and drive to interpret the new, potentially contrary evidence in
such a favorable light.19 Second, she calls into question the objectivity of the inductive
―evidence‖ we generally have about our friends‘ characters. ―[T]hink of how much of
that ‗knowledge‘ of your friend‘s character may already have been corrupted and slanted

17

Hawley, ―Partiality and Prejudice in Trusting,‖ (forthcoming).
Stroud, ―Epistemic Partiality in Friendship,‖ 516. To be clear, by the ―strategy we are now considering,‖
Stroud is referring to the affective strategy of handling counterevidence against our friends in a favorable
light.
19
I have taken some interpretive liberties to put Stroud‘s point here in succinct form. I encourage my reader
to refer to her actual comments in Stroud, ―Epistemic Partiality in Friendship,‖ 515-17.
18
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by the interpretive heuristics of the good friend.‖20 This exchange presents us with a core
issue in the recent debate on epistemic partiality: Can the sort of epistemic partiality we
ought to engage in within close relationships be justified solely on evidential grounds?
Stroud has now given us two very compelling reasons to think it cannot.
Hawley does not offer a rejoinder, so far as I can tell, to the first of Stroud‘s
preemptive replies to her objection—i.e., the reply that an equally informed non-friend
need not be under the same obligation to seek a favorable conclusion as a friend would be.
This is unfortunate, as this seems to be to be a very good reply to Hawley‘s objection. For
what it is worth, I will now offer a rather speculative response on Hawley‘s behalf that
some might find promising.
It is conceivable that there are ways in which a non-friend cannot even in
principle be equally informed relative to a friend about certain aspects of a person‘s
character. If this is true (and I will argue in a moment that it is plausible), then Hawley
could claim that the friend‘s added drive to form favorable conclusions toward her friend
in response to counterevidence might stem from the friend‘s being in the role of the
privileged possessor of this special body of favorable evidence.
I do think it plausible to suspect that being in a close relationship with a person
can provide a unique sort of evidence about her that could not even in principle be
possessed by an impartial (i.e., uninvolved) third party. Here is a fanciful thought
experiment that helps supports this suggestion. Imagine that some psychologist has used

20

Stroud, ―Epistemic Partiality in Friendship,‖ 516. This second reply is quite similar to one Baker makes
in anticipating Hawley‘s objection. Recall Baker‘s view that ―Confidence in a friend may well grow as a
result of experience…But at each stage of a friendship the confidence on has in one‘s friend leaps ahead of
what we can think of as the evidence supporting it.‖ Baker, ―Trust and Rationality,‖ 5.
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me for the last decade as an unwitting subject in his research project on the development
of romantic love. Knowing that I was a consummate bachelor back in my college days,
he chose me then as a perfect subject for his project and managed to implant a teeny
camera and microphone in my forehead one night after I passed out after a wild party. 21
He has closely monitored all of my social interactions ever since. Thus he was ―present‖
when I finally met my wife-to-be, and he has observed our interactions throughout all the
moments we have shared together since. He ―saw‖ everything I saw and ―heard‖
everything I heard in interacting with her. Yet it seems plausible to me to say that there
will be things about her that he has been unable to observe by virtue of his not being
himself in a loving relationship with her.
Indeed, it seems plausible to me that the connection between me and my wife
itself might enable me to see something important about her that he cannot see. No doubt,
the psychologist might (as seems likely enough to me) begin to love my wife after his
many years of close observation of her, but he still will not himself be in an active love
relationship with her. I think it plausible, then, that he could thereby miss out on some
private evidence about her that I am privy to no matter how closely he observed her.
Furthermore, I suspect this private evidence could afford me a tacit knowledge about my
wife‘s character that I could not even share with him if I tried (e.g., the knowledge that
her character is inconsistent with her freely engaging in a certain sort of action). If so,
then this knowledge about her would be in principle unobtainable from outside the
bounds of a close relationship with her.
21

If my mom should be reading this, I encourage her to look up what philosophers mean by ―thought
experiments.‖
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There are three primary steps in my case for thinking it plausible that a lover can
obtain tacit evidence-based justification for trusting his beloved that an impartial observer
could not even in principle obtain. First, it is widely recognized among epistemologists
that there is a distinction between knowing a person as such and having propositional
knowledge about a person.22 Second, the non-propositional content involved in knowing
a person will likely often be tacit since it is hard to express non-propositional content in
sentences.23 Third, it makes sense to me to think that some of this non-propositional
acquaintance knowledge of a person can only be obtained via interactive acquaintance
with that person within the context of a close relationship. So, it seems plausible to me
that the psychologist in my thought experiment can fail to know my wife in certain
relevant respects given that his acquaintance with her is only one-sided and hence fail to
know that she is trustworthy in some respect. Putting all this together, then, we have at
least one way to suggest that the added sense of obligation the lover feels to resist the
weight of new counterevidence (even relative to a well-informed, neutral observer) could
after all be based on his possession of additional evidence. Indeed, it may well be that
something like this tacit awareness of private evidence is often behind the lover‘s
common decree, ―If only you knew her like I do.‖

22

See for example Jeremy Fantl‘s opening line in Jeremy Fantl, "Knowledge How", The Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2012 Edition), ed., Edward N. Zalta. URL =
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/knowledge-how/:
It is common in epistemology to distinguish among three kinds of knowledge. There's the kind of
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you that you know that some fact is true—say, that the Red Sox won the 2004 World Series.
23
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Again, I recognize it is speculative to suggest that epistemic partiality can be
grounded in these sorts of evidential considerations, but it is at least worth noting that if
this speculation were sound, it would be rather important for the epistemology of trust, as
it would seem to have the more general implication that impartial observers will
sometimes (perhaps often) be ill-prepared to make certain types of character judgments
about others if they have not themselves interacted with them in the context of a close
relationship. The upshot would be that a certain amount of epistemic humility is called
for when making judgments about the rationality of someone‘s trust in a person P when
one has not personally interacted heavily with P.
Putting this speculation aside, let us return to Stroud‘s second reply to Hawley‘s
objection. According to that second reply, we cannot ground epistemic partiality solely
on our inductive evidence of our friends‘ abilities and characters, because the so-called
―evidence‖ we have of them will itself be skewed by the demands of the friendship over
time. Hawley does offer us a direct rejoinder to this reply. She claims that Stroud‘s move
here,

…seems to ignore the extent to which becoming friends is typically a gradual
process. We have not always been friends with our friends, and only gradually
take on the obligations—whatever they are—of the good friend. So earlier beliefs
about our friend‘s behavior may have been less ‗corrupted and slanted‘, and thus
can provide some grounds for our current opinions.24

24
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I suspect that even if we grant Hawley‘s claim that our evidence of our friends‘
characters is generally objective in the early stages of friendship, this will be insufficient
to undermine Stroud‘s claim that our overall assessment of our friends‘ characters and/or
abilities will often at some point become skewed in our friends‘ favors relative to the
assessments an impartial observer would make to the same bodies of evidence we possess.
Indeed, it seems clear to me that our beliefs about our friends and loved ones often are
biased in this way. We often think we should trust our loved ones ―against the odds‖ so to
speak—i.e., to trust them even when our trust is not proportioned strictly to the evidence.
Thus I am much less eager than Hawley to attempt to justify epistemic partiality by
explaining it away as an evidentially-based practice after all.
When we trust our loved ones ―against the odds,‖ we are singling them out as
special. We are saying in effect, ―Yes, I recognize that people in evidential situations like
mine are very often trusting people who turn out not to be trustworthy, but I still trust my
loved one to be among the trustworthy.‖ And isn‘t that what we should do? Shouldn‘t we
give our loved ones the benefit of the doubt so long as the evidence against them is not
overwhelming? Failing to trust someone you deeply love and who deeply loves you when
they have not actually wronged you is extremely unfortunate. I can imagine my wife, for
example, being innocent of some charge against her and then discovering with dismay
that I did not trust her to be innocent due to some body of evidence that was sufficient to
garner distrust in her by an impartial observer. That is a painful thought for me. I want
her to know that my trust in her is stronger than that—that I am able to keep trusting her
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even if there is evidence out there that would compel an impartial observer not to. And I
think she would be completely justified in feeling let down by me if this were not my
natural stance towards her. Thus I agree with Baker, Stroud, and Keller then that we are
often supposed to be doxastically loyal to those we love in ways that are not purely
evidentially based—at least to an extent.

.

It is starting to sound more and more like I envision the demands of morality are
trumping the demands of epistemology in such cases. This is precisely why Stroud and
Keller endorse premise (2) in the Stroud-Keller argument. Given that the demands of
close relationships push us to accept conclusions that may not be acceptable on their
evidence alone, it would seem that these demands run counter to the twin goals of
pursuing truths and avoiding falsehoods held paramount by widely-accepted epistemic
norms. Hawley, Curtis Brown, and Troy Jollimore, however, have all argued that there
are mainstream epistemological views that could actually accommodate this phenomenon.
Hawley admits that her objection to premise (1) of the Stroud-Keller argument
may not be decisive, and so, she takes up the question of whether, assuming for the sake
of argument the demands of friendship do sometimes require us to engage in supraevidential belief-forming practices, these demands must be viewed as being in conflict
with mainstream epistemic norms. [This was premise (2) of the Stroud-Keller Argument.]
Hawley claims that these friendship norms (if they exist) could be considered consistent
with epistemic norms so long as we reject the epistemic doctrine of Uniqueness.
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Uniqueness
Given one‘s total evidence, there is a unique rational doxastic attitude that one can
take to any proposition.

Hawley is herself attracted to rejecting this doctrine. She writes,

Different people—and the same person in different moods—can reasonably differ
in their doxastic policies. Some people are somewhat quicker to belief than others
are, some put more weight on the evidence of their own senses than others do,
some are more skeptical about testimony than others are…We are all familiar
with situations in which there is more than one conclusion which could
reasonably be drawn, even against the same background assumptions.25

Thus Hawley thinks that even if we grant Stroud and Keller that the demands of
friendship obligate us to jump to favorable conclusions of our friends‘ characters and
abilities in ways that are not strictly dictated by the evidence, this does not mean that
friendship requires us to engage in epistemically unjustified practices, so long, that is, as
Uniqueness is false. And given, as Hawley seems to assume, that the denial of
Uniqueness is at least a respectable move among mainstream epistemologists, it seems to
follow that premise (2) of the Stroud-Keller argument is false.

25
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There are two possible replies to Hawley‘s objection to (2). The first is to argue
that the denial of Uniqueness is not really consistent with mainstream epistemological
norms after all. There are certainly some very harsh extant criticisms of this move in the
epistemological literature, but there are also enough mainstream epistemologists who
deny Uniqueness to seem to validate Hawley‘s position that the position is consistent
with some mainstream epistemic norms.26 The second reply would be to argue that
merely denying Uniqueness in the way that many mainstream epistemologists do is not
sufficient to accommodate the full range of cases of epistemic partiality that Stroud and
Keller have in mind. After all, one can reject Uniqueness simply because one thinks there
are cases in which a body of evidence is equally consistent with more than one view and
that a person is, therefore, epistemically permitted to accept either of those views
depending on which one strikes him as true. This is one way of interpreting the Hawley
quote above. The evidence as such does not always dictate what features of the case are
most pertinent (e.g. the sensory evidence or the testimonial evidence) or what precise
degree of confidence we should place in the conclusions we draw, and so, the evidence as
such is consistent with multiple reasonable judgments.
But I expect Stroud and Keller would say that the demands of friendship
sometimes obligate us to adopt views that are not ―equally consistent‖ with the evidence

26

For an informative and balanced debate over the merits of Uniqueness see the interchange between
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in this way. I think they mean to say that friends ought to sometimes believe well about
their friends even when it would be irrational for a well-informed non-friend to do so. So
the good friend in such cases, is not just forming one conclusion among others that the
―evidence‖ (in an objective sense) equally permits but one that is less supported by that
evidence. If I am right, then Stroud and Keller will not think the mere denial of
Uniqueness is sufficient to resolve the conflict between the doxastic demands of close
relationships and mainstream epistemological norms.
To her credit, the Hawley quote above could be interpreted in such a way that
extends epistemic permissiveness beyond cases where evidence is equally consistent with
more than one view, but I am not sure that most of the mainstream epistemologists who
deny Uniqueness are willing to go that far. Thus it becomes less and less clear that we
can call the move needed to validate Stroud and Keller‘s partial norms a ―mainstream‖
move simply by pointing out that several philosophers reject Uniqueness. This does not
mean, of course, that we should not be willing to consider a view that is not mainstream,
but we are currently evaluating objections to premise (2) of the Stroud-Keller argument—
objections which are trying to avoid the conclusion that non-mainstream theories are our
only hope in justifying epistemic partiality.

Brown’s Critique
Curtis Brown has recently criticized premise (2) of the Stroud-Keller argument by
arguing for a ―mainstream‖ way in which a judgment about a friend‘s ability or character
could be epistemically justified even if it is not as consistent (in an objective sense) with
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the evidence as is an alternative judgment.27 Brown argues that on a subjective Bayesian
epistemology—a respectable mainstream epistemological view as he sees it—one could
deem the Stroud-Keller supra-evidential doxastic practices as perfectly justifiable. Brown
likens the partial practices of friends to certain investigative practices common among
scientists.

[C]onsider the case of a scientist who hypothesizes that H, but has not yet
subjected H to empirical test. It seems that the scientist might have many reasons
to look with favor on H. One reason might simply be that H is the scientist‘s
creation, and she is inclined to look favorably on her own creations. A different
reason might be that she has a hunch that H is true, a hunch that is not based on
evidence…it seems entirely epistemically reasonable for a scientist to have a
more positive attitude toward H than toward rival hypotheses, even if there is as
yet no relevant evidence…28

It is crucial to Brown‘s view that the degree of credence the scientist gives to H
prior to his evidential investigation is effectively irrelevant to an assessment of the
rationality of his position at any point in the investigation of the evidence.

27

Curtis Brown, ―Friendships: Epistemically Dangerous Liaisons?‖ in Thinking About Friendship:
Historical and Contemporary Philosophical Perspectives, ed. Damien Caluori (New York: Palgrave
Macmillan): 99-117.
28
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It is a staple of Bayesian epistemology that priors can legitimately be determined
in a variety of ways. They may be the result of evaluating prior evidence…But
this is not essential. My prior might also be based on a hunch, or even bias or
prejudice. From the point of view of determining whether I am assessing the
evidence rationally, what matters is not the prior probability I assign to a
hypothesis , but rather whether I update that probability appropriately given the
nature of the evidence [emphasis mine].29

Brown‘s extreme permissivism with regards to priors is highly controversial even
among Bayesians. I suppose it is fair to say, though, that he is working with a
―mainstream‖ epistemological theory for whatever that is worth. Thus if he can
demonstrate that an application of this theory to the Stroud-Keller cases yields no clash
between (his) Bayesian epistemic norms and the norms of friendship, he will have given
us a compelling reason to reject (2) of the Stroud-Keller argument, and we can finally put
to rest the worry that there is simply no live option in contemporary epistemology for
justifying these practices. In applying his Bayesian view to the Stroud-Keller cases,
Brown argues that

Stroud and Keller both stress that friends will not only begin with a more
favorable assessment than a neutral observer might have but will also respond
differently to new evidence…But a crucial point that Stroud and Keller seem to

29
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miss…is that it is entirely rational for two people to assign different posterior
probabilities to a hypothesis after assessing the same evidence, provided they had
different prior probabilities for the hypothesis before taking the new evidence into
account. It seems to me that this simple fact is enough to account for the
responses to evidence of the friends in their stories.30

As Brown sees it, it can be totally reasonable for two people to form different
conclusions after looking at the same body of evidence due to the epistemic legitimacy of
bringing your priors into the investigation—even if those priors are steeped in one‘s
affective biases. Brown illustrates his point by returning to Stroud's case of your friend,
Sam, who is reported to have been rude to someone he met at a party.

Let us suppose that the friend [i.e., you] assigns a prior probability of .9 to the
hypothesis that Sam always acts honorably. And let us suppose that an ―objective‖
or disinterested observer would assign a prior probability of .5 to the same
hypothesis since the disinterested observer has no reason, epistemic or otherwise,
to favor one belief or the other...Now, suppose that both the friend and the
disinterested observer agree that the probability of someone [being as rude as Sam
was reported as being], given they always act honorably, is fairly low, say .3. And
suppose they also agree that the probability of someone who doesn't always act
honorably [being as rude as Sam was reported as being] is much higher, say .7. If

30
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both the friend and the disinterested observer update the probability they assign to
the hypothesis in accordance with Bayes‘ Theorem, they will end up with very
different results. The friend will assign the hypothesis a posterior probability
of .79, while the disinterested observer will assign it a posterior probability
of .3.31

The numbers in the case are of course completely arbitrary, but they demonstrate how
two people can agree about how a body of evidence bears on a situation—i.e., how
probable it is on some hypothesis—while disagreeing in their overall conclusions due to
the differing doxastic commitments with which they began. And if Brown is right that
epistemic justification should be considered only in terms of making accurate judgments
about how probable a body of evidence is on some hypothesis and updating one‘s
probability assessments accordingly, then he has demonstrated that the differences
between two people‘s priors can explain why friends and non-friends can rationally come
to different conclusions even when the evidence as such (i.e., independent of nonevidential priors) favors one of those conclusions more than the other.
Thus a husband‘s affections for his wife will often lead him to assign a much
higher prior to the hypothesis that she is innocent of a charge of infidelity than the
impartial observer would assign. Both can then examine the evidence against her and
agree that the body of evidence is more consistent with the conclusion that she is cheating
than the conclusion that she is faithful while still rationally disagreeing over which

31
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conclusion to accept. Brown‘s approach, then, provides a richer case for epistemic
partialism than can the mere denial of Uniqueness. What is epistemically justifiable for
one to conclude about one‘s total evidence is not just determined by the evidence but by
the combination of one‘s evidence and one's unique priors. And favorable priors assigned
on the basis of affection are epistemically appropriate so far as Brown is concerned.
Brown recognizes that there are two other forms of epistemic partiality
encouraged by Stroud and Keller that go beyond having favorable priors, and he thinks
these can also be deemed epistemically appropriate in the spirit of his Bayesian
framework. ―The first,‖ he says, ―is the possibility that people will more assiduously seek
out alternative hypotheses to explain evidence that might appear to support negative
conclusions about their friends than they would for non-friends.‖ And the second is that
―a friend may also be motivated to look harder for evidence by means of which to test
those hypotheses.‖32 Brown quickly deems these partial practices epistemically justifiable
by parity of reasoning of what we should conclude about scientists who propose and test
new hypotheses to explain away evidence that threaten their ―pet theories.‖

[W]e would not be surprised or critical if a scientist works harder at testing her
own theories than those of others, so long as she does not fudge the data and
properly updates her assessment of the theory in light of it. If this behavior is

32
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epistemically rational for a scientist, then it seems that the similar behavior of
friends is also epistemically rational.33

All in all, Brown concludes that we can agree with Stroud and Keller that friendship often
encourages us to be epistemically partial in our friends' favors without agreeing with
Keller that there is necessarily anything epistemically unjustifiable about our beliefforming practices and without agreeing with Stroud that nothing in mainstream
epistemology can accommodate this conclusion.
But what if, as seems most reasonable, one does not find it very plausible that just
any old prior is epistemically legitimate? Here it might seem less important whether we
agree that a mainstream epistemological theory says all priors are legitimate and more
important whether we should agree that they are. I do not have space here to fully enter
into debates over the merits and demerits of Brown‘s highly subjective Bayesianism, so I
think it more helpful to propose some reasons to think that there is something special
about ―high-trust‖ priors that could plausibly make them justifiable even if we reject the
view that all priors are legitimate. Indeed, I think a compelling case can be made for
thinking they can. But I have one final critical take on premise (2) of the Stroud-Keller
argument to cover first, which will also be useful in helping to make the sort of case I
want to make.

33
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Jollimore’s Critique
Troy Jollimore has recently published an excellent philosophical treatise on the
nature of love in which he argues that love is primarily a certain way of viewing the
beloved.34 He devotes a full chapter entitled ―Love‘s Friendly Eye‖ to the issue of
epistemic partiality raised by Stroud and Keller. His thesis is that epistemic partiality is
often consistent with mainstream epistemic norms after all because partial epistemic
practices are often better ways to arrive at the truth in a given situation than impartial
epistemic practices.

[T]he view that love typically stands in the way of our coming to true beliefs
about the world is not only false but, in an important sense, the opposite of truth.
For part of what love offers is a way of seeing the world that makes possible
insights and understandings that cannot be achieved through less involved, more
dispassionate modes of engagement. Rather than standing in opposition to proper
standards of epistemic rationality, then, love offers its own epistemic approach,
one that is apt to be mischaracterized as epistemically faulty precisely because it
poses a genuine challenge to the allegedly objective standards that are sometimes,
wrongly, assumed to represent epistemic rationality itself.35

What sorts of insights and understandings does Jollimore more specifically have
in mind? His primary focus is on the sort of case Stroud (and Baker) offered involving
34
35
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the partial handling of counterevidence about our loved ones‘ characters. He points out
that sometimes our loved ones really do have exonerating excuses for threatening
counterevidence, and if we are not passionately devoted to their cause, we may miss out
on discovering the truth about their situation. And while he grants that ―the tendency to
assume the best of a person may indeed lead us astray‖ in some cases, it is his contention
that this fact must be checked against the fact that ―the tendency not to assume the best,
to abandon too quickly the effort of seeking an explanation that can rationalize
someone‘s behavior and render it intelligible and even admirable, can also act as an
impediment to our efforts to form a truer picture of the world.‖36 In other words, both
partial and impartial epistemic practices are sometimes a help and sometimes a hindrance
to truth-seeking.
Jollimore even goes so far as to suggest that partial epistemic practices cannot
only be ―justifiable and admirable‖ but that it is rather unfortunate that we ordinarily
refrain from engaging in these practices outside of our close relationships. We do so, he
thinks, ―not because [partial epistemic practices] are inherently flawed or less likely to
get at the truth [than impartial practices]…but simply because they are too costly for us to
incorporate them into universal policies.‖37 In other words, it would be too much for us to
pursue favorable interpretations of the evidence we come across concerning everyone,
and this is a bit of a shame as Jollimore sees it. Consider this description he gives of the
unfortunate sort of impartial doxastic practices we often engage in outside the contexts of
our close relationships.
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It is very easy, when thinking about the actions of strangers of whose conduct we
disapprove, to conclude that they had no reason whatsoever for their behavior and
did what they did simply because they were selfish, insensitive, cruel, or in some
other way bad, and that there is nothing more to be said of the matter. It is much
more difficult to reach such a conclusion with respect to a person one knows well
or whose perspective on life one manages to imaginatively occupy. But
explanations like ―He is just a bad person,‖ although they do sometimes capture
part of the moral truth of a situation, very rarely succeed in capturing all of it.38

Jollimore concludes from this that partial epistemic practices cannot be dismissed as
irrational since ―the fact that love encourages us to see our beloveds in a different way
from the way in which others see them does not suggest that we are seeing them
inaccurately—if anything, we may be seeing them more accurately than anyone else.‖39
As attracted as I am to Jollimore‘s approach, I worry he muddies the waters a bit
in a few key places. First, he seems to move too quickly from the premise that partial
epistemic practices are sometimes truth-conducive to his conclusion that engaging in
them is therefore epistemically justifiable. If it is still open to argue that, on the whole,
impartial investigations tend to give us a truer conception of someone‘s conduct and
character than partial investigations, then the fact that there are exceptions in which the
partial investigations would have done a better job would not be enough to argue from
38
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the grounds of truth-conduciveness alone that these practices are epistemically justifiable
in any given case. So Jollimore needs to either provide us reason for thinking that these
practices are truth-conducive at least as often as impartial practices or else provide an
account as to how it is that one could reasonably expect a partial practice to be truthconducive in a given case if such practices are not truth-conducive in the majority of
cases.
Second, Jollimore seems to overstate the case for thinking it a shame that we do
not pursue partial epistemic practices with regards to everyone. It is not for a mere lack of
resources that we do not extend these practices across the board. Many partial epistemic
practices would simply be incompatible with each other, and so, could not be mutually
pursued. For example, when an accuser offers counterevidence against my wife‘s fidelity,
I cannot simultaneously engage in a biased epistemic practice aiming to sustain my trust
in my wife and a biased epistemic practice aimed at vindicating the accuser in his giving
a reliable testimony. Those two partial practices are mutually exclusive, and it would be
weird from the partialist‘s point of view for me to regret that after having engaged in my
partial practice on behalf of my wife I did not have the mental resources left over to do
my best in validating my wife‘s accuser too. I fear this point has more than trivial import
for Jollimore‘s argument. If, as seems plausible, it is true for any partial epistemic
practice PEP1 one might engage in that one could engage in another partial epistemic
practice PEP2 that aims to discover truths incompatible with the truths PEP1 aims to
discover, then I do not see how we can justify the use of any actual partial epistemic
practices (e.g., PEP1) by pointing out merely that some partial practice or another will be
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truth-conducive much of the time. It seems instead we would need a deeper account of
why a person would be justified in engaging in the particular partial practice he engages
in in a given case rather than one that would have biased him in the opposite direction. I
do not claim that no such account is available, but I do not think it can be based on the
occasional truth-conduciveness of partial practices as such. So far as Jollimore‘s
argument goes, PEP1 and PEP2 stand an equal chance of being truth-conducive. But
since they run in opposite directions, either of these practices is just as likely to bias one
away from the truth as it is towards it. Hence one might well think that any agent
concerned with engaging in a truth-conducive practice would be better off choosing an
impartial investigation over either of these partial ones.
Third, that rhetorically compelling comparison Jollimore makes between the
earnest partial epistemic practices we engage in on behalf of our loved ones and the
rather lazy impartial practices we often engage in for strangers is highly misleading. We
cannot justify our partial epistemic practices by comparing them to certain impartial
practices that would be deemed unjustifiable even on impartial standards. After all, lazily
condemning the behavior of strangers in the way Jollimore describes, while no doubt
common in human practices, is not necessary to nor recommended by the impartial
approach. An impartial observer in the sort of case Jollimore describes could just as
easily take the high road and recognize that there is likely a deeper story behind the
stranger‘s behavior than simply his ―being a bad person.‖ Clearly, the best-possible-light
favoritism of the partialist is not needed to arrive at this more reasonable view. Thus
Jollimore‘s comparison offers us little reason to think that partialism is on the whole more
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truth conducive than the more careful sort of impartialism just described. And those of us
who seek to vindicate epistemic partialism would also do well to note that this more
careful sort of impartial practice, unlike our more demanding partial practices, is well
within our resources to engage in across the board.
In sum, among the objections from the recent literature made against premise (2)
in the Stroud-Keller argument, Brown‘s Bayesian argument seems to me to be the most
promising way of arguing that supra-evidential partial practices can be justified by
mainstream epistemological norms. But as I suggested, it might well be pushing it to say
Brown‘s view is mainstream, and I doubt many will feel compelled to endorse the
epistemic justifiability of partialism if Brown‘s extremely subjective Bayesianism is the
only way to accommodate it. I now want to see, then, if there are any markedly nonmainstream theories that could stand a decent shot at justifying the partial doxastic norms
of friendship or whether we should agree with Keller that these practices are simply
epistemically unjustifiable (even though he thinks we ought to engage in them anyway). I
will now survey the proposals offered by Stroud and Baker before offering one of my
own.

Stroud’s Call for Revising Mainstream Epistemology
After having claimed that epistemic partial practices in friendship do not conform
well to any of the mainstream epistemological theories, Stroud points out that others have
raised a parallel problem with respect to mainstream moral theories. It has been argued
there that since friendship and the partial behaviors it requires are necessary for living a
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good life, any moral theory that cannot accommodate the partial demands of friendship is
an unacceptable theory. Moral theorists who take this approach are thus willing to
concede that the immense value of friendship means that we must let its demands give
shape to the larger moral theory we construct. Stroud suggests that we should wonder
why any epistemological theory that refuses to accept shaping the demands of friendship
should garner our acceptance.
Stroud grants that this is a highly unorthodox way of thinking about
epistemology. As she puts it,

We don‘t normally view it as the business of an epistemological theory to be
compatible with important human goods, such as friendship. In the epistemic
domain, most theorists would embrace the ‗ideal of purity,‘ holding that
epistemology‗s concerns are specific, distinctive, and not to be corrupted by
considerations stemming from the believer‘s interests.40

Stroud, however, thinks that proponents of this orthodox view need to consider what they
are giving up in light of the partial demands on the doxastic practices of good friends.

Given the very strong reasons we have to engage in friendships, the
epistemological theorist will have to concede that his standards are not
authoritative with respect to what we ought to believe all things considered. This
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is a nontrivial price to pay: many epistemologists no doubt assume that in
formulating standards for epistemic rationality they are limiting the rationality of
belief simpliciter.41

We can summarize Stroud‘s argument as follows.

5) It is all-things-considered rational to pursue close friendships.
6) Pursuing close friendship sometimes requires one to engage in supraevidential epistemic practices.
 7) If the supra-evidential partial practices demanded by close friendships are
epistemically unjustifiable, then epistemic rationality is not equivalent to allthings-considered rationality.

This is a neat little argument. While I do not myself feel compelled to insist that the
prescriptions of all-things-considered rationality will in every case be identical to the
prescriptions of episetemic rationality, I agree with Stroud that there is ample motivation
for epistemologists to open up to having a discussion about how our ordinary notions of
epistemic rationality might be reconstrued in order to at least make room for the supraevidential partial practices common in our best relationships. Stroud even jumpstarts this
discussion with an intriguing proposal.
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Stroud’s “Social Epistemology” Proposal
Stroud offers a very brief proposal for reconstruing epistemic rationality in order
to accommodate partial friendship norms. Keep in mind that she is not proposing this for
our acceptance but merely for our consideration as an example of the sorts of
conversations we could start having in epistemology.

Like a defense lawyer, the friend who consistently advocates the more charitable
hypothesis serves an important social epistemic function: without her input,
negative views (which propagate rapidly through gossip) might become
entrenched with little resistance, leading to a decrease in the overall accuracy of
the social set of beliefs about her friend. A move to a social perspective could thus
highlight recognizably epistemic values that transcend the narrower confines of
evidentialism.42

This is a compelling suggestion. Why simply assume that a person‘s doxastic practice is
epistemically justified or not only by virtue of the likelihood that it will lead that
individual person closer to the truth? Perhaps we should think of epistemic justification
instead in the more collective sense: What is the likelihood that this person‘s doxastic
practice will lead us closer to the truth?
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Jason Kawall argues along similar lines that our overall epistemic assessments
must take into account both self-regarding and other-regarding intellectual virtues.43 To
be ―other-regarding‖ as an epistemic agent is to aim at contributing to others‘ pursuits of
truth and not just one‘s own. While Kawall is not directly concerned with how an
epistemic partialist‘s resilient trust in the face of counterevidence might contribute to the
collective‘s pursuit of truth, he does make one claim about ―creative agents‖ that seems
especially relevant: ―[C]reative agents can be seen as good epistemic agents, even if their
creativity leads them to false beliefs, to the extent that their creativity acts as a catalyst
for others in their epistemic community.‖44 As Stroud sees it, the good friend plays an
important social epistemic role, serving as a catalyst for others to take on a more careful
examination of the counterevidence against her friend. I find Stroud‘s proposal
compelling enough to take seriously, and so, think it serves well in defending my thesis
that it is at least plausible to think that supra-evidential partial practice are epistemically
justifiable.

Baker’s “Moral Discovery” Proposal
Recall that Baker had argued for essentially the same thesis as Stroud two decades
prior. She too thought that the epistemic demands of friendship ―run counter to our
general picture of what it is to be rational‖45 And she too was unwilling to concede that
meeting these demands really was irrational. And just like Stroud, she offers in passing
her own speculative idea as to how we might revise our conception of rationality to
43
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accommodate friendship norms. Though Baker does not explicitly say she is offering a
revision of epistemic rationality in particular, it will suit our present purposes to think of
her proposal in those terms. I warn my reader that Baker‘s suggestion is very quick and a
good bit more elusive than Stroud‘s, so I will be forced to take some significant
interpretative liberties.
―We must look at the nature of moral facts,‖ she says. ―Just as trust is part of
friendship, it may be that trust is both causally and logically a condition of truths of the
sort we call moral.‖46 It is difficult to know what Baker means when she says that trust is
a causal condition of moral truths as well as a logical condition of them. Does she want
to say that trust is literally necessary for the existence of these truths or just that it is
necessary for our discovery or appreciation of them? Since I find the second
interpretation more plausible in its own right, I will interpret Baker according to it.
Given this, we can look to some earlier comments in her paper that she seems to
drawing upon for further clarification of her proposal. She claims in an earlier section
that trust is necessary for the existence of moral agents.

[M]any philosophers have insisted that the possibility of there being moral agents
depends upon the kind of development of children in which certain trusting
relationships are indispensable, in particular, the trust children have first in their
parents, and next in their peers…What is now to be emphasized is that we cannot
expect people themselves incapable of trusting others to engender trust on the part
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of their children, either toward themselves or other children. Nor can we expect to
develop individuals capable of trust in their formative years only.47

Putting these two quotes together (and keeping in mind the need for taking
interpretative liberties), here is the basic line of argument Baker proposes as I see it.

8) Trust is needed for the formation and hence existence of moral agents.
9) Only moral agents can discover and appreciate moral truths.
 10) Trust is needed for the existence of beings who can discover and appreciate
moral truths.
11) If an epistemic practice is necessary for the discovery and appreciation of
moral truths, then engaging in that epistemic practice is epistemically
justifiable.
 12) It is epistemically justifiable to trust.

This argument may go wrong in a number of places, but rather than getting
myself bogged down in all those possible discussions, I want to offer one big-picture
observation about it. Even if the argument is sound, it seems to miss the target of
justifying the uniquely supra-evidential practices of partial trustings that we are
concerned with. That is, even if trust is necessary for the formation of moral agents and
hence for the discovery and appreciation of moral truths, I do not think it follows
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straightaway that partial epistemic practices in particular are necessary for any of this. So
in my judgment, this argument does not get off the ground as an argument justifying
epistemic partialism unless it can be argued that the sort of trust that is necessary for the
formation of moral agents need involve the biased sorts of trustings we are concerned
with here.

My “Important Truths” Proposal
I want now to offer a new proposal as to how supra-evidential forms of epistemic
partiality might be epistemically justifiable in at least some cases. My suggestion is built
on the claim that an attempt to quell one‘s natural tendency to engage in these practices
would in many cases prevent one from discovering certain important truths. I will first
explain how this can occur and then show why I think it is plausible to think that the
epistemic stakes of trusting should be relevant to epistemic evaluations of epistemic
partialism.
There are many ways in which a failure to engage in epistemic partialism towards
a friend or loved one can prevent one from obtaining important truths. Thinking back on
Keller‘s principal case, a failure to look favorably on a friend‘s poetic abilities might
prevent one from coming to appreciate her genuinely important but otherwise unexpected
perspective of the human condition. Likewise, a failure to give a loved one the benefit of
the doubt when presented with an allegation against her might prevent one from pursuing
and subsequently discovering the explanation that ultimately exonerates her. Those
would be important truths to miss.
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Moreover, a failure to think the best of one‘s friend or lover can significantly
harm the intimacy of the relationship, and hence prevent one from acquiring important
truths that intimacy with her makes possible. For example, if your friend or lover comes
to suspect that you do not believe favorably of her in some respect that matters to her, she
may be deeply hurt and even subsequently resentful towards you. Hence much of what
you stood to learn from your intimacy with her may now be unattainable to you. If you
should try to appease her by informing her that you were at least initially inclined to
believe favorably of her but talked yourself out of it in the effort to attain a more
―objective‖ viewpoint, she will be further offended by an awareness of your arguably
priggish priorities. In general, she will have a hard time sharing much of herself with you
if she does not feel that she can count on you to view her favorably. In sum, if knowing
her at a deep level is valuable, then the epistemic stakes of partialism might be rather
high.
A lack of trust can also significantly harm the intimacy of one‘s relationship in
cases where the untrusted is unaware of it. If, for example, a spouse becomes suspicious
of his wife‘s fidelity, he will have a great deal of trouble relating to her even if he keeps
his suspicions private. If that suspicion could have been culled by engaging in the usual
amount of epistemic partialism typical of a good friend, the intimacy of his relationship
will have suffered unnecessarily. If in fact she is faithful, this will have been a great
shame for both of them.
In sum, if one is unwilling to participate in the epistemic demands of love and
friendship, one stands to miss out on a good many important truths in life. It is not just
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that one stands to miss out on learning the various sorts of privileged information about
the other person (including non-propositional acquaintance knowledge) in the examples
above, but one also stands to miss out on vital truths one can learn about oneself and
about life—all in the process of loving and being loved in a deeply devoted (and so,
inherently risky) relationship.
I want to suggest, then, that there can be significant epistemic value in engaging in
epistemic partialism on the basis of these heightened epistemic stakes. As a first step in
lending plausibility to this claim, we can note that numerous epistemologists already
maintain that some truths are epistemically more valuable than others. Surveying recent
work on epistemic goods, Jason Baehr writes,

[O]ne often finds comments to the effect that what is good or desirable from an
epistemic standpoint is true belief, but not true belief simpliciter or true belief
about just any old subject-matter. For instance, true beliefs about the number of
blades of grass on the neighbour‘s front lawn, grains of sand in a cubic foot of the
Sahara, or listings in the Hong Kong telephone directory, are not, it is standardly
claimed, part of the epistemic goal. Rather, what is good or desirable from an
epistemic standpoint is true belief about subject-matters or facts which are
epistemically significant, worthy or interesting.48
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Given this, it seems that one important measure of the epistemic value of
engaging in a certain doxastic practice will be the epistemic value of the truths one stands
to acquire by that practice. And given, as I tried to suggest above, that one might well
stand to learn some highly valuable truths by engaging in epistemic partialism in one‘s
close relationships, it seems plausible to think that the epistemic value of engaging in
epistemic partialism can be fairly high from this perspective.
This line of thinking raises some very interesting questions for how we should go
about making epistemic appraisals. It suggests that the overall epistemic value of a
doxastic state—e.g., giving the loved one the benefit of the doubt—can be dependent in
some way on the epistemic stakes of maintaining that state. That is, whether a belief or
belief-forming practice is overall epistemically justifiable will be determined at least in
part by a consideration of the epistemic consequences at stake. Despite the fact that it is
widely accepted among philosophers that one‘s moral justification for performing a
certain action is at least sometimes dependent on the morally-relevant consequences at
stake, it is not at all common in philosophy to say that a person is sometimes
epistemically justified in holding a certain belief by virtue of the epistemically-relevant
consequences at stake. Philosophers tend to keep epistemic evaluations of beliefs isolated
from considerations of future epistemic gains. They focus on an individual belief and ask,
for example, whether the evidence renders it likely that that belief is true. They do not
bother to ask whether that belief is in some way needed to play an important role in the
acquisition of other truths. I want to suggest that we reconsider this differential treatment
between moral and epistemological assessments.
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Roderick Firth once drew attention to this issue in his presidential address to the
American Philosophical Association.49 He claimed that belief can fail to have intrinsic
epistemic merit, by which he means that it fails to be well-supported by the evidence, yet
have a great deal of instrumental epistemic merit, by which he means that the belief is
causally related to the acquisition of other beliefs that are well-supported by the evidence.

Consider, to take just one dramatic example, the belief that human beings are
created and sustained by God for the primary purpose of expanding human
knowledge. This belief might have no intrinsic epistemic merit at all… Yet it
might have a very high degree of instrumental epistemic merit. If the belief were a
common one, it might alter human motivation in a way that would produce
undreamed of advances in human knowledge.50

Firth‘s thesis is that these two forms of epistemic value are ―irreducibly distinct‖ and that
there are therefore always two different types of epistemic appraisals that can be made
about a belief.
I wonder, though, why we should not think there is a higher-level realm of
epistemic norms that takes both of Firth‘s kinds of epistemic merit into account when
making all-things-considered epistemic prescriptions. This is at least very much the way
many of us think that ethics works. While many of us have strong deontological inklings,
we nonetheless recognize that a concern for consequences is oftentimes relevant in our
49
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all-things-considered moral judgment on the appropriate course of action in a given case.
Thus we will say, for example, that despite the fact that killing an innocent child has a
great deal of intrinsic moral disvalue, it can nonetheless be the overall morally
appropriate action in our overall pursuit of the good under certain extreme circumstances.
It seems plausible to think that a parallel all-things-considered epistemic norm would take
into account both the degree to which a given belief is proportioned to the evidence and
the degree to which it is needed to play a role in one‘s overall pursuit of the truth.
Granted, there are a number of complicated variables such an approach would
have to deal with. These include (likely among others) deciding how to properly factor in
(a) the degree to which the belief is not proportioned to the evidence, (b) the likelihood of
the various positive and negative epistemic consequences that may result from holding
the belief, (c) the intensity of those various consequences, and (d) the degree to which the
given belief is needed to bring about the desired epistemic outcome. In the case Firth
mentions, for example, we might think this last factor is especially significant if we think
it would be easy for folks to have an alternative motivation for pursuing significant
advances of human knowledge besides the belief that God has given them that pursuit as
their major purpose in life. So, all of these issues (and likely more) will need to be
broached if we grant that epistemic stakes are relevant to overall epistemic evaluations of
beliefs just as ethicists have been forced to discuss parallel issues in granting that the
overall moral assessments of our actions must be sensitive to their moral stakes. It is
beyond the scope of my project to broach these very complicated issues here. I want only
to suggest that it is plausible to think that the highest-level epistemic assessments do need
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to take epistemic consequences into account. If so, then it seems too hasty to rule out
epistemic partiality in friendships as epistemically unjustifiable given that the epistemic
stakes of engaging (or refraining from engaging) in epistemic partialism are sometimes
high.51
To close this section, I will now offer a rather bizarre thought experiment
intended to further corroborate the plausibility of thinking that epistemic stakes should be
relevant to overall epistemic assessments. The case controls for a few of the variables
mentioned above and takes us outside the realm of epistemic partiality in friendship and
into another common realm of supra-evidential partiality, namely that which occurs
among sports fans. Though fanciful, the case is built on a couple of real-life facts about
me: my unceasing confidence in my beloved NFL team, the Carolina Panthers, and my
desire to one day understand Einstein‘s theories of relativity at a very deep level.
As any NFL fan will know, the Carolina Panthers have not been very good for
several years. Yet every single offseason, I find myself feeling optimistic about the
upcoming season. The current offseason is no exception. If I am honest, I must admit that
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yet again I find myself believing that the Panthers will have a winning record and make
the playoffs in the upcoming season. I must also admit that this belief is likely not
proportioned to my evidence. Thus I know I am engaging in some supra-evidential
epistemic partiality on behalf of my team, and this practice seems to come quite natural to
me as fan. I suppose I could take steps to overcome this doxastic practice if I dwelt a bit
more on the evidence. Honestly, though, it is rather fun to be this sort of fan, and so, I
choose not to subject this doxastic practice to much conscious scrutiny. If pressed, I
would probably classify this as a harmless epistemically unjustified doxastic practice. It
is something I probably ought not do from the epistemic point of view strictly speaking,
but I would say that it is all-things-considered permissible. But let us see what happens
when the circumstances of my case are imaginatively altered such that engaging in this
supra-evidential practice stands to offer me significant epistemic gains.
Suppose a brilliant and pedagogically-adept physicist, who is also a fan of the
Carolina Panthers, hears of my optimism and offers me an exciting opportunity. As he is
personally distraught about his own inability to maintain confidence in the Panthers, he
has taken quite an interest in my supra-evidential optimism. After all, I am a philosopher
supposedly trained in careful reasoning who is nonetheless willing to spurn reason in
letting myself be carried away as a football fan, and that makes me something of a special
case.52 The physicist has secured the services of a neuropsychologist and would like to
use me as their principal subject in a study on supra-evidential doxastic practices among
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sports fans. All that will be required of me is that I maintain my confidence in the
Panthers throughout the offseason so that they can continue to study me at regular
intervals by making some harmless observations of my brain activity. Since my
confidence in the Panthers comes quite naturally to me, I recognize this will be easy
work . In exchange, he offers to spend as much one-on-one time with me as I need to
explain the ins and outs of relativity theory. It is apparent to me that this arrangement is
too lopsided in my favor to pass up; it will give me my best shot at ever attaining a deep
understanding of these astonishing theories.
I expect I would be quite eager to participate in the study under these terms. After
all, I have no intention of trying to talk myself out of being confident in the Panthers
anyway, and now there is the added bonus of a great intellectual payoff if I am able to
persist in my confidence. The question I want now to raise is whether I would still be
epistemically unjustified in my confidence in the Panthers.
It seems rather odd to think that higher-level epistemological norms would dictate
that I ought even now try to rid myself of this partial practice. In this case, the epistemic
stakes of my actively seeking to give up my confidence in the Panthers are very high. I
need that practice to have a good chance at ever understanding the universe at one of its
most fundamental levels. And the epistemic risks of my maintaining confidence in the
Panthers are rather low: I likely risk only having some beliefs about a football team that
are not proportioned to the evidence. I think it quite plausible to think, therefore, that I
ought epistemically—in the strictest sense—persist in my partialism in this scenario.
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Likewise, I am suggesting we could plausibly say the same thing about the
epistemic partiality involved in friendship. If we agree that it is sometimes necessary to
make favorable judgments about a friend that ―go beyond the evidence‖ as a way of
pursuing and maintaining relational intimacy, then I expect there will be cases in which
the epistemic stakes favor allowing oneself to persist in that partial practice. Hence I
think this provides an approach to arguing that epistemic partiality in friendship can be
epistemically justifiably that is worthy of serious consideration.

Epistemic Partiality: A Final Warning
It cannot likely be overstated how dangerous epistemic partiality can be. It comes
inherent with epistemic, prudential, and even sometimes moral risks. Allowing one‘s
judgment to be swayed by one‘s affections towards certain individuals can lead one to
adopt a host of false beliefs, can put one in harm‘s way, and can even cause one to fail to
stand up for what is right. What I have tried to emphasize in this chapter, though, is that
there are also important dangers that we face coming from the opposite direction. If one
is insistent on assessing one‘s loved ones from an impartial, objective point of view, one
puts oneself at risk of missing out on some very important truths, reaping the prudential
benefits of enjoying intimate relationships, and failing in one‘s moral duty to be a good
lover or friend to those whom matter most. In focusing in this chapter on the latter sorts
of risks (and particularly the epistemic ones), I do not want to suggest that it is generally
better to err on the side of partiality than impartiality. Rather, I simply think that the risks
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of impartiality have been underrepresented, particularly among epistemologists, and so, a
focused discussion of those dangers is, I think, very much needed.
In the end, there are likely no easy answers as to how to properly balance the
various risks between epistemic partiality and epistemic impartiality. Victoria McGeer
expresses well the tension of trying to operate between these two opposing sources of
danger when she writes,

[I]f we trust too readily or too far—trust, that is, without question—we can leave
ourselves open to exploitation, manipulation, tyranny, brutality and the pain of
betrayal if it turns out that our trust is misplaced. Of course, over-ready—or what
I shall call, ‗incontinent‘—trust is no worse a problem than over-ready—
incontinent distrust. If we are too ready to withdraw our trust, too prone to
question or doubt, we not only lose the befits, current and prospective, of a
trusting relationship, we lay ourselves open to acting immorally towards others
whom we have, though distrusting, misjudged.53

I hope this chapter takes us a step further in appreciating that in addition to the prudential
and moral risks McGeer describes in this quote, we also face epistmic risks from both
sides.

53

Victoria McGeer, ―Developing Trust,‖ Philosophical Explorations 5 no. 1 (2002), 24-5.
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Chapter Summary
My thesis in this chapter was modest. I wanted to argue that it is at least plausible
to think that engaging in supra-evidential partial epistemic practices is sometimes
epistemically justifiable in the context of close relationships. I think this thesis is
substantiated somewhere between the proposals offered by Brown, Jollimore, Baker,
Stroud, and me no matter how ―mainstream‖ these proposals turn out to be. So I move on
now to my final chapter in which I explore the implications of evaluating the rationality
of religious trust given the sort of evidence the religious truster might have for his
confidence in God and given the plausibility of thinking that one can be epistemically
justified in engaging in supra-evidential partial practices in trusting a person one loves.
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Chapter 5:
Towards an Epistemology of Religious Trust
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Chapter Introduction
Having explored the nature of trust and its connections to the affections, I now
want to more closely explore the epistemology of religious trust in particular. This is a
discussion I am only hoping to initiate in this dissertation after having spent earlier
chapters motivating it; I will not attempt to show in this final chapter that any religious
believers actually are justified in trusting God to prevent gratuitous evils. I do hope to
show, though, that there is at least enough underexplored territory in the epistemology of
religious trust to render it too hasty of the ―unfriendly atheist‖ to assert that none are
owing to the world‘s many inscrutable evils. The upshot to this is that, given my
argument in Chapter 2 about the proper dialectical goal of theists in the debate over
inscrutable evils, the religious trust approach is able to achieve for theists the only goal
that is reasonable for them to have in this debate. I also, however, want to raise a number
of challenges along the way for theists who think it obvious that their religious trust is
justified purely on the basis of evidence. This, I suggest, means theists should have
particular interest in the more general debate on the epistemology of epistemic partiality
in trusting discussed in Chapter 4—the sort of giving the benefit of the doubt that is
common in human relationships and that many religious persons are doubtless extending
towards God in the face of inscrutable evils.
I will argue for one further thesis at the end of the chapter. I will show that in
addition to being a viable alternative to dealing with the problem of inscrutable evils, the
religious trust approach also seems to afford theists the significant epistemic and
dialectical advantages of being able to avoid all the prominent objections raised against
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skeptical theism mentioned at the end of Chapter 1. These include all the ―bleeding
skepticism‖ worries and the falsifiability problem that skeptical theists have had much
trouble responding to. This will be a somewhat surprising result given that the
―dismissivism‖ inherent in the religious trust approach about our competency to make
sense of God‘s allowances of evils is even stronger than the ―mere skepticism‖ of it
advocated for by skeptical theists.

Defining My Paradigm Religious Truster
First, an important qualification: While I am focusing in this chapter on the
potential epistemic value of religious trust, I am well aware that there are all sorts of
doxastic attitudes and practices that go by the name ―trusting God.‖ That is, there are all
sorts of religious trusters in the world trusting God in all sorts of different ways and for
all sorts of different reasons. I certainly do not wish to lump all these religious trustings
together in one epistemically evaluable pile, as it is rather obvious that many of them are
quite properly subject to epistemic and even moral condemnation. The religious zealot,
for example, who ―trusts God‖ to protect him when he bombs the local abortion clinic is
thinking irrationally and immorally. As a less extreme example, the religious college
student who, despite the privilege she has of pursuing a quality education, uses her ―trust
in God‖ as an excuse to avoid grappling seriously with the problem of evil in her
philosophy class is also failing epistemically and morally. Since a lot goes by the name of
―trusting God,‖ I certainly do not want to be understood as trying to chart a path in this
chapter for defending all such attitudes.
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Yet I also fail to see a way to precisely circumscribe the range of religious
trustings I have in mind. I am at least restricting the term ―religious trust‖ to a person‘s
trust in God to prevent gratuitous evils specifically, but this does little to restrict the scope
of the sort of truster I have in mind. So, I think a brief description of the sort of
paradigmatic image that comes to mind for me when I think of the religious truster will
be a helpful even if imprecise way of defining my target. I am picturing the sort of
faithful religious believer who has an inner sense of genuine love for God, who seeks
earnestly and honestly after him, who often subjects her faith in him to honest
questioning, and who continues to feel herself drawn to love and trust her God in spite of
the difficulties she faces. She lives her religious life intentionally and passionately but
with a recognition of her fallibility and many weaknesses, and so, with a hope that she
will be afforded much grace for her missteps in the process. That is the sort of person I
will have in mind. I am fortunate to be able to put at least a few names and faces with that
image, and so, my mental grasp of it is rather tangible even if hard to precisely explicate.
While I recognize that those who have not so closely observed such folks might prefer a
more precise description of this image before entering into this sort of investigation, I do
hope that this is enough to enable us to avoid the distractions that much more obviously
objectionable forms of ―religious trust‖ might otherwise promote.

Unfriendly Atheism and the Epistemology of Religious Trust
It will be important to keep in mind in this chapter what is meant by the term
―unfriendly atheist.‖ Recall that Rowe gave that label to the proponent of his argument
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who goes beyond asserting that he (the proponent) is justified in accepting the argument‘s
crucial premise that gratuitous evils exist to claiming that everyone (who reflects on the
world‘s inscrutable evils at least) ought to accept it. In the context of the religious trust
approach, then, the unfriendly atheist asserts that owing to the existence of the world’s
many inscrutable evils, no one is epistemically justified in trusting God to prevent
gratuitous evils. This commits the unfriendly atheist to the following two theses on the
epistemology of religious trust: first, that no religious persons are justified in taking
themselves to have evidence for trusting God sufficient to override the counterevidence
of inscrutable evils, and second that, given the first thesis, it is also the case that no
religious persons are epistemically justified in engaging in supra-evidential epistemic
partialism towards God to make up for the lack of sufficient evidence—i.e., trusting him
in the absence of sufficient evidence out of their affections towards him. I aim to show
that both of these theses seem to lie beyond the scope of Rowe‘s argument from evil and
thus commit the atheist to positions on other contentious philosophical issues, some have
which have not be sufficiently explored; thus I claim that unfriendly atheism is, just as
Rowe suspected, too hasty.

Can God’s Trustworthiness Be Evidentially Justified?
Recall that I said to trust a person to do something is to believe she will (or
would) meet a commitment to do it out of a positive moral attribute. Hence in trusting
God to prevent gratuitous evils, the religious truster holds three component beliefs: (1)
the belief that God is able to prevent gratuitous evils, (2) the belief that he has a
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commitment to prevent them, and (3) the belief that he will meet that commitment out of
a positive moral attribute. I will assume that the religious truster can be justified in taking
God to have a commitment to prevent gratuitous suffering.1 So the question of whether
the religious truster can be justified in trusting God to prevent gratuitous evils ultimately
depends on whether she can be justified in her judgments of God‘s abilities and her
judgments of God‘s character. The first question we can ask about the religious believer,
then, is whether she can have sufficient evidence to believe God is able to prevent
gratuitous evils.
Since we are assuming for the sake of argument that the religious truster can at
least have sufficient evidence for believing God is the intelligent creator of the universe
(since, again, nothing in the argument from evil rules that out), it might seem a short leap
to grant her also that she also has sufficient evidence for thinking him smart and powerful
enough to be able to ensure that he allows no evil without sufficient reason. But upon
reflection, I suspect this is too quick. Our current knowledge of the apparent fine tuning
of our universe as well as its sheer size would certainly suggest that if there were an
intelligent creator behind it, he must be extraordinarily smart and powerful. But this does
not automatically entail that he has the ability to prevent gratuitous evils. By definition,
that would require him to have the ability to intervene in the physical world whenever an
omnipotent, omniscient being would not have a justifying reason for allowing an evil.
And while it might well be possible that a being who is not himself omnipotent and
omniscient could yet be powerful and smart enough to prevent all the evils that an
1

Recall from my discussion in Chapter 3 that I am using ―commitment‖ in a very broad sense to include
both one‘s moral obligations and other actions one explicitly promised to do but is not obligated to do.
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omnipotent, omniscient being ought to prevent, it seems that the religious believer‘s best
bet for having an evidentially justified trust in God‘s ability to prevent gratuitous evils is
to have an evidentially justified belief that her God is himself omniscient and omnipotent.
This shows that our religious truster who wants her trust to be proportioned to her
evidence will need much more than any evidence of God‘s abilities she might obtain
through observing the wonders of the physical universe. It is a noteworthy lesson from
the history of natural theology that an argument for a personal creator of the universe is
never a good argument for one with the traditional omni-properties of standard theism,
and a similar lesson applies here.
Making matters worse for the religious truster, it seems outright impossible that
God could ever demonstrate that he is omnipotent and omniscient to a person as opposed
to just really powerful and really smart. Sure, he could amaze one with signs and
wonders and spout off some brilliant undiscovered mathematical theorems, but it would
still seem to be a leap beyond the evidence to say that he has all the skill and knowledge
necessary to make sure our suffering is not in vain. The best God could do, then, is to
testify to one that he has the requisite abilities, but then one would have to take him at his
word. So in that case, one‘s confidence in his abilities would have to be grounded in a
prior confidence in his character. And this brings us rather quickly to the most pressing
issue for religious trusters: On what evidence can they base their extreme confidence in
God‘s character when it comes to trusting him to prevent gratuitous evils?
To be clear, when I spoke just now of religious trusters‘ ―extreme‖ confidence in
God‘s character, I do not mean to refer the degree of confidence they have in God‘s
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goodness and unfailing love for earthly creatures. The sort of religious truster I have in
mind might well find her confidence in God to be rather thin some days. Rather, I was
referring to the extreme circumstances under which her confidence in God‘s goodness is
nevertheless sustained (even if it sometimes wanes significantly). There are numerous
evils in the world that remain inscrutable to the brightest human minds, and yet in the
face of those many inscrutable evils, many believers continue to trust in God‘s goodness.
It is in this sense that their confidence in God‘s character seems a bit extreme. What
evidence could they possibly have for thinking him so immensely good under such bleak
circumstances? I will now consider some possible approaches the religious truster might
take to answering this question.

The Natural Theology Approach
Some religious believers might attempt to ground their confidence in God‘s
character in the theistic proofs of natural theology. Richard Swinburne‘s ―cumulative
case‖ argument for the existence of God, for example, would afford one this sort of
approach.2 Unlike skeptical theists, Swinburne agrees with me that inscrutable suffering
does count noticeably against the existence of a perfect God. Unlike me, however, he
thinks that when all the evidence of the theistic proofs are brought to bear on our
cognitive situation, they are enough to outweigh the counterevidence of inscrutable evils.
If he is right, then this is one way in which the religious truster can have sufficient
evidence for trusting God.

2

Richard Swinburne, The Existence of God.
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I already mentioned my reasons for dissatisfaction with this sort of approach in
Chapter 3. To briefly repeat, I do not wish to rule out the possibility that there are a
handful of sophisticated theistic philosophers who are justified in thinking God to be
perfectly good by way of some combination of arguments for theism, but I for one, would
not want my trust in God to be dependent on them. The philosophical issues surrounding
these arguments are too complex and contentious for most religious trusters. I want to
explore a religious trust approach that fits with the phenomenology of religious trusters
who feel themselves to be trusting a person as opposed to accepting a set of philosophical
proofs.

The Direct-Perception Religious Experience Approach
There are some believers who will claim to have evidence of God‘s
trustworthiness by virtue of having experienced the perfect goodness of God directly in
some sort of a rapturous religious experience. They may claim the experience to have
been so vivid so as to outweigh any counterevidence against God‘s goodness afforded by
inscrutable evils. I do not wish to enter much here into debates over the veridicality of
such experiences, an issue that has already been discussed at length by numerous others.3
I do, however, want to raise a few worries I have for this approach.
First there is the problem that relatively few religious believers have ever had
such rapturous experiences. Hence like the natural theology approach, this approach must
also fail to be helpful to the majority of believers, save for the highly controversial
3

See Jerome Gellman, ―Mysticism,‖ in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2011 Edition),
ed., Edward N. Zalta, URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2011/entries/mysticism/> and the
sources cited there.
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prospect that their reports of their experiences grant the rest of us sufficient evidence that
such a being exists. Second, I have trouble conceiving of what it would mean to directly
experience a being as perfectly good in the first place. What would be the indicator in
such an experience that the object of the experience instantiates perfect goodness as
opposed to just an awesome, inspiring display of goodness that leaves open the question
of whether the being instantiates full-blown perfect goodness?4 Finally, there is the worry
that a single (or, at best, a handful) of direct perceptual experience(s) of God‘s perfect
goodness is not enough ―evidence‖ to outweigh the counterevidence of inscrutable evils.
Speaking for myself at least, given that plausible alternative explanations can likely be
supplied for these experiences besides the explanation that they are veridical, I would be
very reluctant to trust God to prevent gratuitous evils in a world such as ours based on a
solitary experience I had fifteen or twenty years ago.
Despite my reservations regarding the direct-perception approach, I should note
that it may well be sufficient in itself to show that unfriendly atheism is too hasty. It is
one thing to say that the reports of such experiences do not afford third parties sufficient
evidence to believe that any of those experiences are veridical and quite another to say
that even the subjects of those experiences are not justified in taking their own experience

4

William Alston makes a claim that would push back against this worry.
[W]e should not suppose that we can identify a priori any limits on what objective features can
manifest themselves in patterns of phenomenal qualia. Apart from (sense) experience we would
not have been able to anticipate that trees are, generally, recognizable by their look, while
physicists are not. In mystical perception, too, one can learn only from experience what features
and activities of God can be recognizable by the way God presents Himself to one‘s experience.
See William Alston, Perceiving God: The Epistemology of Religious Experience (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 1997): 47.
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to be veridical.5 The unfriendly atheist commits himself to the stronger of these two
views in his assertion that no one is justified in trusting God in the face of inscrutable
evils, and so, may already be jumping the gun.

The “God’s been Good to Me” Approach
I turn now to what I expect will be the most common source of evidence for
God‘s trustworthiness cited by religious believers. It is still experiential evidence but of a
much less rapturous and less isolated sort than that discussed in the previous approach. It
features prominently in the sort of Christian tradition with which I am most familiar,
which emphasizes the way in which a devout adherent to the faith can experience a lifelong ―walk with God‖—i.e., a sort of communion with God that the believer can
experience more or less throughout her life. This communion is not generally
experienced as living in the presence of an overwhelming force that amazes one‘s senses
or overpowers one‘s consciousness but more as the quieter companionship of a faithful
and loving friend whose goodness is perceived in subtler ways. One of the most common
ways this goodness is perceived is in its seeming to one that God is, or has been, actively
assisting one in one‘s life journey. In conformance to the way this sort of experience is
often expressed, we can call the attempt to use this sort of experiential evidence as
sufficient evidence of God‘s trustworthy character the ―God‘s been good to me‖
approach.
5

William James is famous for claiming that mystical experiences ―when well developed usually are, and
have the right to be, authoritative over those who have them,‖ but that ―mystics have no right to claim that
we ought to accept the deliverance of their peculiar experiences, if we are ourselves are outsiders and feel
no private call thereto.‖ From William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human
Nature, (London: Longmans, Green, and Company, 1902): 422-424.
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I do not know how to adequately describe the nature of an ―experience‖ that spans
the duration of a person‘s religious life. Generally, though, there will be particular
episodes in this life-long experience that will stand out to the believer as particularly
strong evidence of God‘s faithfulness—the sorts of experiences they tend to fall back on
in moments of acute doubting— and so, it will help to focus here on those. Many
believers will mention particular events in their lives, for example, when certain events
seemed especially arranged by God for the meeting of their needs, or times when God
seemed to urge them to act in certain ways that proved to be to their great benefit or times
when God seemed to them to ―carry‖ them through difficult circumstances.6 I want to see
now what the prospects are for thinking a religious truster could acquire sufficient
evidence of God‘s trustworthiness from a collection of such experiences.
Even supposing a religious truster can at least be justified in thinking God has
been actively assisting her, there is, I think, a major problem in thinking such experiences
could constitute sufficient evidence of God‘s overall trustworthiness to prevent gratuitous
evils. Here‘s the rub: God‘s demonstrating his good will toward one or one‘s family or
friends does not amount to his demonstrating good will toward all creatures. While some
religious believers seem not to appreciate this fact, there are doubtless many who do. I
expect many religious believers are well acquainted with the disorienting tension created
6

It is not necessary for the sort of experience I have in mind that the person explicitly forms beliefs about
God‘s assistance during the trying circumstances. Sometimes, believers will reflect back on these
experiences and recall having a sort of background sense of comfort or inner strength whilst they were
consciously preoccupied with the struggle being faced, and so, only later come to recognize that
background sense as God‘s assistance. For a discussion of the way in which unconscious background
experiences can later produce justified memorial beliefs, see Jennifer Lackey, ―Why Memory Really is a
Generative Epistemic Source: A Reply to Senor,‖ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74, no. 1
(2007): 209-19. Thanks to E.J. Coffman for pointing this out.
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by thanking God for his loving assistance in their own lives whilst observing others
suffering with no apparent assistance from him. Perhaps they should conclude, then, that
they are just God‘s favorites—the ones he prefers to help for whatever reason. This
would make their God out to be something more along the lines of ancient conceptions of
deities, who would benefit or disregard certain humans as they please. I do not suppose
there would be anything obviously irrational in befriending such a deity if you happen to
be one of the ones it chooses to benefit; after all, we probably all have people in our lives
whom we are willing to call ―friends‖ despite our recognition that they have some rather
serious character flaws. Nor would there be anything obviously irrational in coming to
trust such a deity to take care of one‘s wellbeing; after all even scoundrels can sometimes
be reasonably trusted by their closest confidants. But this ―God,‖ like some of our human
friends, could hardly be trusted to take adequate care of the outsiders. Hence he could not
be trusted to prevent gratuitous evils across the board.
So how could the religious truster who wants her trust to be justified by her
experiential evidence of God‘s goodness ever determine that his God is not just playing
favorites with her and a select group of others? Some might point to experiences in their
lives when God urged them to care for strangers, thereby showing his concern for those
outside their existing inner circle, but this cannot likely go so far as to suggest that he
cares for all creatures. And if there is not much by way of observable evidence of God‘s
universal love for all creatures, then the religious truster will just have to take God‘s
word for it when he assures her that he is trustworthy through and through. Perhaps it can
be argued that God‘s testimony to her can suffice as evidence of his trustworthiness if
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indeed he has been so good to her; perhaps, that is, she will have sufficient evidence for
thinking he would not deceive her. This is an interesting prospect, but I do not know if it
would be successful. I think it at least as plausible to think that taking God at his word on
this point without any independent reason to think he has universal concern for creatures
would, in the face of so many inscrutable evils, be to take a leap of trust in him beyond
the evidence.

Appeal to Religious Doctrine
One way the believer might try to round out her evidential case for God‘s
trustworthiness is by appealing to certain ―evidences‖ within her faith tradition. From a
coherentist perspective, at least, we can note that trust in God would be more rational in
light of some theological beliefs than others. It is hard to see, for example, how a person
who is committed to thinking God will inflict eternal torture on Aborigines for failing to
believe certain specific doctrines promulgated in a western monotheism can nonetheless
take herself to have good reason to trust God to take adequate care of everyone. Other
religious doctrines, though, cohere much better with trusting God. For many Christians,
for example, the core of their gospel (as they understand it) is that God has himself made
an extreme self-sacrifice out of his immense love for all humans. Perhaps, then, such a
view can contribute to the religious truster‘s case for expecting God to have an
appropriate level of concern for everyone.
This gives rise to another way in which a religious truster might appeal to her
faith system in an attempt to bolster her case for trusting God in the face of inscrutable
evils. Some religious doctrines speak of God‘s simultaneously loving and mysterious
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ways. I think the Christian doctrine of divine atonement just referenced fits this mold.
Despite the numerous Christian theologians through the ages who have tried to formulate
an explanation both of why humans were supposedly in desperate need of that sort of
sacrifice and how the death of God (or his son depending on one‘s Christology) somehow
fulfills that need, I, for one, am unable to make much sense of it.7 The Christian
philosopher, Eleonore Stump, shares this sentiment when she writes: ―What is in fact
valuable about the atonement? Although the answer to this question might seem
elementary, on reflection the question turns out to be remarkably difficult to deal with.‖8
But even if a clear understanding of the ethics and metaphysics of Christian atonement is
attainable, I think the Christian will have to admit that it does not come easily. To put it
in other words, the atonement is either inscrutable or at best hardly scrutable even after
much considerable intellectual effort. This should give the Christian reason to think that
the human competency to make sense of the necessary connections between God‘s
allowing—or even enduring—inscrutable sufferings and greater goods is further beyond
our grasp than we might otherwise expect. Perhaps that makes her trusting him in the face
of other inscrutable evils more reasonable than it otherwise would be. Perhaps there are
other core doctrines in her or other religious systems that could have the same effect.

7

For a brief overview of some major theories of the atonement and their criticisms, see Section 4 of
Michael Murray, ―Philosophy and Christian Theology,‖ in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall
2012 edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta. URL =
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2012/entries/christiantheology-philosophy/>.
Analytic philosophers are increasingly taking a look at this issue. There are a number of pertinent
essays in Michael Rea, ed., Oxford Readings in Philosophical Theology vol. 1, (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2009).
8
Eleonore Stump, ―The Nature of the Atonement,‖ with a Response from E. J. Coffman, in Reason,
Metaphysics, and Mind: New Essays on the Philosophy of Alvin Plantinga, eds. Kelly James Clark and
Micheal Rea (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012): 128.
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But what is the unfriendly atheist to think about such appeals to religious
doctrine? He might well argue that we ought to keep separate any coherentist appraisals
of the religious truster‘s epistemic situation—i.e., appraisals that take into account such
considerations as how well her theological beliefs conform with her trust—from our more
―objective‖ evidentialist appraisals—i.e., considerations that care more about whether she
has good evidence for believing any of that stuff. I do not wish to enter into that broader
epistemological debate here, but it is at least worth noting that the unfriendly atheist
commits himself to maintaining that either (a) no religious trusters are justified in
believing those internally helpful doctrines in the first place or (b) their being justified in
believing those doctrines would be insufficient—even in conjunction with the
experiential evidence discussed earlier—to constitute sufficient evidence for their belief
in God‘s overall trustworthiness. There is already, though, at least one formidable
argument in religious epistemology against taking option (a) found in Alvin Plantinga‘s
work on the epistemology of Christian belief. Plantinga argues that one cannot claim that
the core doctrines of the Christian theist‘s worldview (e.g., universal atonement) are
unwarranted without first taking on the broader project of arguing that they are false.9.
The unfriendly atheist, then, unlike a friendly atheist such as Rowe, commits himself to
thinking Plantinga‘s argument fails. That should seem rather hasty given that his
unfriendly atheism is supposed to be based on the existence of inscrutable evils and not
on his having formidable criticisms to challenging arguments in religious epistemology.
Option (b) would clearly seem too hasty. Philosophers have not yet even had such

9

Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief, especially Chapters 5 and 6.
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conversations as whether someone who is by hypothesis justified in accepting the
Christian doctrine of universal atonement, for example, would have sufficient reason to
trust God to prevent gratuitous evils. I do not think a question like this has an obvious
answer either way, so it would be presumptuous for the unfriendly atheist to decide the
issue on the front end.

Epistemic Partiality in Religious Trust: Some Preliminaries10
None of this entails, of course, that any religious trusters really do have sufficient
evidence for their trust in God. All I have claimed thus far is that it is too hasty to say that
none of them do. Notice, though, that even if I am wrong about that, unfriendly atheism
may be too hasty for another reason. It does not follow from the supposition that no
theists have sufficient evidence for trusting God to prevent gratuitous evils that no theists
are justified in trusting him. That is, the religious truster can still be justified in her trust
so long as it is a live option that she can be epistemically justified in going beyond her
evidence in engaging in epistemic partialism towards God. Indeed, I think it obvious that
many religious trusters have deep affections for God and are thus likely to extend to him
similar forms of epistemic partialism as good friends and lovers tend to extend to each
other (see Chapter 4). So, I will now look to position my inquiry into the epistemology of
10

After thinking about the issues in the next couple of sections for some time, I stumbled upon an old C. S.
Lewis essay in which he does in his own way essentially what I set out to do here, namely draw a
connection between the epistemic partiality we show in human-human relationships to the believer‘s
doxastic practices towards God. See C. S. Lewis, ―On Obstinacy in Belief,‖ in The World’s Last Night and
Other Essays by C. S. Lewis, (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1960): 13-30. [The essay first
appeared in The Sewannee Review, 63, no. 4 (1955): 525-38.] Though I do not interact explicitly with
Lewis in what follows, I have no doubt that his discussion has influenced my own.
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religious trust within the context of that broader debate over epistemic partiality in close
relationships.

The Reality of Religious Affections
It is easy to understand why many people throughout history have feared a deity
of one kind or another but not as easy for all observers to understand why so many people
seem to genuinely love God. I have heard of some critics who speculate that all
contemporary religious love and devotion is really just fear in disguise. I think such
critics are clearly mistaken. I have known many people of whom I am quite confident in
saying that they truly love God and that their love for him takes precedence over any
relevant fear they might otherwise have. They take themselves to be devoted to God as
grateful and loving servants, children, or friends—or some combination thereof. It
actually makes a good deal of sense that many religious people grow to love God given
the sort of experiences they report having had of him and the sorts of things they have
come to believe about him. They find in God a faithful companion and great source of
peace and hope. And crucially they find in him a person who is concerned for their wellbeing as manifested to them by occasions of apparent divine assistance. And in the
Christian tradition, believers even take themselves to find in God a person who was
willing to undergo immense torture out of his love for the world. That sort of being is not
very hard to love, at least not in moments when the mind is filled with such thoughts of
him. But what about when other thoughts come along, particularly thoughts about the
world‘s many inscrutable evils? What is a person who is disposed to love God supposed
to think of him then?
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Gale’s Objection to Loving God in the Face of Inscrutable Evils
In the midst of his attacks on skeptical theism, Richard Gale offers the following
severe remarks about trying to love a person whose reasons for allowing suffering remain
inscrutable.

Some amount of inscrutability is not only allowable but even desirable in love and
friendship relationships. What would love be if there weren‘t a core of mystery to
the beloved? But how mysterious, how totally other, can the beloved be?...While
we need not understand all of the beloved‘s moral reasons for her behavior, it
must be the case that, for the most part, we do in respect to behavior which vitally
affects ourselves...We can hardly love someone who intentionally hurts us and
keeps his reasons a secret unless for the most part we know his reasons for
affecting us as he does and moreover know that they are benevolent.‖11

What should we think of Gale‘s remarks? First, we need not get hung up on his
implicit construal of God‘s allowing evils as God‘s ―intentionally hurting us.‖ I take it
Gale would also say that we can ―hardly love someone‖ who simply fails to intervene on
our behalf unless he (for the most part) explain his reasons for doing so. But why think a
person could hardly love under those circumstances? After all, it must be acknowledged
that many religious believers genuinely do love God (quite a bit, actually) despite their
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Richard Gale, ―Evil as Evidence Against God,‖ in Debating Christian Theism, ed. J. P. Moreland and
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recognition of the world‘s inscrutable evils. Thus Gale‘s claim could be quickly
dismissed if it is to be understood merely as a claim about human psychological abilities.
I think Gale‘s point is best understood instead, though, as an evaluative claim
concerning the appropriateness of loving someone under such circumstances. I take it he
thinks that one ought not (in some sense) ever love a person who allows her to suffer
without clearly communicating at least most of his reasons. But why think this has to be
true? Why simply rule out the possibility of a person being within her moral and
epistemic rights in loving a person who allows her to suffer without explaining his
reasons? It seems like there could be special cases worth addressing before taking this
categorical view on the rationality of love. Whereas Gale requires not only that the
beloved reveal (at least most of) his reasons for allowing suffering but also that the lover
be able to appreciate the soundness of those reasons, it seems to me that neither of these
is required for justifiably remaining in a love relationship. The key ingredient, on my
view, is that the lover be justified in thinking her beloved has sound reasons, and it seems
quite plausible to me that there can be special cases in which one could be justified in
having that conviction about the beloved even if one is unable to appreciate the beloved‘s
reasons for acting as he does and even without having heard tell of those reasons.
To put it concisely, if genuine love already exists, that love ought to be able to
withstand a good bit of inscrutability. Hence I think it too quick for Gale to claim that
religious trusters cannot be justified in loving God. Their love for him is not dependent
on their being able to appreciate the nature of his justifying reasons for allowing suffering
but on their conviction that he has them. Thus we should not quickly dismiss their love
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for God as irrational without having explored the rationality of their religious trust which
sustains their conviction that he has his reasons.

Owning Up to Religious Epistemic Partialism
This is especially so when we consider the fact that there is room to think a fair
amount of epistemic partiality is called for in similar situations. We have already seen
that lovers and friends tend to handle counterevidence against their loved ones differently
than impartial observers. I argued in Chapter 4 that not only does this practice seem to be
morally appropriate in some cases, it is at least plausible to think that this practice can be
epistemically justifiable as well. Hence I think theists should not fear admitting at this
point that when it comes to evaluating the counterevidence against God‘s character
afforded by inscrutable suffering, they are probably not very good at being impartial
observers. Instead, many approach this counterevidence as lovers and friends of God
who, despite being stunned at the way in which our world often does not fit easily with
their sense of God‘s character and confused as to why he does not make more of his
purposes clear to us, are not yet prepared to turn their backs on him without a struggle.
Many theists would attest that as they grapple with this tension, they often feel an
undercurrent of trust running through them, a deep-seated disposition to think that there
must be a justifying explanation for all the evil we see around us as well as justifying
reason for why God does not make his rationale clearer to us. Like scientists trying to
salvage their pet theory, they search for hypotheses to explain this counterevidence. They
might spend some time first trying to come up with plausible explanations on their own
as to why God would be justified in allowing various inscrutable evils. When these fail,
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they might even try to come up with plausible explanations as to why God would be
justified in not sharing his reasons with us. And when they cannot find hypotheses along
these lines that conform well enough to their overall body of evidence, they find
themselves at a significant crossroads: Do they give up on their conviction that God is
good and trustworthy, or do they give in to the inner call they feel to trust God despite
their lack of explanations and thereby formulate the ultimate fallback hypothesis that can
accommodate the troublesome data—i.e., the hypothesis that humans are significantly
more incompetent about such matters than we would otherwise have reason to suspect?
The fact that many theists take this latter option might seem to impartial observers as
evidence of irrational desperation. Impartial observers should note, though, that from the
theist‘s point of view, taking the first option would not just be giving up on a preferred
theory (as in the scientific analogue), it would be betraying a loved one, and betrayal is
never to be taken lightly. Furthermore, as my discussion in Chapter 4 suggests, there is
reason to think that resisting one‘s tendency towards epistemic partiality is not always the
high road to take even from the point of view of epistemology.
I am aware that many theists would not be comfortable describing their response
to inscrutable suffering in the language of epistemic partiality. Some will want to see
their acceptance of the ―fallback hypothesis‖ of incompetence as firmly grounded in the
evidence they have obtained of God‘s trustworthiness. I am confident, though, that other
theists would recognize that they are probably not relying solely on their evidence when
accepting the hypothesis of incompetence. I expect that upon closer inspection, many
would admit that they are probably just doing what good friends and loved ones tend to
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do; they are giving their loved one—God in this case—the benefit of the doubt. After all,
they have been living in what seemed to them to be the reality of a mutual love
relationship between themselves and God. They now feel his call to trust him with the
proper managing of the world‘s suffering. And they feel in themselves a tendency to do
just that at the risk of being of naïve and trusting too much. Their fear of trusting too
much though is checked by their fear of trusting too little, for, as we all know from our
loving human relationships, it is a sad state of affairs when a lover turns his back on his
beloved too soon. So these religious trusters ―hang in there‖ so to speak—so long as they
are able.

Prospects for a Justifiable Epistemic Partiality towards God
Should theists resist this doxastic bias? Well, that really depends on how we
answer the question of the last chapter. When is epistemic partiality justifiable, and when
is it not? This is why I think theistic philosophers have a horse in the broader epistemic
partiality race. And since, as I argued in the last chapter, the status of epistemic partiality
is very much a live debate in philosophy, I do not see any reason as of yet for theistic
philosophers to be ashamed of exploring this approach to the problem of inscrutable
evils. In fact, I believe an honest investigation into the epistemic value of our partial
trusting practices more generally might well have significant payoffs for religious
trusters. I will now attempt to substantiate this claim by pointing out how well the
speculative proposals discussed in the last chapter for defending the epistemic partiality
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of friendship would seem to apply to the religious truster‘s epistemic partiality towards
God in the face of inscrutable evils.

Brown’s Subjective Bayesian Approach
Recall Curtis Brown‘s argument that epistemic partiality between lovers and
friends can be viewed as epistemically appropriate if we accept the subjective Bayesian's
view on the legitimacy of priors.12 On his account, it is within one‘s epistemic rights to
bring one‘s affective biases into assigning a high initial probability to a view. It is also
within one‘s epistemic rights to formulate further hypotheses in an attempt to explain
away data that threatens that view and to seek hard after new data that can lend credence
to those favorable accommodating hypotheses at least until further investigation yield
evidence to disconfirm these efforts. This can explain in the end why one person is
justified in accepting a different conclusion than another person given their agreement
about the bearing of certain counterevidence.
Brown‘s approach would seem to accord quite well with the religious trust
approach to the problem of inscrutable suffering. The truster‘s prior experience with God
and her deep affections for him lead her to assign a very high probability to the view that
he is immensely trustworthy. Her view is then frequently threatened by the
counterevidence of inscrutable suffering. So, she puts her mind to the task of formulating
favorable hypotheses to accommodate the incoming data, which as I suggested
previously, ultimately results in the formation of the hypothesis that we are significantly
incompetent in the domain of God-justifying reasons for allowing suffering. This, as
12
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Brown would point out, is akin to what a scientist might do in an attempt to salvage a pet
theory. And like the scientist, the religious truster does not have to stop with the mere
formulation of an accommodating hypothesis. She can also be justified (on Brown‘s view
at least) in searching for data that supports this new hypothesis. This frees the religious
truster to turn her attention to looking for evidence that confirms her hypothesis of
incompetence.13
There are epistemic dangers here of course. Any sense of confirmation she finds
for her fallback hypothesis may be a sign of neurosis—i.e., ―seeing‖ evidence for an
unlikely hypothesis that is not really there out of a deep-seated need to save her theory.
Conspiracy theorists are well known for this. The threat of falling into the epistemic trap
of the conspiracy theorist, though, is not unique to religious trusters; it is a threat to
anyone who has a deep commitment to any view and/or person who is presented with
challenging counterevidence. Epistemic partialism is always epistemically risky. But as
my discussion in Chapter 4 points out, impartialism has its epistemic risks as well.

13

It is worth pointing out that it is not a necessary consequence of this process that one‘s degree of
confidence in God‘s trustworthiness would come out lower at the end of the process than it was at the
beginning. This is so even if the truster acknowledges, as I think she should, that the counterevidence of
inscrutable suffering does in itself lower the probability that God is trustworthy. This is because it might
well turn out that her willingness to face this threatening evidence will lead the truster to formulate an
accommodating hypothesis and subsequently discover powerful confirming evidence of that hypothesis.
For example, perhaps God might afford her some sort of inner confirmation of her hypothesis of
incompetence. Thus it is conceivable that such an experience could in the end afford her new confirming
evidence of God‘s trustworthiness that she did not have before.

232

Stroud’s Social Epistemology Approach
Consider next the prospects for the epistemic partiality of religious trust in light of
Stroud‘s sociological approach to epistemic partiality.14 Recall that Stroud suggests that
epistemic partiality could be viewed as epistemically justifiable if we take a broader
societal perspective on doxastic practices. From this societal perspective, it is easy to see
that our collective truth-seeking enterprises often benefit when a subset of individuals are
willing to run with hypotheses that are not exactly proportioned to their evidence.
Sometimes those folks will uncover new important data as a result that the rest of us
would have otherwise missed. Thus from this vantage point, there is a good bit of
epistemic value in their sticking to these hypotheses. This is not to say that just anyone
who is committed to a hypothesis is playing an important epistemic social role, however,
so we must not jump to the defense of all committed religious doxastic practices. Some
folks are dogmatic and unquestioning in sticking to their hypotheses and have little to
offer the collective epistemic enterprise, particularly when they inculcate other members
with their closed-minded perspectives. But having members who earnestly pursue
opposing hypotheses whilst maintaining a reasonable degree of open-mindedness is, I
think, very important from the societal epistemic point of view.
Here again I think we can see fruitful territory for theistic philosophers to explore.
If they can expand upon Stroud‘s proposal and defend it as a plausible approach to the
problem of epistemic partiality more generally, then they can present the unfriendly
atheist with a new challenge. It seems likely, after all, that there is a good bit of Stroud‘s
14
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society-level epistemic value in having members of our society who are able to stick with
the ―God-hypothesis‖ in the face of inscrutable evils when others are unable to,
particularly those who do so in a reasonably open-minded way. Surely, there will be
something worthwhile we can learn from these folks whether from their failures or their
successes. And in the case of religious trusters, we must admit that they give us the
potential—no matter how unlikely it might seem to outsiders—to uncover some
extremely worthwhile data. If, for example, they should somehow uncover new evidence
for thinking there exists a trustworthy God after all, this would be vital information for all
of us to grapple with.
On the other hand, perhaps a deeper exploration into Stroud‘s social epistemology
approach will yield the conclusion that we cannot deem an individual‘s partial doxastic
practices as epistemically justifiable for the individual in any relevant sense. Perhaps, that
is, even if we agree that the religious truster‘s doxastic practice can play an important
society-wide epistemic function, this does not render her practice epistemically justifiable
for her to engage in. Indeed, I expect many people would want to distinguish between
epistemic justification in the social sense and epistemic justification in the individual
sense, and we must acknowledge that it is only the latter with which the unfriendly atheist
is chiefly concerned when he asserts that no one is justified in trusting God to prevent
gratuitous evils. At the very least, though, taking Stroud‘s proposal seriously should give
pause to the sort of unfriendly atheist who would like to talk religious trusters out of their
trusting enterprise. (I am thinking here of the so-called ―new atheists.‖) For since it looks
like society stands to benefit epistemically from the epistemic partiality displayed by
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religious trusters (at least the reasonably open-minded ones), it seems plausible to think
one would be epistemically unjustified from this societal perspective in actively seeking
to put an end to their practice.

The “Important Truths” Approach
Finally, consider how the epistemic partiality of religious trust might be defended
from the vantage point of my ―important truths‖ proposal from the end of Chapter 4.
There I suggested that there can be significant epistemic value in friends engaging in
supra-evidential practices by virtue of the way in which those practices make possible
their pursuit of certain important truths. I do not think it an overstatement to say that if
there is a supremely powerful God whom we can depend on to have a brilliant plan in
which our plight is significant and meaningful, and who loves each of us more than any
human can, that would be among the world‘s most wonderful truths. Consider, then, the
religious truster as she finds herself drawn to ―gutting it out‖—i.e.., in sticking with her
God by giving him the benefit of the doubt in the face of the powerful counterevidence
afforded by inscrutable evils. For her it is precisely this doxastic move that makes
possible her continued (even if strained) intimacy with God; if she did not believe he had
a higher purpose at stake in his way of managing worldly affairs, she would not be able to
carry on with him. And if the relationship turns to be what she hopes it is, namely a
mutually loving relationship with a genuinely trustworthy God, then continuing in that
relationship makes possible her coming to perceive some of the most important truths the
universe has to offer her.
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Now, she knows on the front end of course that this could all turn out to be a ruse
and that instead of obtaining some of the world‘s most important truths, she may be led to
accept a series of unfortunate delusions. And she even knows that giving herself over to
her trusting tendencies may—though not necessarily so—prevent her from ever seeing
those delusions for what they really are. So, does she take the epistemic risk that love
compels her to take? Or, does she turn her back on God, seek to put an end to her
epistemic bias, and risk missing out on the vital truths she might possibly learn if she
sticks with him?
I recognize that there is an added element of significant epistemic risk in this case
relative to the thought experiment I used to motivate the plausibility of my ―important
truths‖ proposal in Chapter 4. Having false beliefs about a sports team is not the same as
having false beliefs about the ultimate nature of the universe. Just as some truths are more
epistemically valuable than others, we must admit that some falsehoods are more
epistemically disvaluable than others. Nevertheless, I think a case can be made for
thinking the unfriendly atheist would be too hasty to assert that any religious truster who
stands on the precipice of possibly discovering some of the world‘s most wonderful
truths is epistemically unjustified (solely on the grounds of Rowe‘s argument) in
engaging in the very epistemic practice that makes her continued pursuit of those truths
possible. Religious trusters would do well, I think, to embrace the fact that their trust in
God commits them to a grand vision of the universe—one in which the turmoil of
humanity is (somehow) not allowed in vain and the trustworthy creator can even be
known in personal experience. A serious investigation into the epistemic value of sticking
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with such a hypothesis given the potential epistemic consequences at stake, therefore,
might well pay dividends for them in a debate over unfriendly atheism.

Conclusion on Epistemic Partiality in Religious Trust
In sum, there are already some promising avenues for philosophers of religion to
explore in defending the epistemic partiality inherent in many actual religious trustings. I
conclude that this should give additional pause to the unfriendly atheist who is adamant
that no one is justified in trusting God in the face of inscrutable suffering. This should
also give theists an incentive to spend less of their collective energy trying to defend
skeptical theism against its numerous objections and focus more on the epistemology of
the more natural theistic response to the problem of inscrutable suffering—a doxastic
practice of committed and therefore likely not impartial trusting in God.
As an added incentive for this shift of focus, I will now show how I think the
religious trust approach (whether based on an appeal to evidence, epistemic partiality, or
both) is able to avoid the most pressing objections raised against skeptical theism in the
philosophic literature. I take it that any approach to the problem of inscrutable suffering
which is both philosophically tenable and able to skirt around the major problems facing
the current in vogue approach is worth talking about.
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The Religious Trust Approach and Bleeding Skepticism
At the end of Chapter 1, I briefly surveyed some of the prominent objections
raised against skeptical theism in the current philosophical literature. The bulk of these
objections, which I labeled ―bleeding skepticism‖ objections, claim that skeptical theism
commits its proponents to certain obviously pernicious forms of skepticism beyond the
skepticism they call for concerning our ability to detect God-justifying reasons for
allowing suffering. One major advantage of the religious trust approach over the skeptical
theist approach is its apparent ability to steer clear of all these bleeding skepticism
worries.
This is ―apparent,‖ though, only after inspection, as it should actually come as a
bit of a surprise given that the hypothesis of incompetence that the religious truster is
driven to accept constitutes an even stronger skepticism of our ability to grasp God‘s
justifying-reasons for allowing evils than does skeptical theism. Recall that the skeptical
theist‘s defensive strategy requires ―only‖ what I called in Chapter 2 ―mere skepticism‖
of the relevant competency. This is the view (roughly) that it is at least as likely that there
are justifying reasons beyond our grasp for all the world‘s inscrutable evils as it is that
there are not. I pointed out that theists, however, are committed to the non-existence of
gratuitous evils and hence require that it be more likely than not that there are such
reasons. The religious trust approach attempts to locate grounds for this highly
―dismissive‖ view of the relevant human competency in the theist‘s grounds (evidential
and/or partial) for trusting God. Hence it would be reasonable to expect that if the mere
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skepticism called for by skeptical theists bleeds perniciously, then the stronger skepticism
inherent in the religious trust approach would absolutely hemorrhage.
Interestingly, however, I think the opposite is true. The reason has to do with the
drastically different grounds on which the skeptical theist and the religious truster base
their respective skepticisms. The skeptical theist accepts as a philosophical premise that
we have significant cognitive limitations that prevent us from making reasonable
judgments about whether inscrutable evils are gratuitous. He is then faced with the
critic‘s challenge of explaining how taking such a negative view of our competency in the
relevant domain can be motivated by purely philosophical considerations and why these
considerations would not in turn entail deeper skepticisms. The religious truster,
however, arrives at her hypothesis of incompetence in the relevant domain only by way
of her prior trust in God. In other words, apart from her grounds for trusting God, she
claims to see no reason to suspect significant human competence in the domain of Godjustifying reasons for allowing suffering. It is only because her trust compels her to
accept this hypothesis that she holds it. And this makes a huge difference, I think, in the
skeptical implications of her view, for her skepticism will bleed only as far as the trust on
which her skepticism cuts.
Consider first how the religious trust approach would handle the most prominent
bleeding skepticism objection lodged against skeptical theism, namely that skepticism of
our ability to detect God-justifying reasons for allowing suffering entails pernicious
moral skepticism. If, says the objection, one cannot form reasonable beliefs about
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whether an omnipotent, omniscient being would need to allow evils for the attainment of
greater good, then one cannot reasonably decide when one ought to prevent evils onself.
Skeptical theists have recently attempted a flurry of responses to this objection,15
but none of them are as clean and simple as the one the religious truster can provide. The
religious truster will say that she is not skeptical about what to do in these moral
situations, because even though her trust in God compels her to view humans as
incompetent in one particular domain—i.e.,. the domain of God‘s reasons for allowing
suffering—that very same trust assures her that she is plenty competent in the domain of
her moral obligations in response to suffering. After all, in her mind, this God that she
trusts so much has made it very clear what she ought to do in such situations. Indeed,
many theists experience God‘s clear call to alleviate suffering in both their consciences
and their scriptures. While it is of course natural for a theist to wonder from time to time
how it is that God could have such different obligations in response to creaturely
suffering than she has, her trust in him ultimately compels her to view this discrepancy
itself as some sort of cosmic matter that must be beyond our comprehension. Her trust in
God thus compels her to think both that (a) humans are incompetent about the justifying
reasons as to why God allows various sufferings and (b) she has every reason to alleviate
them herself.
Another way to put this point is to say that in the religious trust approach, one‘s
trust in God serves as a litmus test for which human competencies one is to be skeptical
of. If trusting God dictates that one take oneself to be significantly incompetent about
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God‘s moral obligations in response to suffering, then that is what a committed truster
will do. And if, contrary to fact, trusting God would dictate that one ought to take oneself
to be significantly incompetent about one’s own moral obligations in response to
suffering, then the religious truster would be challenged to do that as well. Fortunately,
though, many religious trusters will recognize that their trust in God pushes them in the
opposite direction on that point.
The religious truster can make a similar move in response to Weilenberg‘s
provocative argument that skeptical theism entails that the theist cannot trust divine
revelation.16 Recall Weilenberg maintains that the skeptical theist must admit that, for all
he knows, there would be a necessary connection between God‘s deceiving him in any
putative revelation of truth and the attainment of some greater good. The religious truster,
however, would be able to handle this worry differently from the skeptical theist. Unlike
the skeptical theist, the only reason she has to suspect incompetence in the domain of
God-justifying reasons for allowing inscrutable evils is that she trusts God. But it is hard
to see how she could simultaneously trust God in such a grandiose way and yet fail to
take him at his word on other matters. Put simply, either she trusts him deeply, or she
does not. If she trusts him, she will take him at his word and will also believe that he has
good reasons for allowing suffering. Giving up either of these would be a failure to trust.
This serves to underline just how fundamental a role religious trust plays in the noetic
structure of the sort of theist I have in mind.

16
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Consider next how the religious truster can make a similar move in response to
Bruce Russell‘s objection that skeptical theists are committed to global skepticism about
the external world.17 Russell argues that as far as the skeptical theist can say, there might
well be a necessary connection between God‘s putting him in a globally deceptive
skeptical scenario and the attainment of some greater good. But again, the religious
truster will simply assert that she is skeptical of her ability to ascertain God‘s justifying
reasons for allowing suffering only because she trusts God and that this very same trust
compels her to think she inhabits a very real universe. I suppose it should be conceivable
to her that God might one day tell her that she is actually in a globally deceptive world in
which case she would then have to decide whether to go on trusting him and hence
distrusting her own senses. But it is not as if this is a choice the religious truster actually
has to make.

The Religious Trust Approach and Falsifiability
Finally, recall the powerful objection against skeptical theism from William Rowe
and Ian Wilks that is distinct from all these bleeding skepticism objections.18 They point
out that skeptical theism (at least in its current formulations) renders theism impervious
to falsification in a way that seems out of the bounds of rationality. As Rowe puts it,
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Since we don‘t know [according to the skeptical theist] that the goods we know of
are representative of the goods there are, we can‘t know that it is likely that there
are no goods that justify God in permitting human and animal life on earth to be
nothing more than a series of agonizing moments from birth to death. But such a
view is unreasonable, if not absurd.19

I do not know of any place in the literature in which skeptical theists have
responded to this challenge. Perhaps this only validates Wilks‘ suspicion that a skeptical
theism that is strong enough to prevent inscrutable suffering in the actual world from
counting against the existence of God yet weak enough to allow some conceivable
sufferings to count against his existence would be an ―impossibly nuanced‖ view.20 Or
perhaps it is because skeptical theists have had their hands full with trying to head off all
those bleeding skepticism worries. Either way, the religious trust approach provides a
helpful alternative to consider given, as I will now show, that it can avoid this pressing
worry.
The religious trust approach in no way renders belief in God impervious to
disconfirmation from suffering. It does not at all entail that humans in all conceivable
worlds would be justified in discounting the weight of inscrutable evils against theism.
Rather it claims only that in those worlds in which it is justifiable to love and trust God,
one can have a defeater for the counterevidence of inscrutable suffering. Obviously, a
person would not be justified in trusting God in the heinous sort of world Rowe mentions
19
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and Yandell describes in detail (see Ch. 1, p. 66) in which there is nothing but immense
suffering all around. God has done nothing in that world to garner one‘s love and trust;
hence it would clearly be unreasonable to take the religious trust approach to the problem
of inscrutable suffering in that world. But the religious truster does not take herself to
inhabit that world. Rather, she takes herself to inhabit a world in which her belief in
God‘s loving and ultimately trustworthy nature is cultivated in her via a deeply lived
experiential process. Hence, so long as it is remains an open question whether the theist
can be justified in taking herself to occupy such a world, the religious trust approach
remains a viable alternative to skeptical theism. It is a great advantage of the religious
trust approach that it does not render the rationality of theistic belief impervious to the
counterevidence of inscrutable evils. But even better, it provides a promising way to
suggest that faithfully persisting in theistic belief in the actual world can be rational all
the same.

Conclusion
In this dissertation, I have tried to motivate and initiate the religious trust
approach to defending the rationality of theism in the face of inscrutable evils. This
approach diverges sharply from skeptical theism, a view I have become less and less
enamored with over the years. Whereas I once agreed with skeptical theists that
proponents of Rowe‘s evidential argument were puffing themselves up in assuming they
are too smart for there to be explanations of suffering that lie beyond their
comprehension, further reflection has led me to think that the presumption of competence
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needed to ground their belief in the existence of gratuitous evils is actually quite
reasonable. Fortunately for theists, the religious truster, unlike the skeptical theist, is able
to say with sincerity that it makes a great deal of sense for a person to base his atheism on
the many terrible evils of our world given that so many of them defy our best attempts at
explanation. The religious trust approach is intended only to serve as a way of defending
the theist’s rejection of the premise that gratuitous evils exist and not to attack the
atheist‘s acceptance of it. Just as it can be rational for impartial observers and close
friends to rationally disagree over whether a given person is trustworthy in some respect,
I think it plausible that atheists and devoutly religious persons could rationally disagree
over whether the existence of inscrutable evils renders God untrustworthy.
So while there is much about the epistemology of religious trust I have left
unexplored in this dissertation, I hope to have at the very least achieved enough here to
enable proponents of Rowe‘s argument and theists to better respect each other‘s point of
view. Proponents of Rowe‘s argument are simply acknowledging how unlikely it would
seem to think that humans would be so drastically incompetent about an omnipotent,
omniscient being‘s moral obligations with respect to creaturely suffering. And theists, in
turn, are engaging in a doxastic practice towards God that we often deem laudable in
relationships more generally; they are continuing to trust someone they love in spite of
counterevidence. Thus it would behoove both sides, I think, to refrain from accusing the
other of being unreasonable—at least until further investigation could substantiate the
accusation.
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